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ABSTRACT
IDENTITY AND THE LIMITS OF POSSIBILITY
SEPTEMBER, 2011
SAM COWLING
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
Possibilities divide into two kinds. Non-qualitative possibilities are distinguished
by their connection to specific individuals. For example, the possibility that Napoleon
is a novelist is non-qualitative, since it is a possibility for a specific individual,
Napoleon. In contrast, the possibility that someone—anyone at all—is a novelist
is a qualitative possibility, since it does not depend upon any specific individual.
Haecceitism is a thesis about the relation between qualitative and non-qualitative
possibilities. In one guise, it holds that some maximal possibilities—total ways the
world could be—differ non-qualitatively without differing qualitatively. It would, for
example, be only a haecceitistic difference that distinguishes actuality from a maxi-
mal possibility where Napoleon and Nefertiti swap all of their qualitative properties
and relations. According to this alternative possibility, things are the very same qual-
itatively, but which individuals occupy which qualitative roles differs: Nefertiti would
be a stout conqueror, while Napoleon would be a beautiful consort.
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This dissertation is an examination of the nature of haecceitism, the arguments
in its favor, and the consequences that follow from it. In Chapter One, I distinguish
various conceptions of haecceitism and related theses concerning maximal possibili-
ties, possible worlds, the identity of indiscernibles, and non-qualitative properties. In
Chapter Two, I develop and defend conceivability arguments for haecceitism in the
face of various anti-haecceitist challenges. In Chapter Three, I consider the relation
between haecceitism and the Humean approach to plenitude, which aims to charac-
terize the space of possible worlds in terms of combinatorial principles. In Chap-
ter Four, I examine the distinction between qualitative properties like redness and
non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and argue in favor of fundamental non-
qualitative properties. In Chapter Five, I present a novel version of non-qualitative
counterpart theory, which employs bare particulars to reconcile modal realism and
haecceitism. In Chapter Six, I clarify and defend quidditism, the property-theoretic
analogue of haecceitism. I conclude in Chapter Seven by defending the modal view
of essence.
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CHAPTER 1
HAECCEITISMS
1.1 Preliminaries and Possibilities
In 1973, Bruce Springsteen released his first album, Greetings from Asbury Park,
N.J. That same year, Thomas Pynchon published his third novel, Gravity’s Rainbow.
While these events actually took place, they might not have. Springsteen could have
released a jazz album; Pynchon could have written a children’s book. In either case,
the world and its inhabitants would have been a different way than they actually are.
But, as things turned out, these alternative possibilities were left unactualized.
Since these alternative possibilities are possibilities for Springsteen and Pynchon,
they are non-qualitative possibilities. Other possibilities, like the possibility that
something red exists, are not possibilities for any specific individual. Instead, they
are qualitative possibilities. They could obtain regardless of whether any specific
individual existed, since they depend exclusively on how the world is qualitatively.
For example, the possibility that something red exists would obtain whether the world
contained only a single rusty pick-up truck or a lone crimson berry.
At the actual world, a vast number of possibilities, both qualitative and non-
qualitative, obtain: human beings exist, trees sprout leaves, manned spaceflight oc-
curs, and Thomas Pynchon writes novels. While each of these possibilities could have
failed to obtain, they are all actualized. Among these many actualized possibilities
is one unique maximal possibility. This maximal possibility includes each and every
actualized possibility and obtains exclusively at the actual world.
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An analysis of possibility, maximal and otherwise, is a central pursuit in the
metaphysics of modality. But it is not the only pursuit. In addition, we aim at
knowledge about what is and is not possible. In this chapter, I will take up an issue
of particular relevance to this latter pursuit. For this reason, I will not presuppose
a particular analysis of possibilities. So, while it is natural to identify possibilities
with propositions or states of affairs, I will assume only that the notions of possibility,
maximal possibility, and inclusion are sufficiently well understood.1 And, with these
notions available, we can inquire into the limits of possibility within a largely neutral
framework. Note, also, that we are presently concerned with possibilities rather than
possible worlds. As will become clear, there is some reason to think they are one and
the same, but, for the moment, it will be helpful to leave this question open.
Unsurprisingly, philosophers disagree over the limits of individual possibility. Es-
sentialists believe there are certain properties or relations that constrain non-qualitative
possibilities.2 For example, they hold that properties like being human or being a
mammal are essential to Springsteen and Pynchon, so it is impossible for these indi-
viduals to exist without instantiating these properties. In contrast, anti-essentialists
accept a broader range of non-qualitative possibilities. They believe it is possible
for Springsteen or Pynchon to exist without instantiating these allegedly essential
1For discussion, see Adams (1981). If one identifies possibilities with propositions and maximal
possibilities with conjunctions of possibilities, inclusion can be helpfully understood as entailment.
2Essentialism admits of many varieties. Among its advocates are Kripke (1980), Plantinga (1974),
Salmon (1986), Ellis (2001) and Wiggins (2001).
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properties.3 So, according to anti-essentialists, there are no limits on the range of
individual possibilities.4
Haecceitism, like essentialism and anti-essentialism, is a thesis about the limits of
possibility. It holds that maximal possibilities can differ solely in terms of the indi-
viduals they are possibilities for. Unfortunately, many doctrines have been labelled
as “haecceitism”. And, while most of these doctrines hold that some possibilities or
possible worlds differ solely in terms of the identity of the individuals they include,
these doctrines differ in both subtle and substantive ways. So, prior to taking up
haecceitism’s relation to the limits of possibility, our first challenge is to get clear
about what haecceitism is, and what it is not.
To this end, we must distinguish two theses that philosophers typically intend
by “haecceitism”.5 One thesis concerns only possibilities; the other concerns both
possible worlds and possibilities. I examine these varieties of haecceitism in Sections
Two and Three. After clarifying their differences, I spend the remainder of this chap-
ter getting straight on their finer points as well as their relation to doctrines often
conflated with haecceitism. So, in subsequent sections, I clarify how haecceitism re-
lates to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (Section Four), the existence
of haecceities (Section Five), transworld identity (Section Six), and singular proposi-
3Anti-essentialism is a minority opinion. Quine (1960) famously denounces essentialism, but re-
tains a disdain for modality that precludes his categorization as an anti-essentialist. And, although
he is not an anti-essentialist, Chisholm (1967) offers a notable argument for anti-essentialism consid-
ered at length in a later chapter. Lewis (1986) attributes a form of anti-essentialism to Pavel Tichy.
For further discussion, see Nelson (2007).
4I assume here that anti-essentialists uphold the necessity of identity, but see Nelson (2007) for an
argument that anti-essentialists ought to deny that even the identity and distinctness of individuals
is necessary.
5My attempt to clarify the commitments of haecceitism builds upon earlier efforts in Lewis (1986)
and Skow (2008). Another usage of the term ‘haecceitism’ is found in the work of Nathan Salmon,
who views haecceitism as a thesis about whether we are able to stipulate which individuals are
being referred to in various counterfactual scenarios. See Salmon (1996) for further discussion of
what Salmon intends by ‘haecceitism’. Yet another usage of ‘haecceitism’ is found in Gallois (1998),
but I do not take up his account here.
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tions (Section Seven). I conclude by summarizing the relevant conclusions about the
varieties of haecceitism in Section Eight.
Before proceeding, let me note that my aim here is not to uncover “the one true
meaning” of the word ‘haecceitism’ or to suggest that philosophers have heretofore
been mistaken about what they have meant in employing the term. My aim is only to
provide a taxonomy of the views that cluster around haecceitism-talk. Philosophers
are well within their rights to define their terms as they see fit, but if their definitions
lead to conflations and confusions, philosophical work must be done. My aim here
is to do exactly this. And, in so doing, I will develop a taxonomy which makes
perspicuous the distinctions between a number of theses too often run together. I
do hold that this taxonomy, in addition to clarifying the distinctions and relations
between theses, also squares with the usage and intentions of most philosophers who
take up these issues. Accordingly, my project here is not to offer a revisionist account
of the philosophical terrain. In subsequent chapters, my efforts will, however, extend
beyond mapping this terrain and aim at finding the best place to settle within it.
1.2 Alethic Haecceitism
As I said above, there are two varieties of haecceitism. The first variety of haec-
ceitism, alethic haecceitism, is a thesis about what sorts of modal claims are true
and, therefore, what possibilities we should countenance. On this score, defenders of
alethic haecceitism are fortunate: common modal intuition appears to side in their
favour. Consider, for example, that you could have been one of two twins. You could
have been the eldest twin or you could have been the youngest twin. And, regardless
of which twin you were, events in the world could have unfolded in the very same
way.
Since our ordinary modal reasoning finds nothing incoherent in these modal claims,
there is strong prima facie reason to accept them as true. And, to this end, we must
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distinguish among the possibilities these claims describe. It seems, then, that there
is a maximal possibility according to which you are the eldest twin and another
maximal possibility according to which you are the youngest twin. Furthermore,
these possibilities differ only in terms of which of non-qualitative possibilities they
include—in this case, the possibilities for you and your twin.6
Alethic haecceitism is the doctrine that some maximal possibilities differ in just
this way. And, with this in mind, we can now define our first variety of haecceitism
as follows:
Alethic Haecceitism: Some maximal possibilities differ only with re-
spect to the non-qualitative possibilities they include.
Maximal possibilities can differ, not only with respect to non-qualitative possibili-
ties they include, but also with respect to the qualitative possibilities they include.
Qualitative possibilities obtain only if certain qualitative properties or relations are
instantiated. How exactly qualitative properties or relations are to be distinguished
from non-qualitative ones is a contentious issue.7 For present purposes, I will assume
that properties or relations like being spherical or being larger than any red object are
qualitative and, furthermore, that we have some intuitive grasp of the notion of a
qualitative property or relation. Accordingly, the possibility that something spherical
exists and the possibility that something blue is larger than something red are both
qualitative possibilities. And, with this mind, we can note that if some maximal pos-
sibility includes the qualitative possibility that a golden mountain exists and another
does not, these possibilities are separated by a qualitative difference. We can define
qualitative difference as follows:
6This examples owes to Lewis (1986: 231).
7I examine outstanding proposals for analyzing this distinction in Chapter Four and defend the
view that qualitative properties supervene upon natural properties as conceived of and defended in
Lewis (1983).
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Qualitative Difference: Possibilities differ qualitatively if and only if
they differ with respect to the qualitative possibilities they include.
Qualitatively indiscernible possibilities include the very same qualitative possibil-
ities. And, if alethic haecceitism is true, there are distinct but qualitatively indis-
cernible maximal possibilities. So, in cases like the twin example provided above,
alethic haecceitism accommodates the truth of the relevant modal claims by dis-
tinguishing qualitatively indiscernible maximal possibilities solely in terms of the
non-qualitative possibilities they include. Since alethic haecceitism entails that some
possibilities differ without differing qualitatively, we can say that such possibilities
are separated by a haecceitistic difference rather than a qualitative one. We can now
define haecceitistic difference as follows:
Haecceitistic Difference: Possibilities differ haecceitistically if and only
if they differ only with respect to the non-qualitative possibilities they
include.
According to alethic anti-haecceitism, there is a qualitative difference between any
distinct maximal possibilities. So, faced with the twin case above, the anti-haecceitist
must reject the possibilities we considered. Instead, he must claim that some quali-
tative difference holds between every maximal possibility according to which you are
the eldest twin and every maximal possibility according to which you are youngest
twin.
Having introduced alethic haecceitism, let us now consider another example often
employed to motivate it. Suppose that there is a plane along which our universe is
mirror-symmetric. According to this mirror-hypothesis, there are, on the other side
of the universe, mirror-duplicates of you, me, Springsteen, Pynchon, and everyone
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else on our familiar side.8 Given suitable technology, we might even observe this
mirror-reversed side of the universe, perhaps errantly believing it to be our reflection.
Now, further suppose that, later this week, the mirror-reversed side of the universe
opposite us will blink out of existence. Billions upon billions will perish instantly.
Mirror-duplicates of you, me, Springsteen and Pynchon will vanish. Fortunately, life
will continue here as we soldier on without our mirror-duplicates. Note, however, that
this non-qualitative possibility, according to which we survive, is nowhere near as dis-
tressing as the non-qualitative possibility according to which our half of the universe,
rather than that of our mirror-duplicates, ceases to exist. In this less appealing of
outcomes, our mirror-duplicates continue on, but we are doomed by this time next
week.9
There is a stark contrast between non-qualitative possibilities where you exist
next week and those where you perish. In considering the mirror-hypothesis, this
contrast must be understood in terms of a haecceitistic difference between possibili-
ties. Quite clearly, the individual who instantiates all of your qualitative properties
and relations—your qualitative profile—on this side of the universe is you, an indi-
vidual you care very deeply about. The individual on the other side of the universe
that shares your qualitative profile is not you. And, while you may feel no animosity
towards him or her, you two are distinct, so, if one of you is to be annihilated, you
should hope it is your mirror-duplicate.
In this case, the maximal possibility where you survive and the possibility where
you do not are separated only by a haecceististic difference. And, insofar as this case
and others like it involve genuinely distinct possibilities, a satisfactory conception
8I assume here that mirror-duplicates are indiscernible and set aside worries about handedness
or spatial orientation.
9This example follows those considered in Adams (1979), Lewis (1983b), and Lewis (1986).
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of modality must acknowledge haecceitistic differences in order to limn the space of
possibilities. Alethic haecceitism does exactly this.
An additional class of modal claims involving “swapping” or “replacements” also
require the truth of alethic haecceitism. Consider the claim that you could be quali-
tatively just as I am and I could be just as you are. According to this claim, there is
a possibility according to which you and I “swap” our respective qualitative profiles.
Similarly, there is a possibility according to which Springsteen has all the qualitative
properties that Pynchon does and Pynchon has all the qualitative properties that
Springsteen does. In swapping cases of this kind, there is no qualitative difference
between the possibilities under consideration. They differ only with respect to the
non-qualitative possibilities involved.
Other modal claims involve “replacement”. Consider the claim that the world
could be just as it is qualitatively but that you nevertheless fail to exist. Instead, an
individual distinct from all actual individuals but qualitatively indiscernible from you
“replaces” you, occupying your actual qualitative role. Since this possibility involves
an individual that does not actually exist, it is a case of replacement rather than
swapping. But, as like swapping cases, replacement cases can be accommodated only
if one accepts alethic haecceitism.
As I have explained it, alethic haecceitism is a thesis about what modal claims
are true. And, since modal claims typically describe possibilities, alethic haecceitism
is best understood as the claim that there are maximal possibilities that differ only in
terms of the non-qualitative possibilities they include. Evidence for accepting these
possibilities emerges from cases like those considered above or from our more common
modal intuitions.10 But, for reasons that will now be made clear, alethic haecceitism
10I consider the case for alethic haecceitism in Chapters Two and Six.
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is a thesis importantly distinct from the ontic variety of haecceitism, which is a claim
about the nature of possible worlds as well as possibilities.
1.3 Ontic Haecceitism
Our second variety of haecceitism, ontic haecceitism, is a thesis about the relation
between possible worlds and possibilities.11 According to ontic haecceitism, there are
possible worlds that represent all the same qualitative possibilities but represent dis-
tinct non-qualitative possibilities.12 For example, according to certain forms of ontic
haecceitism there is a possible world, distinct from the actual one, that represents
a maximal possibility according to which Springsteen is just as Pynchon actually is
and vice versa.
While the general character of ontic haecceitism is clear enough, a precise formu-
lation of ontic haecceitism is a trickier matter. Note, first, ontic haecceitism is not a
thesis about the “metaphysical character” of possible worlds. It is neutral with re-
spect to any number of views one might have about the ontological status of possible
worlds. So, for example, it is a thesis that both modal realists and actualist ersatzers
can endorse.
Second, it is not merely a thesis about the possibilities that worlds represent. In
this respect, it differs from alethic haecceitism. And, while it does require that there
be maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically, ontic haecceitism is a stronger
thesis. It concerns the things that represent these possibilities: possible worlds.
Third, it is not the thesis that there are qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds.
While ontic haecceitism is most plausibly developed in terms of qualitatively indis-
cernible worlds, this commitment is negotiable. One could accept that there are
11Again, I follow Skow (2008) in carving up haecceitistic theses along roughly these lines.
12Ontic haecceitists include Adams (1979), Plantinga (1974), and Salmon (1996).
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indiscernible possible worlds and still deny ontic haecceitism. Indeed, I will consider
just such a view—defended in Lewis (1986)—in the following section. Similarly, one
can deny that there are indiscernible possible worlds and still accept ontic haecceitism.
For example, if one identifies possible worlds with sets of sentences, these sentences
might differ qualitatively—perhaps by the substitution of synonyms—yet represent
maximal possibilities that differ only haecceitistically. In light of these considerations,
we are best served to define ontic haecceitism as follows:
Ontic Haecceitism: There are distinct possible worlds that represent
maximal possibilities that differ only with respect to the non-qualitative
possibilities they include.
In introducing alethic haecceitism, I avoided any talk of possible worlds, but the
primary contrast between alethic and ontic haecceitism should now be clear. While
alethic haecceitism is a thesis about maximal possibilities, ontic haecceitism is a thesis
about how possible worlds represent possibilities. Specifically, it requires that there
are distinct possible worlds that represent all the same qualitative possibilities yet
differ in terms of the non-qualitative possibilities they represent. So, while alethic
haecceitism requires haecceitistic differences between possibilities, ontic haecceitism
requires that distinct possible worlds do the job of representing these possibilities.
The conflation of alethic and ontic haecceitism is understandable. Philosophers
often eschew talk of possibilities in favour of talk about possible worlds. This is be-
cause most philosophers assume that our modal thought and talk is properly analyzed
in terms of a plurality of possible worlds. It is natural, then, to take the arguments
for alethic haecceitism as providing evidence for ontic haecceitism. As we will see,
however, alethic haecceitists need not be ontic haecceitists. And, to see how exactly
these theses come apart, it will be helpful to say a bit more about possible worlds
and their relation to both ontic haecceitism and modality in general.
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According to possible worlds theory, our modal discourse ought to be analyzed in
terms of possible worlds.13 Taken at face value, this commitment requires that there
exist a plurality of possible worlds—one for every one of the myriad total ways the
world might have been—and that claims about what Springsteen and Pynchon could
or must do are to be analyzed as claims about what would have been true if a certain
possible world were actualized.
This apparatus of possible worlds earns its keep by making sense of our modal
thought and talk. In asserting that a proposition is necessarily true—that it must
be the case—one claims that it is true at all possible worlds. In asserting that a
proposition is possibly true—that it could be the case—one claims it is true at some
possible worlds. In this way, the apparatus of possible worlds allows us to make sense
of the varying modal status of propositions.
The apparatus of possible worlds also allows us to distinguish varieties of modality.
For example, given the laws of physics that hold at the actual world, no massive body
can travel faster than the speed of light. Despite this, it seems possible that, in a world
with different laws of physics, something could travel faster than the speed of light.
The apparatus of possible worlds gives us a natural way to reconcile these claims:
the space of nomologically possible worlds—worlds where the actual laws of physics
hold—is a subset of the space of all metaphysically possible worlds which includes
worlds where the actual laws of physics do not hold. Assertions that nothing could
travel faster than the speed of light can be interpreted as concerning only the space
of nomologically possible worlds and, therefore, be rendered true. Other assertions
that one could travel faster than the speed of light, can, as required, be interpreted
as claims about the wider space of metaphysically possible worlds.14
13Possible worlds theorists include Adams (1979), Lewis (1986), Plantinga (1974), and Salmon
(1996).
14Unsurprisingly, many philosophers disagree about the taxonomy of modalities. Some essentialists
(e.g., Ellis (2001) hold that metaphysical and nomological necessity coincide. Others distinguish
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The apparatus of possible worlds also affords us another way to distinguish the
category of non-qualitative possibilities. For example, de dicto modal claims like
‘Necessarily, something exists’ attach modal operators directly to propositions. They
concern the modal properties of the actual world that are independent of any facts
about how individuals are represented across possible worlds. For this reason, de dicto
modal claims are equivalent to qualitative possibilities. In contrast, de re modal claims
like ‘Pynchon is necessarily human’ are claims about non-qualitative possibility; they
depend upon the way individuals are represented across the space of possible worlds.15
Given possible worlds theory, we can take non-qualitative and de re possibility to be,
for the most part, interchangeable. For this reason, we can also define alethic and
ontic haecceitism in terms of de re possibility:
Alethic Haecceitism: Some maximal possibilities differ only in terms
of the de re possibilities they include.
Ontic Haecceitism: There are distinct possible worlds that represent
maximal possibilities that differ only in terms of the de re possibilities
they include.
Equipped with a better understanding of the character and fertility of possible worlds
theory, we can now clarify the broader commitments of ontic haecceitism.
Ontic haecceitism invites certain conclusions about the space of possible worlds. In
particular, it seems to show that the space of possible worlds varies along two dimen-
sions. Along one dimension—the qualitative dimension—possible worlds differ with
respect to the qualitative possibilities they represent. Along the second dimension—
the non-qualitative dimension—possible worlds differ with respect to which individ-
nomological, metaphysical, and logical necessity. Insofar as possible, I will remain neutral on the
relation between these purportedly distinct modalities.
15See Bricker (2007) for more on the distinction between de re/de dicto modalities.
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uals they represent. And, while philosophers are quick to acknowledge variation
along the qualitative axis, the ontic haecceitist holds that no adequate metaphysics
of modality can be offered without attending to the non-qualitative dimension and
differences in what is represented de re. In addition, the ontic haecceitist holds that
variation along this non-qualitative axis is independent (perhaps partially, perhaps
totally) of variation along the qualitative axis. So characterized, the ontic haecceitist
is not committed to any specific view about how possible worlds represent possibilities
that differ haecceitistically. It is worth noting, however, that since ontic haecceitism
holds that certain possible worlds represent possibilities separated by haecceitistic
difference, ontic haecceitism does require that such possibilities be accepted. For this
reason, ontic haecceitism entails the truth of alethic haecceitism.
Given possible worlds theory and alethic haecceitism, ontic haecceitism is liable to
be seem attractive. This is because it allows for a one-to-one correspondence between
maximal possibilities and possible worlds. So, for every maximal possibility, there is
a unique possible world that represents that very possibility. Such a view is therefore
well-suited to accommodate the possibilities described in the twin and mirror-universe
examples above. Despite this, the leap from alethic to ontic haecceitism is greater
than it might initially seem. In large measure, this is because certain philosophers,
most notably David Lewis, have ably defended modal ontologies that accept alethic
haecceitism, while rejecting ontic haecceitism.16
Lewisian haecceitism—the particular package of alethic but non-ontic haecceitism
defended in Lewis (1986) and elsewhere—requires a rich ontology of possible worlds
and a subtle thesis about the nature of de re representation. This Lewisian picture
carries with it a commitment to possibilism—the thesis that merely possible entities
exist—and the denial of actualism—the thesis that the domain of actual entities is
16See, for example, Lewis (1983b) and (1986).
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necessarily coextensive with the domain of existents.17 In particular, Lewis accepts
modal realism—a variety of possibilism that identifies possible worlds with a plurality
of disconnected, maximal sums of spatiotemporally related individuals. Lewis also
denies that individuals exist in more than one world, but, even so, he accepts that
individuals are represented as existing at various worlds. This is because Lewis holds
that de re representation is accomplished by way of counterpart relations—relations of
similarity that obtain between distinct individuals. According to counterpart theory,
individuals have their modal properties in virtue of the way that their counterparts
are.18 And, since there are many counterpart relations—each corresponding to some
relation of qualitative resemblance—the modal properties of individuals are incon-
stant; they vary from context to context as the relevant counterpart relation changes.
According to Lewis, qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds cannot differ in
terms of what de re possibilities they represent. And, since Lewis denies there are
qualitatively indiscernible worlds that differ in terms of the de re possibilities they
represent, he rejects ontic haecceitism. Interestingly, Lewis does remain agnostic on
the question of whether qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds do indeed exist.19
But, even if we suppose Lewis to accept that these worlds exist, his denial of ontic
haecceitism is not in jeopardy. This is because a commitment to ontic haecceitism
does not require merely the existence of qualitatively indiscernible worlds but, rather,
that some possible worlds represent the very same qualitative possibilities but distinct
de re possibilities. Since Lewis denies these indiscernible worlds differ with respect to
the possibilities they represent, their existence is compatible with the falsity of ontic
haecceitism.
17For some influential defenses of actualism, see Adams (1981), Kripke (1980), and Plantinga
(1974). Possibilism is defended in Lewis (1986), Bricker (2006), Williamson (1998) and elsewhere.
18For more on counterpart theory, see Lewis (1968), (1971), and (1986).
19See Lewis (1986: 224).
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Because Lewis accepts that there are maximal possibilities that differ only haeccei-
tistically, he accepts alethic haecceitism. But, unlike ontic haecceitists, he holds that
one and same world—considered under different counterpart relations—represents a
multitude of maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically. So, for example, the
actual world, considered under distinct counterpart relations, might represent both
the possibility that Springsteen and Pynchon have the qualitative profiles they ac-
tually do as well as the possibility that Springsteen and Pynchon swap qualitative
profiles. In this way, one possible world, given the relevant counterpart relations, rep-
resents a plethora of non-qualitative possibilities and, in so doing, allows the Lewisian
haecceitist to deny that there is a one-to-one correspondence between maximal pos-
sibilities and possible worlds.
I will have much more to say regarding Lewisian haecceitism and the reconciliation
of alethic haecceitism with ontic haecceitism and its denial in later chapters.20 But,
at present, my interest is a more modest one: I aim to clear the conceptual brush that
surrounds the haecceitist theses just considered. This requires a close examination of
the relation between alethic and ontic haecceitism and the metaphysical theses they
are too often confused with. I will now begin by considering the relation between
haecceitism and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.
1.4 The Identity of Indiscernibles
The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter, PII) is a thesis about
the relation between identity and properties. It holds that no individuals can share
all their properties without being identical. Formulated in second-order logic, PII is
the following claim about the relation between identity and properties:
(PII) ∀F∀x∀y[(Fx↔ Fy)→ x = y]
20In Chapter Five, I consider objections to Lewisian haecceitism, and present an alternative modal
realist treatment of haecceitism.
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According to PII, if any individuals instantiate all the same properties, they are the
very same individual. As is well-known, the above formulation of PII admits of many
interpretations. On one interpretation, the second-order quantifier is unrestricted and
quantifies over any properties whatsoever.21 Let’s call this unrestricted version of the
PII, UPII.
If certain views about properties are correct, UPII is trivial.22 This is because,
according to these views, there are properties like being Thomas Pynchon and being
Bruce Springsteen. And, if these properties fall within the scope of the second-order
quantifier, UPII can offer us no further understanding of the relation between identity
and properties. We know very well that anything with the property being Thomas
Pynchon is identical to Thomas Pynchon. So, to permit quantification over these
sorts of properties is to presuppose an understanding of the relation between identity
and properties that PII was supposed to help us acquire in the first place. Faced
with the threat of trivializing PII, the tenability of stronger versions of it is worth
considering. We can do so by placing restrictions on the domain of the second-order
quantifier that result in progressively stronger formulations.
The most natural restriction is one that excludes non-qualitative properties—
sometimes called “haecceities” or “thisnesses”—like being Thomas Pynchon.23 The
resulting interpretation of PII allows second-order quantification over only qualitative
properties. Among these latter properties are intrinsic properties like being a material
object or being spherical and extrinsic properties like being larger than every blue
21I take PII to quantify over properties and relational properties like being to the south of an
iceberg.
22I have in mind here abundant views of properties that hold every set of individuals to correspond
to a property. Such views are in opposition to sparse views of properties that hold properties to
correspond to only universals or certain elite sets of individuals.
23I’ll employ the term ‘haecceities’ here, but I take the the two terms are interchangeable.
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thing.24 In contrast, other non-qualitative properties like being Thomas Pynchon’s
hat or being to the left of Bruce Springsteen must also be excluded from the domain
of properties in order to avoid trivializing the PII. In this way, PII is no longer
trivialized by virtue of excluding properties like being Thomas Pynchon.
On its most plausible interpretation, PII holds that if any two individuals in-
stantiate all the same qualitative properties—setting aside the above excluded non-
qualitative properties—they are the very same individual.25 For this reason, PII, in
conjunction with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, purports to give necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the identity of individuals in terms of the identity of properties.
With this understanding of PII, we can consider a now-familiar challenge posed in
Black (1952):
Isn’t it logically possible that the universe should have contained nothing
but two exactly similar spheres? We might suppose that each was made of
chemically pure iron, had a diameter of one mile, that they had the same
temperature, colour, and so on, and that nothing else existed. Then every
quality and relational characteristic of the one would also be a property
of the other. Now if what I am describing is logically possible, it is not
impossible for two things to have all their properties in common. This
seems to me to refute the Principle [i.e., PII].26
Black’s description of a possibility involving two indiscernible spheres seems prima
facie acceptable, so there is pressure to accept that there is a possible world with only
two qualitatively indiscernible objects. But, if such a world is indeed possible, then
24It is worth noting that by restricting the domain of the quantifier to only intrinsic properties,
one commits themselves to the identity of any duplicates, since duplicates share all their intrinsic
properties. In contrast, indiscernibles share, not only their intrinsic properties, but all their extrinsic
and relational properties as well.
25See Hawley (2009) for further discussion of the various interpretations of PII.
26Black (1952: 156)
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the relation between qualitative properties and identity is at odds with PII, since
numerical distinctness is consistent with qualitative indiscernibility. Black’s proposal
is, therefore, a counter-example to PII.
A defender of PII might, when faced with Black’s argument, hold that PII is a
contingent rather than necessary truth and that, as a result, Black succeeds only in
pointing out that certain worlds defy PII. While one should, if they accept Black’s
argument, concede that PII is at best contingently true, it seems that if PII is merely
contingent, it is robbed of what makes it metaphysically and conceptually significant.
It fails to capture a necessary truth about the coextension of qualitative indiscerni-
bility with identity. But it is this very coextension that makes PII theoretically
interesting.27
In light of Black’s counterexample, we ought to deny that qualitative indiscerni-
bility entails numerical identity, and reject PII. This is an important discovery about
the nature of identity, but, given our present interests, the more interesting question
is how PII relates to haecceitism and, in particular, whether its falsity entails some
form of haecceitism. To this end, I will now argue that the truth of PII is an issue
orthogonal to the truth of alethic haecceitism.
To see how these two issues come apart, recall that PII is a claim about whether or
not qualitatively indiscernible yet distinct entities might coexist. In contrast, alethic
haecceitism is a claim about whether certain maximal possibilities differ only in the
non-qualitative possibilities they include. Consider that one could consistently accept
that some maximal possibilities differ haecceitistically, but, at the same time, deny
that there are any possibilities according to which two qualitatively indiscernible yet
distinct entities coexist. For example, one might deny that there are any maximal
possibilities according to which qualitatively indiscernible spheres exist, but accept
27Adams (1979: 17) discussion of almost indiscernible twins lends further support to the denial of
PII.
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that there are maximal possibilities that differ only in terms of which lone sphere
they represent as existing. For this reason, one can accept alethic haecceitism while,
at the same time, accepting PII.
In addition, one can reject alethic haecceitism, while, at the same time, denying
PII. For example, one could hold that there is a unique maximal possibility wherein,
say, two qualitatively indiscernible iron spheres exist, but that there are no maximal
possibilities that differ solely in terms of the identity of the spheres in question.
According to a such a view, there are maximal possibilities that include possibilities
for qualitatively indiscernible entities, but none of these maximal possibilities differ
haecceitistically. Although such a view is unattractive, its consistency does suffice
to show that there is an important conceptual distinction between PII and alethic
haecceitism.
While PII and alethic haecceitism are orthogonal theses, difficult questions arise
when we consider the relation between PII and ontic haecceitism. The first compli-
cation concerns differing views about the metaphysical status of possible worlds. For
example, some views, like modal realism, hold that possible worlds are individuals,
while other views about possible worlds deny this. And, if possible worlds are not in-
dividuals, they will fall outside the scope of PII. For this reason, if possible worlds are
not individuals, PII has no implications for the truth or falsity of ontic haecceitism.
Alternatively, if possible worlds are individuals, the truth or falsity of PII might
have implications for ontic haecceitism. For example, if PII is true, then there are no
qualitative indiscernible possible worlds. And, without these worlds, it is unclear how
a modal realist might ensure that possible worlds represent maximal possibilities that
differ haecceitistically. If, however, one endorses a form of linguistic ersatzism that
identifies possible worlds with more mundane individuals like sentences or sets of sen-
tences, these individuals might be discernible even while they succeed in representing
maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically. It seems, then, that the truth of
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PII is compatible with both ontic haecceitism and the identification of possible worlds
with individuals. Alternatively, if PII is false, ontic haecceitism need not follow. Re-
call that Lewis might accept qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds, but, since
he denies that such worlds differ in what they represent de re, he does not thereby
endorse ontic haecceitism. For these reasons, we can see that ontic haecceitism and
PII are, for the most part, unrelated theses.
Having clarified the relation (or lack thereof) between PII and alethic and ontic
haecceitism, we can now turn to a related issue often thought to be relevant to
haecceitism. This issue revolves around the existence of haecceities and their relation
to the truth or falsity of haecceitism.
1.5 Haecceities
The nature of haecceities (or what I have been calling “non-qualitative proper-
ties”) like being Thomas Pynchon turns largely on the truth or falsity of PII. For
example, if PII is true, then identity is to be analyzed in terms of qualitative indis-
cernibility. And, if so, it is natural to view properties like being Thomas Pynchon
as qualitative properties. Alternatively, if PII is false, then identity does not reduce
to qualitative indiscernibility. And, one might therefore naturally view haecceities
as non-qualitative properties that can differ between indiscernible entities. To differ-
entiate between these two very different views about the nature of the haecceities,
we can hold the former sort of view to be committed to qualitative haecceities and
the latter sort of view to be committed to primitive haecceities, where only primitive
haecceities are understood to be non-qualitative.28
28There are complications that I gloss over here regarding the inference from the falsity of PII
to the non-qualitative nature of haecceities. While I take up these questions in Chapter Four, our
interests here are well-served by resting content with the distinction between these two kinds of
haecceities.
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Characterizing haecceities as qualitative or non-qualitative raises the difficult ques-
tion of how the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction should itself be understood.
And, while most philosophers accept that there is such a distinction, there is much
disagreement about how it is properly drawn.29 Later, I will take up the question of
how this distinction is best understood, but, for the moment, I will again attempt to
remain neutral on this issue. Setting these concerns aside, we can still profitably take
up the question of how the existence of primitive haecceities relates to haecceitism.
Getting clear on this issue will prove helpful because the assumption that the exis-
tence of primitive haecceities entails haecceitism is both common and mistaken.30 In
order to see why commitment to haecceities and haecceitism come apart, we need to
consider two views. The first view accepts primitive haecceities but neither alethic nor
ontic haecceitism; the second view accepts alethic or ontic haecceitism, but not prim-
itive haecceities. By considering these views, we can draw out the important divide
between a commitment to primitive haecceities—a thesis about the metaphysics of
properties—and alethic and ontic haecceitism, which are orthogonal theses regarding
the space of possibilities and possible worlds.
The first case in which primitive haecceities and haecceitism come apart is in
the metaphysics of the benighted necessitarian who denies that there are any non-
actual possibilities. She believes that the world could have been no other way than
it actually is. Nevertheless, she defends the view that there are primitive haecceities
(perhaps because she believes the mirror-hypothesis to be true). And, even while
she accepts primitive haecceities, she rejects both alethic and ontic haecceitism; she
denies there are any non-actual possibilities or non-actual possible worlds that differ
haecceitistically. For her, there is no space of possibilities or possible worlds, only the
29See Lewis (1983) and Bricker (2007) for supervenience-based account. See Adams (1979) for
discussion of a linguistic account.
30Swinburne (1995) seems to be guilty of this. See Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1997) for
discussion.
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single point in logical space that is the actual world. In her preferred metaphysics,
we can see that commitment to alethic or ontic haecceitism is not entailed by a
commitment to primitive haecceities.
The second case in which haecceitism and primitive haecceities come apart is in
the metaphysics of the austere nominalist who rejects properties altogether.31 Even
while she denies there are properties, she accepts that individuals are distinct from
one another. Moreover, she accepts certain modal claims about individuals. She
agrees that you could have been the eldest of two twins or the youngest. She further
agrees that, in either case, the course of events would have been unaltered. In accept-
ing these claims, she takes on a commitment to alethic haecceitism, but, in virtue of
her nominalism, she does without primitive haecceities. Moreover, she might accept
an ontology of concrete possible worlds and hold that, while these worlds represent
possibilities that differ haecceistically, they do so in a way that requires no commit-
ment to properties. With this in mind, we can see that primitive haecceities do not
incur a commitment to either variety of haecceitism or vice versa.
Primitive haecceities and haecceitism should not be conflated. And, while we
must note their independence, the best version of ontic haecceitism might be one
that traffics in primitive haecceities. Indeed, the view of ontic haecceitism I will
defend in later chapters is of this kind. But, having explained that these claims are
independent of one another, we can now turn to another issue that cuts across the
debate over haecceitism: transworld identity.
1.6 Transworld Identity
Kaplan (1975) marks the introduction of “haecceitism” into the parlance of con-
temporary metaphysics. There, Kaplan characterizes haecceitism as follows:
31This point owes to Lewis (1986: 225).
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The doctrine that holds that it does make sense to ask—without reference
to common attributes and behavior—whether this is the same individual
in another possible world, that individuals can be extended in logical
space (i.e., through possible worlds) in much the way we commonly regard
them as being extended in physical space and time, and that a common
“thisness” may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may
underlie great resemblance, I call Haecceitism.... The opposite view, Anti-
Haecceitism, holds that for entities of distinct possible worlds there is no
notion of trans-world being.32
Kaplan’s characterization runs together a number of theses that, while closely
related to both alethic and ontic haecceitism, are worth keeping separate. Indeed,
given Kaplan’s characterization of “anti-haecceitism”, one might think that haec-
ceitism is just the commitment to “trans-world being” or, as most philosophers now
say, “transworld identity”. For this reason, it is important to note why a commit-
ment to transworld identity does not entail ontic or alethic haecceitism. Before doing
so, we should, however, clarify as best we can what exactly is meant by “transworld
identity”.
Talk of transworld identity arises in the context of possible worlds theory. And, in
one sense, it is an uncontroversial thesis. This benign sense of “transworld identity”
requires only that individuals are represented as existing at distinct possible worlds.
So, for example, some possible world represents the de re possibility that Pynchon is
a pirate, while another represents the possibility that he is a viking. Regardless of
one’s views on possible worlds, one ought to accept this kind of de re representation.
This is because denying benign transworld identity is tantamount to denying that de
32Kaplan (1975: 723)
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re modality can be accommodated within the framework of possible worlds and such
a denial should sit poorly with any possible worlds theorist.
Since benign transworld identity is presupposed by any possible world theorist,
the ontic haecceitist, by virtue of accepting possible worlds theory, is committed to
its truth. That said, philosophers who eschew talk of possible worlds might attempt
to accommodate alethic haecceitism within some other metaphysical approach to
modality.33 For this reason, alethic haecceitism does not entail benign transworld
identity.
In the opposite direction, it should be clear that benign transworld identity does
not entail alethic or ontic haecceitism. This is because benign transworld identity
is compatible with any number of views regarding the limits of possibility, many of
which deny that maximal possibilities are ever separated by haecceitistic differences.
For this reason, we can see that transworld identity, in its benign sense, is largely
orthogonal to the issue of haecceitism.
In addition to benign transworld identity, there is a more controversial sense of
“transworld identity”. Unfortunately, the way to explicate this second, more con-
troversial sense is itself controversial. In order to get a grip on this notion, let us
first consider Lewis’s version of counterpart theory, which is often cited for rejecting
“transworld identity” in the controversial sense.
According to Lewis’s version of counterpart theory, de re representation works
in terms of qualitative resemblance: individuals bear counterpart relations to one
another in virtue of their qualitative properties. And, while no individual is a part of
more than one world, individuals have their de re modal properties in virtue of the
counterpart relations they stand in. So, for example, while Thomas Pynchon exists
only at the actual world, he has the de re modal property of being possibly a pirate
33See, for example, modalist views developed in Prior and Fine (1977) and discussed in Melia
(1992).
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in virtue of bearing a resemblance relation to a distinct individual that is a pirate at
another possible world. So, according to a Lewis’s view, the domains of individuals
that exist at distinct possible world never overlap. Rather, they are connected by the
counterpart relation, a relation that does not obey the logic of identity.34
A distinctive feature of Lewis’s version of counterpart theory is that it is developed
against the backdrop of modal realism, which holds possible worlds to be concrete
maximal sums of spatiotemporally related individuals. Because distinct worlds stand
in no spatiotemporal or causal relations to one another, it is natural to assume that
they do not overlap or share any of their parts. Even so, some have defended a version
of modal realism that holds that the domains of worlds do overlap.35 According to
modal realism with overlap, Thomas Pynchon is a part of the actual world as well as
a part of other possible worlds. Moreover, he has the de re modal property of being
possibly a pirate in virtue of being a part of a world wherein he is a pirate. According
to modal realism with overlap, the domain of individuals that exist a distinct possible
worlds do, in fact, overlap. And, as a result, the overlapping of domains is understood
in terms of the logic of identity rather than, say, counterpart theory.
With this distinction in mind, we might be tempted to understand “transworld
identity” as the thesis that the domains of distinct possible worlds admit of overlap.36
But understanding “transworld identity” in this way proves unhelpful in making sense
of much debate in the metaphysics of modality. This is because Lewis’s counterpart
theory is most often contrasted with actualist views of modality that reject an ontol-
ogy of concrete possible worlds, but are touted to sustain a commitment to genuine
“transworld identity”. These actualists typically endorse some variety of ersaztism
34Most notably, the counterpart relation is intransitive whereas identity is transitive.
35For discussion of modal realism with overlap, see Lewis (1986). For a defense, see McDaniel
(2004).
36See Bricker (2007) for a related but perhaps distinct discussion of transworld identity.
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about possible worlds, according to which possible worlds are identified with actually
existing entities that accomplish the task of representing the space of possibilities.
These ersatz worlds do not literally have individuals like Thomas Pynchon as their
parts. For this reason, it is unclear how the domains of ersatz worlds could be un-
derstood to overlap with the domain of the actual world except in something like the
benign sense of transworld identity considered above.
An alternative proposal for understanding the controversial sense of “transworld
identity” might look to how different theories accommodate de re representation. On
one hand, primitivists hold that de re representation is unanalyzable and cannot be
explained in terms of any other notion. On the other hand, reductivists hold that de re
representation is analyzable in terms of some other notions. For example, according
to Lewis’s modal realism, de re representation is explained in terms of qualitative
resemblance between counterparts. And, according to modal realism with overlap,
de re representation is also explained in terms of identity. In contrast, primitivists
hold that de re representation cannot be analyzed. And, while many primitivists do
attempt to explain what entities accomplish this representation (e.g., uninstantiated
universals or sets of sentences), de re representation is nevertheless taken to be, at
bottom, unanalyzable.37
The divide between reductivism and primitivism is an important one. For this
reason, one might consider whether the debate over “transworld identity” is properly
understood as the debate between reductivists and primitivists. As it turns out, this
interpretation of the debate over “transworld identity” is unsatisfactory. Not only
does it stray too far from concerns about identity simpliciter. It also classifies cer-
tain views in a way at odds with most philosopher’s usage of “transworld identity”.
37Strictly speaking, this incorrect. For the linguistic ersatzer, de re representation is analyzed in
terms of naming. Even so, they too must accept some form of primitive modality, if not primitive
de re modality. See Lewis (1986: 142-164.) for discussion.
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Consider, for example, a version of modal realism that accepts counterpart theory,
but denies that resemblance is what determines counterpart relations. Instead, this
non-qualitative counterpart theory holds that counterpart relations hold in virtue of
primitive non-qualitative properties or relations rather than qualitative ones.38 Ac-
cording to such a view, de re modality proves unanalyzable, even while individuals
never belong to the domain of more than one world. Such a view seems properly iden-
tified as rejecting “transworld identity” but it does require the truth of primitivism.
For this reason, the distinction between primitivism and reductivism is not plausibly
identified as the issue underlying the debate over “transworld identity”.
It seems, then, that there are two important yet orthogonal distinctions: one holds
between those who disagree about whether the domains of worlds overlap and another
holds between those who disagree about whether de re representation is primitive.
While these views crosscut one another, neither corresponds with what philosophers
seem to intend by the elusive and controversial sense of “transworld identity”. For
this reason, we are better served to consider whether these independent issues have
implications for the truth of haecceitism.
Let’s first distinguish splitters—those who deny the domain of individuals at dis-
tinct worlds ever overlap—from lumpers, who accept that overlap sometimes occurs.
Let’s also distinguish primitivists—those who accept that representation de re is
primitive—from reductivists who hold that representation de re is to be analyzed
away. Now, rather than surveying the varying combinations of alethic and ontic
haecceitism with splitting, lumping, primitivism, and reductivism, let me note the
following important points regarding the relation between these views.
First and foremost, alethic haecceitism neither entails nor is entailed by any of
these surveyed views. So, while certain views have an easier time accommodating its
38Not all versions of non-qualitative counterpart theory need to be primitivist ones. I defend a
reductive version of non-qualitative counterpart theory in Chapter Four.
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truth, alethic haecceitism is a thesis wholly separate from the reductivist/primitivist
and splitting/lumping disputes. But, as usual, ontic haecceitism proves to have more
interesting conceptual connections.
If representation de re is to be analyzed in qualitative terms, then ontic haec-
ceitism must be rejected. This is because ontic haecceitism requires that possible
worlds represent distinct de re possibilities in terms of something other than qualita-
tive properties. For this reason, the most familiar version of reductivism—the viewed
advanced by Lewis—rules out ontic haecceitism. That said, modal realism with over-
lap, which is also a reductivist view, is compatible with ontic haecceitism, since it
analyzes de re representation in terms of parthood and identity. For this reason,
the primitivist/reductivist distinction does not uniquely characterize ontic or alethic
haecceitism. In addition, the splitter/lumper distinction does not help in character-
izing ontic haecceitism. This is because splitters, who seem well-postitioned to reject
ontic haecceitism, can endorse both alethic and ontic haecceitism. If, for example,
one accepts non-qualitative counterpart theory and becomes a splitter, they would
nevertheless be properly classified as an ontic haecceitist. With these complications
in mind, ontic haecceitism can be seen to be a thesis largely orthogonal to either in-
terpretation of “transworld identity”. And, having clarified the relation between the
various senses of “transworld identity” and haecceitism, we can now turn to another
thesis that one might plausibly confuse with haecceitism: the existence of singular
propositions.
1.7 Singular Propositions
Up to this point, I have helped myself to talk about, and quantification over,
possibilities without commitment to any specific account of their nature. Neutrality in
this regard is helpful, since the points I’ve made are general ones, independent of any
strong background assumptions. Here, I want to outline the account of possibilities
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I prefer. It is important to note that this account is not entailed by alethic or ontic
haecceitism; it could be abandoned even while either form of haecceitism is retained.
Even so, I believe it to be the most plausible way to understand both our ordinary
and philosophical talk about possibilities.39
According to the account I favour, possibilities are identified with possible propo-
sitions.40 Maximal possibilities are, in turn, identified with maximal conjunctions of
propositions. They include non-maximal possibilities by way of entailment. And, for
every proposition, a maximal possibility entails that proposition or its negation. In
addition, if we accept possible worlds into our ontology, they can be seen to bear a
unique relation to propositions. When a possibility obtains at a world, that proposi-
tion is true at that world. And, since a maximal possibility obtains only at one world,
a maximal conjunction of propositions is true at a unique world.41
The appeal of identifying possibilities with propositions emerges, in part, from
the fact that propositions play a central role in other philosophical domains. Most
notably, propositions are crucial in making sense of the content of our thought and
talk. They are mind and language-independent entities. They are expressed by
sentences and, in contexts, the truth-value of propositions determines the truth-value
of sentences. In addition, they are the objects of our attitudes like believing and
doubting. For example, to believe that Thomas is verbose is to bear the belief relation
to the proposition that Thomas is verbose. So, by accepting propositions into our
ontology, a wide array of intentional phenomena like belief can be made tractable.
39The main rival to this account, which identifies possibilities with states of affairs, will be ignored.
I follow Lewis (1992) in rejecting states of affairs on Humean grounds.
40Since one might accept contradictory or impossible propositions, this identification must be
qualified as no possibility is identified such a proposition.
41A further notable connection between propositions and possible worlds is found in the attempt
to reduce the former to the latter. I remain neutral on whether propositions should be viewed as
sui generis entities or as reducible to properties or sets of possible worlds. See Lewis (1986) and
Stalnaker (1984).
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The nature of propositions, here identified with possibilities, affords us a unique
way to express the commitments of haecceitism. To see why this is so, it will be helpful
to contrast two rival views about propositions. Fregean views hold that propositions
are complex and have modes of presentation (hereafter, MoP)—typically understood
to be descriptive abstract representations—and properties or relations as their con-
stituents. Millian views also hold that propositions are complex, but deny that they
have modes of presentations as constituents. Instead, they have individuals—in many
cases, concrete entities—and properties or relations as their constituents.42 Fregeans,
therefore, hold that a sentence like
(1) Bruce is American.
expresses a proposition represented as<MoPBruce, being American>, where ‘MoPBruce’
represents the mode of presentation that picks out Bruce.
In contrast, Millians believe that (1) expresses a singular proposition: an abstract
object that, in some way, contains both the object, Bruce, and the property, being
American. This proposition is representable as <Bruce, being American>. According
to Millianism, the contribution of a name to the semantic content of a sentence in
which it occurs is just the individual it refers to. And, since the semantic content of
a sentence is a proposition, Millianism entails that sentences like (1) express singular
propositions.
Singular propositions contain the individuals they are about. So, even if two
individuals are qualitatively indiscernible, a singular proposition about one of the
individuals will not contain the other. For example, even if there is a duplicate of our
galaxy located in the distant reaches of the universe that contains an exact duplicate
of Bruce, the semantic content of (1) would be our nearby Bruce, rather than his
qualitative duplicate. In contrast, general propositions do not contain the individual
42See Caplan (2007) for discussion of the distinction between Millian and Fregean views.
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they are about. They can be satisfied by distinct objects. For example, a sentence
like
(2) The largest biped is right-handed.
could be about an individual, Bruce, at one time and a distinct individual, Thomas,
at another time. Singular propositions like <Bruce, being right-handed>would be
entailed, at a certain time, by the general proposition in question and the fact that
Bruce is the largest biped. But, for reasons just noted, this singular proposition differs
in semantic content from the general ones that might entail it.
The distinction between general and singular propositions parallels the distinction
between qualitative and non-qualitative possibilities. So, while the truth of general
propositions depends upon whether certain qualitative possibilities obtain, the truth
of singular propositions depends upon whether certain non-qualitative possibilities
obtain. It is natural, then, to identify singular propositions with non-qualitative pos-
sibilities and general propositions with qualitative possibilities. These identifications
also afford us another way to formulate the thesis of alethic haecceitism:
Alethic Haecceitism: Some maximal consistent sets of propositions
differ only in terms of the singular propositions they have as members.
If one rejects the identification of possibilities with propositions, this thesis has no
modal implications. It is merely a claim about the existence of conjunctions of propo-
sitions. But, if propositions are possibilities, and maximal possibilities are maximal
conjunctions of propositions, this definition entails that some possibilities differ haec-
ceitistically. With this account of possibilities available, one might, following Kaplan
(1975), hold that the existence of singular propositions entails the truth of alethic
haecceitism.43 This would be a mistake.
43See Kaplan (1975: 724).
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On the view I have outlined, the acceptance of singular propositions does entail
the acceptance of non-qualitative possibilities; however, a distinct and stronger claim
about the space of non-qualitative possibilities is needed to establish alethic haec-
ceitism. This claim would need to establish that there are maximal conjunctions of
propositions that differ haecceitistically and are also compossible. Clearly, the truth
or falsity of this claim about the compossibility of certain conjunctions of propositions
does not follow from the existence of singular propositions alone. So, while I hold that
alethic haecceitism is properly understood against the backdrop of propositions and
singular propositions, the acceptance of singular propositions does not entail alethic
haecceitism.44
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to clarify an array of theses that cluster around
the word ‘haecceitism’. According to the taxonomy I’ve outlined, haecceitism divides
into two principal varieties: alethic and ontic. The first variety is a thesis about the
truth of modal claims; the second variety is a thesis about possible worlds and de re
representation. Alethic haecceitism holds that some maximal possibilities differ only
in terms of the non-qualitative possibilities they include. Ontic haecceitism holds that
some possible worlds differ in terms of the non-qualitative possibilities they represent
without differing in what qualitative possibilities they represent. After distinguishing
these two theses, I considered their relation to four theses: the denial of PII, the
existence of primitive haecceities, the acceptance of “transworld identity”, and the
commitment to singular propositions. I then argued that both alethic and ontic
44The related thesis of “Kripkean Specification” is also distinct from alethic haecceitism. Accord-
ing to it, we are capable of stipulating which particular individual we are speaking of, when we
speak of counterfactual possibilities. But, since this thesis says nothing regarding the limits of de re
possibility, it is consistent with the denial that maximal possibilities differ haecceitistically. For this
reason, it neither entails nor is entailed by alethic haecceitism. See Kripke (1980: 44), Lewis (1986:
222), and Salmon (1996: 205) for further discussion.
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haecceitism are orthogonal to these theses. They neither entail nor are entailed by
them.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENTS FOR HAECCEITISM
2.1 Introduction
Possibilities can be distinguished in many ways. To begin, let us distinguish
non-qualitative possibilities like the possibility that Napoleon is bipedal or that Pyn-
chon writes novels from qualitative possibilities like the possibility that something—
anything at all—is red or that seven spheres exist. While the the former possibilities
depend in some way upon the existence of specific individuals, the latter are not tied
to any specific individuals.
We can also distinguish maximal possibilities from non-maximal ones. Maximal
possibilities are total ways the world could be. They include or entail non-maximal
possibilities. Some of these are qualitative; others are non-qualitative. For exam-
ple, the actual maximal possibility includes the qualitative possibility that someone
smokes as well as the non-qualitative possibility that Obama smokes. The actual max-
imal possibility therefore differs from various non-actual maximal possibilities where
no one smokes, Obama does not smoke, or where Obama fails to exist altogether.
Once we distinguish possibilities in preceding fashion, we can formulate the fol-
lowing thesis:
Alethic Haecceitism: Some maximal possibilities differ only in terms
of the non-qualitative possibilities they include.
If alethic haecceitism is true, there are ways the world could be that include all the
same qualitative possibilities but differ with respect to the non-qualitative possibilities
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they include. This kind of difference between maximal possibilities is a haecceitistic
difference. So, while alethic haecceitists accept that there are some maximal possi-
bilities that differ this way, alethic anti-haecceitists do not.1
To get a firmer grasp on alethic haecceitism, consider a maximal possibility ac-
cording to which you and Obama swap all of your actual qualitative properties and
relations. If this is a genuine maximal possibility, it differs from actuality only in
terms of the non-qualitative possibilities it includes. And, since all qualitative mat-
ters are the very same, the existence of maximal possibilities that differ in this way
entails alethic haecceitism.
In addition to alethic haecceitism, there is a second thesis that is properly labelled
as a kind of haecceitism. This additional thesis outstrips alethic haecceitism since it
makes reference not only to maximal possibilities, but also to possible worlds—the
entities typically held to represent maximal possibilities:
Ontic Haecceitism: There are distinct possible worlds that represent
maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically.
Ontic haecceitism is a thesis about the relation between maximal possibilities and pos-
sible worlds. According to its most natural implementation, maximal possibilities—
some of which differ haecceitistically—uniquely correspond with or are identical to
possible worlds.
Although ontic haecceitism entails alethic haecceitism, the converse does not hold.
Some, most notably Lewis (1986), have accepted alethic haecceitism, but rejected
ontic haecceitism. And, while these theses can come apart, it is important to note
that alethic haecceitism is the more general thesis. It can be accepted or rejected
1Alethic anti-haecceitists include Forbes, (1985), Sider (2002), Nolan (2001), Robinson (1989),
and Dasgupta (2009).
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by both defenders and opponents of possible worlds. For this reason, it is properly
viewed as the broader, more general conception of haecceitism.
In this chapter, I consider alethic haecceitism and the arguments in defense of it.
For this reason, I set aside, as best I can, the issues raised by the metaphysics of
possible worlds and ontic haecceitism and focus instead on maximal possibilities. In
particular, I will set my sights on determining whether the following sort of claim,
which depends upon maximal possibilities but need not depend upon possible worlds,
is true: “Things could have been just as they actually are in all qualitative respects,
but the facts about the identity of individuals might be different.” Since my interest
is in alethic rather than ontic haecceitism, several issues about the metaphysics of
worlds will be set aside in the following discussion. Even so, I will mark the relevance
of certain views about worlds when appropriate. In addition, I examine issues raised
about the scope of haecceitistic differences and ontic haecceitism in later chapters.
How should one make the case for alethic haecceitism? Although there is a broad
range of arguments that lend support to alethic haecceitism, the most powerful argu-
ments are conceivability arguments.2 Here, these conceivability arguments for alethic
haecceitism will be my primary focus. For those us friendly to alethic haecceitism,
many of these arguments will seem convincing. Nothing interesting there. What is
interesting is how the alethic anti-haecceitist might respond to them. Through careful
consideration of these responses, we can get a better sense of how one might defend
alethic anti-haecceitism and of the costs that alethic anti-haecceitism incurs. To this
end, I consider a battery of conceivability arguments for alethic haecceitism and de-
2Another direct argument for haecceitism is “Chisholm’s Paradox”, which is offered—but not
accepted—in Chisholm (1967) and endorsed in Mackie (2006). See Chapter Six for discussion. Less
direct arguments, which rely on substantive auxiliary assumptions, can be drawn from Kripke (1980)
where it is seems that our best theory of probability requires some form of haecceitism, Stalnaker
(2008) where it is suggested that our best theory of content requires some form of haecceitism, and
Melia (1999) where some form of haecceitism is needed to avoid settling intuitively open questions
about the deterministic/indeterministic status of quantum mechanics.
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velop what I believe to be the best available alethic anti-haecceitist responses. Once
the dust has settled, I hope to have shown that alethic anti-haecceitism is untenable
and that we ought to accept alethic haecceitism. After examining the dialectic be-
tween the alethic haecceitist and the anti-haecceitist in Sections Two through Six, I
conclude by offering a taxonomy of conceivability arguments for alethic haecceitism
that isolates their most significant features.
Before getting underway, it will be helpful to briefly mark some working assump-
tions. These are mostly simplifying assumptions that are intended to provide a rough
and neutral framework for discussion. So, while there is assuredly more to be said on
each of these topics, my aim here is only to offer a general backdrop for understanding
the debate between alethic haecceitists and alethic anti-haecceitists.
Let me begin by clarifying the relevant sense of “conceivability”. In what follows,
I aim at neutrality with respect to issues about whether conceivability, imagination,
or some other notion is at the center of modal epistemology.3 To this end, I use
‘conceivability’ and ‘imaginability’ synonymously and help myself to what I take to
be the common ground between parties to this debate. Specifically, I take the rele-
vant notion of conceivability or imaginability to be positive, since it involves forming
a representation of a world, situation, or maximal possibility rather than negative,
where negative conceivability requires only that a possibility is not ruled out by some
body of knowledge (e.g., what one knows).4 I also take conceivability or imaginability
to involve more than prima facie conceivability, but less than the ideal conceivability
available only to ideal rational agents. So understood, the operative notion of con-
ceivability requires that one detect no contradiction, upon sustained reflection, within
a positive representation one forms. And, although I will employ ‘conceivability’ and
3This is not to say that conceivability is the whole story. I defend a modal epistemology that
turns on principles of plenitude in Chapter Three.
4These distinctions—presented roughly here—owe to Chalmers (2002).
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‘imagination’ interchangeably throughout, I draw distinctions between kinds of con-
ceivability or imagination as we proceed. Note, also, that I use “maximal possibility”
as a stand-in for the more familiar, but also more contentious talk of “possible worlds”
in most of what follows. Again, this is to side-step worries about possible worlds in
favor of more neutral terminology. For convenience’s sake, I will also focus primarily
on the conceivability of maximal rather than non-maximal possibilities.
Let me now clarify how I will understand the inference from conceivability to
possibility. Here, I assume that an apparently conceivable maximal possibility pro-
vides prima facie evidence of a genuine maximal possibility.5 I further assume that
this prima facie evidence is defeasible in the face of an alternative explanation of
an apparently conceivable maximal possibility. Alternative explanations of appar-
ently conceivable maximal possibilities—explanations that deny that an apparently
conceivable maximal possibility is a genuine maximal possibility—take two forms.
First, the existence of an apparently conceivable maximal possibility, m, might be
explained, not by the fact that m is a genuine rather than only apparently conceivable
maximal possibility, but, instead, by the fact that an agent mistakes some maximal
possibility, m*, for m and, for this reason, is mistaken in concluding that m is a
maximal possibility. Explanations of apparent conceivability that take this form holds
agents to form errant modal beliefs by virtue of conflating or mistakenly identifying
maximal possibilities. For example, Kripke (1980) offers an explanation of why some
agents believe that Hesperus and Phosophorus could be distinct even while they
are necessarily identical: agents mistake the genuine possibility that there are two
planets that resemble Venus for an apparently conceivable maximal possibility in
which Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct.
5This terminology might seem odd since an apparently conceivable maximal possibility might
not be a possibility at all. Notice, however, that an apparently round square need be neither round
nor square.
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The second alternative explanation of an apparently conceivable maximal possi-
bility is not that agents are mistaken about which maximal possibilities are which,
but rather about which apparently conceivable maximal possibilities are genuinely
possible. According to this form of explanation, the existence of an apparently con-
ceivable maximal possibility, m, is to be explained, not by holding m to be genuinely
possible, but, instead, by holding an agent conceiving of m to be conceiving of what
is in fact a maximal impossibility. Explanations of this sort do not impute any kind
of modal illusion to agents, but, instead, hold that, in at least some cases, appar-
ently conceivable maximal possibilities that might initially seem possible prove to be
impossible. As I will argue shortly, there is reason to believe that the former kind
of explanation, which appeals to a kind of modal illusion, provides a more attractive
modal epistemology. For the moment, however, it will helpful to bear in mind that
both kinds of explanations might be deployed to explain away apparently conceivable
maximal possibilities without commitment to their genuine possibility.
2.2 The Electron Argument
Let us begin by considering the Electron Argument. Let ‘Lois’ name your favourite
actual electron. Let ‘Lana’ name your least favourite actual electron. Assume, as
seems quite plausible, that Lois and Lana are distinct—indeed, necessarily distinct—
but are also intrinsic duplicates of one another. Granted these assumptions, we can
present the following argument for alethic haecceitism:
The Electron Argument
P1. It is conceivable that only Lois exists.
P2. It is conceivable that only Lana exists.
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P3. If P1, there is a maximal possibility that includes only Lois.6
P4. If P2, there is a maximal possibility includes only Lana.
P5. If there is a maximal possibility that includes only Lois and there is
a maximal possibility includes only Lana, alethic haecceitism is true.
C1. Therefore, alethic haecceitism is true.
Before evaluating the Electron Argument as an argument for alethic haecceitism, it
will be useful to discuss why a modified version—in particular, one that replaces
“maximal possibility” with “possible world”—fails as an argument for ontic haec-
ceitism.
Recall that ontic haecceitism holds that there are unique possible worlds that
correspond to maximal possibilities (some of which differ haecceitistically). On this
view, the distinct maximal possibilities involving Lois and Lana are identified with
distinct possible worlds. For those who accept alethic haecceitism but reject ontic
haecceitism, the distinctness of these worlds is denied. Instead, there is only a single
world that does the job of representing both the maximal possibility where only Lois
exists and the maximal possibility where only Lana exists.
The Electron Argument will provide no support for ontic rather than alethic haec-
ceitism, since the non-ontic haecceitist can accommodate the distinct maximal possi-
bilities yet deny there are distinct possible worlds.7 Fortunately, our present interest
is not in possible worlds, but in whether we ought to accept maximal possibilities that
differ haecceitistically. With this in mind, let me now turn to the task of discovering
6For simplicity’s sake, I assume that maximal possibilities can “include” individuals by way of
including the possibility that they exist (e.g., the relevant maximal possibility includes the possibility
that Lois exists).
7This is precisely the strategy of Lewis (1986).
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whether the alethic anti-haecceitist—let’s call her ‘Anti’ for short—-can resist the
Electron Argument.
The first strategy available to Anti is to deny one or both of P3 and P4. There
are two problems with this strategy. The first is a minor one: if Anti rejects only one
of P3 and P4, some reason for her choice is required. But, since it is unclear what
would make one premise less plausible than the other, her choice will be arbitrary
and therefore objectionable. Better, then, for Anti to reject both P3 and P4 instead
of only one.
While Anti can avoid this worry about arbitrariness, she faces a larger problem.
If she rejects P3 and P4, she accepts that the best explanation of the apparent
conceivability of the Lois-maximal possibility and the Lana-maximal possibility is that
we conceive of maximal impossibilities. But, in accepting this as the best explanation,
Anti severs the evidential connection between conceivability and possibility that P3
and P4 capture.
For those who hope to determine what is possible by appeal to what is conceiv-
able, a preferable strategy is to maintain that, when we seem to conceive of what the
alethic anti-haecceitist holds to be impossible—namely, maximal possibilities that dif-
fer haecceitistically—this is not because we conceive of the impossible. Instead, Anti
ought to hold that we conceive of maximal possibilities that are genuinely possible,
but are mistaken about the content of our conceiving. In particular, we mistake one
maximal possibility for another and, in attempting to conceive of the Lois-maximal
possibility and the Lana-maximal possibility, we conceive of a single maximal possi-
bility twice over. (Perhaps it is one including Lana or perhaps Lois or perhaps an
entirely different electron.) In this way, the evidential link between conceivability and
possibility is retained, but Anti can still offer an explanation for why the defender of
the argument is mistaken in drawing the incorrect alethic haecceitist conclusion.
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To be sure, some will be content to bite the bullet, deny one or both of P3 and
P4, and accept that conceivability does not provide a guide to possibility. But, if
one is content to explain apparent conceivability by holding individuals to conceive
of the impossible, one will have a blanket response to any conceivability argument
for a thesis one finds objectionable. Such blanket responses are not of particular in-
terest here. What is of interest is whether Anti can sustain the evidential connection
between conceivability and possibility in addition to her alethic anti-haecceitist scru-
ples. For this reason, I will focus here and throughout on the anti-haecceitist who
opts for the second kind of strategy: denying the relevant conceivability premises and
attempting to explain away the conceivability in question by appealing to something
like modal illusion (i.e., errors involving the misidentification or conflation of maximal
possibilities).
How should Anti explain the alethic haecceitist’s mistaken belief that he conceives
of the distinct Lois and Lana-maximal possibilities? The best explanation proceeds
by ascribing to the alethic haecceitist what I will call “modal delusion”.8
Modal delusion occurs when individuals form mistaken beliefs about the content of
their imaginings. In the present case, the mistake is as follows: the alethic haecceitist
believes that he conceives of a Lois-maximal possibility and then of a Lana-maximal
possibility. In fact, he conceives of one and the same maximal possibility twice over.
(It is an open question whether it is the Lois-maximal possibility, the Lana-maximal
8Modal delusion is intended to be reminiscent of “modal illusion” associated with Kripke (1980:
103-104, 141-150). It is an interesting and difficult question how precisely these are related. For
Kripke, modal illusion occurs, roughly, when an individual imagines a “qualitatively identical epis-
temic situation” to his or her actual one, where the meanings of terms fixed by description pick out
different individuals or properties than they actually do. The precise features of modal illusion are
a matter of some controversy, but, as with modal delusion, it shows a kind of epistemic insensitivity
to singular content and the primary role that qualitative (or, as I discuss later, experiential content)
plays in forming our modal beliefs. For discussion of “textbook Kripkeanism”, see Yablo (2005). For
a dissenting interpretation, see Byrne (2006). For further discussion, see Soames (2006) on Kripke
and Gendler and Hawthorne (2002) and Bealer (1994) on the finer details of modal illusion.
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possibility, or some other maximal possibility including some other individual, say,
Diana.)
To see why this mistake occurs, notice that imaginings typically include two kinds
of content: singular content, where this content is determined by the identity of
the individuals an imagining is about, and general content, where this content is
determined by the distribution of qualitative properties and is therefore independent
from singular content.
According to the alethic haecceitism, the content of his conceivings are 〈Lois, being
a lonely electron〉 and 〈Lana, being a lonely electron〉. These propositions, differ with
respect to singular content, but still share the same general content 〈x, being a lonely
electron〉.
In contrast, Anti holds that the alethic haecceitist is mistaken in believing his
imaginings to differ with respect to their singular content. Anti holds that these
imaginings share the very same singular and general content. While it will seem to
the alethic haecceitist as if he imagines distinct maximal possibilities, the content of
his imaginings are one and the same. Furthermore, given their shared general content,
the alethic haecceitist will be unable to determine that he is modally deluded and
will mistakenly believe that the content of the conceivings associated with P1 and
P2 are different. Armed with an explanation of the apparent conceivability of a Lois-
maximal possibility and distinct Lana-maximal possibility, Anti can now deny one or
both of P1 and P2 and grant merely the apparent conceivability of P1 or P2.
Intuitively, the alethic haecceitist argument and Anti’s response deliver competing
explanations of the conceivings relevant to the Electron Argument:
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The alethic haecceitist might complain that Anti’s explanation delivers a highly coun-
terintuitive view of modality. After all, it seems plausible that, for any actual indi-
vidual, there is a maximal possibility that contains only that individual. And, since
Lois and Lana are actual electrons, it seems that we should be able to “subtract”
the rest of the actual maximal possibility and be left with different maximal possi-
bilities. Against this response, Anti can note that this notion of “subtraction” is a
good guide to qualitative possibility and accept that, for any actual individual, there
is a maximal possibility that contains only a qualitative duplicate of that individual.
Anti will deny, however, that we can draw any conclusions about non-qualitative pos-
sibility using this “subtraction”-based reasoning, since it is useful only as a guide to
qualitative possibility.
Anti’s appeal to modal delusion provides an alternative explanation of the ap-
parent conceivability of the Lois-maximal possibility and Lana-maximal possibility;
however, whether it is indeed the best explanation will turn on whether we ought to
accept alethic haecceitism. For example, if there is some argument for alethic haec-
ceitism that Anti cannot provide a suitable response to, I submit that we ought to
accept alethic haecceitism and, in turn, accept P1 and P2. But, if Anti can success-
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fully rebut all of the arguments for alethic haecceitism, we can follow her in rejecting
P1 and P2 and accept Anti’s alternative explanation. For this reason, we ought to
turn to alternative arguments for alethic haecceitism. And, since the just-considered
strategy will allow Anti to block arguments that are sufficiently similar to the Elec-
tron Argument, let us turn to an argument that involves a rather different kind of
imagination.9
2.3 The Staring Contest Argument
Imagination comes in different kinds. Consider, for example, the difference be-
tween imagining running a marathon and imagining that you are running a marathon.
The first kind of imagination, inside imagination, issues from a particular perspective.
It likely involves you imagining the feeling of exhaustion, the burning sensation in
your legs, and the appearance of the finish line in your field of vision. Intuitively, it
requires us to place ourselves within an imaginary situation and occupy a particular
perspective within that situation.
The second kind of imagination, outside imagination, does not issue from a par-
ticular perspective. And, while you might visualize yourself “from above” wearing a
racing number, leading the pack, and collapsing at the end, outside imagination need
not involve any sort of sensuous imagination. You might simply hold the proposi-
tion that you are running a marathon fixed in your reasoning and draw conclusions
from it.10 Outside imagination is therefore are general kind of imagination that in-
9For example, Anti can treat an argument in Jubien (1993: 41-42) along the same lines: “Suppose
the world consisted only of two globes—globes that were qualitatively indistinguishable. The globes
would be at a certain distance from each other. They would be made of the same kind of material.
They would be of the same size, color, density, and so on. We can certainly imagine that even at
the microscopic and subatomic levels, there was no qualitative difference between them. Yet, the
argument continues, it seems clear that the positions of the globes might have been reversed.”
10A natural way to sharpen this distinction is to appeal to a distinction between content modeled
in terms of sets of possible worlds and sets of centered possible worlds consisting of a world and an
individual (and perhaps a time) within that world. While this is a helpful heuristic, it is unavailable
45
volves representing a situation but abstracts away any particular perspective that the
situation is to be imagined from.
Since we have been treating conceivability and imagination interchangeably, we
might wonder whether conceivability arguments for haecceitism can be offered from
both “the outside” and “the inside”. We have already considered the Electron Argu-
ment which is imaginable only from the outside. And, since the Electron Argument—
an outside argument—met with a prima facie satisfactory response from Anti, perhaps
a move to inside imagination will allow us to overcome Anti’s challenge.
Let us now consider whether appeal to inside imagination makes for an argument
that cannot be undermined by Anti’s appeal to modal delusion. To begin, imagine
a situation in which you and a qualitatively indiscernible doppelganger are the lone
occupants of a world in which you stand upon two mountains, Apex and Peak. Further
assume that, given your highly competitive temperament, you and your doppelganger
have become locked in a staring contest that will continue indefinitely. You stand
on Apex; your doppelganger stands on Peak. Furthermore, the purely qualitative
description of this world, STARING, is satisfied. Granted these assumptions, we can
offer an inside argument for haecceitism, the Staring Contest Argument:
The Staring Contest Argument
P1. It is conceivable that STARING is satisfied and you stand upon Apex.
P2. It is conceivable that STARING is satisfied and you stand upon Peak.
P3. If P1, it is possible that STARING is satisfied and you stand upon
Apex.
at the moment, since the question of haecceitism is closely connected with whether we need to model
particular contents as sets of worlds and centered worlds or sets of worlds only. See Ninan (2008)
for helpful discussion of these issues.
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P4. If P2, it is possible that STARING is satisfied and you stand upon
Peak.
P5. If it is possible that STARING is satisfied and you stand upon Apex
and it is possible that STARING is satisfied and you stand upon Peak,
haecceitism is true.
C1. Therefore, alethic haecceitism is true.11
Having earlier set aside those strategies that involve denying premises like P3 and
P4 that link conceivability with possibility, Anti must deny one or both of P1 and P2.
In doing so, she faces the challenge of explaining away their apparent plausibility.
In order to meet this challenge, the notion of modal delusion, previously applied
to outside imagination, must be adapted to inside imagination.12 Intuitively, this
is not a difficult notion to grasp. It requires only that the experiential content of
inside imagination—the content that determines how things seem from an imaginative
perspective—is compatible with distinct singular content—the content determined by
the identity of the individuals imagined. So, for example, if I imagine seeing one of
two twins, Ben or Carl, the experiential content of my inside imagination might be
the same, but the singular content—determined by which particular twin I imagine—
might differ depending on whether I imagine Ben or Carl.
Anti’s explanation of inside modal delusion—let us suppose it is your very own
modal delusion—will now run as follows: While you believe you have inside imagined
11The Staring Contest Argument has a close parallel in the case involving Lewis’s Two Gods.
See Lewis (1979). A related argument, discussed in Lewis (1986) and Graff Fara (2009), involves
worlds of eternal recurrence. According to these arguments, we are to imagine occupying different
epochs (albeit the same qualitative role) in different possible worlds. As with the Staring Contest
argument, our imaginings will have identical experiential content and will therefore be subject to
the same anti-haecceitist response.
12Any argument that invokes inside imagination has a corresponding version that invokes outside
imagination, but not conversely. Perhaps, however, one might accept the possibility of worlds of
“pure subjectivity” that have no imaginable general content and can therefore be imagined exclu-
sively from the inside. But, then again, perhaps not.
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two distinct maximal possibilities that differ with respect to where you are located,
there is only a single maximal possibility. You form your mistaken belief that there
are two qualitatively indiscernible maximal possibilities because you believe that your
inside imaginings, while sharing the same experiential content, differ in terms of their
singular content. In one case, you believe you inside imagine standing on Apex and
looking at your doppelganger on Peak. In the other case, you believe you inside
imagine standing on Peak and looking at your doppelganger on Apex. But you
are mistaken, and your mistake is a natural one. There is only one possibility for
you—perhaps it is standing on Apex, perhaps it is standing on Peak, or perhaps it
is standing on some entirely different mountain. And, since you cannot distinguish
your inside imaginings in terms of their experiential content, Anti can maintain that
you form the mistaken belief that the singular content of your inside imaginings differ
and that you therefore suffer from modal delusion.
We can represent Anti’s and the alethic haecceitist’s competing explanations as
follows:
Anti’s response to the Staring Contest Argument runs in close parallel to her
response to the Electron Argument. To be sure, it raises a number of puzzles about
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inside imagination that the previous argument did not, but, at the very least, Anti
has offered a prima facie plausible explanation of why we might incline to accept P1
and P2 even while one or both are false. It seems, then, that moving from outside
imagination to inside imagination will not sway Anti towards alethic haecceitism.
Something further is required. In the next section, I consider an inside argument that
attempts to improve on these initial efforts and make a convincing case for alethic
haecceitism.
2.4 The Replacement Argument
The Electron and Staring Contest Arguments share a strange feature that many
conceivability arguments do not. They require a kind of pair-wise conceivability-
possibility inference. We are required to conceive of two non-actual maximal possibil-
ities, and, given their genuine possibility, we are to conclude that they are separated
by a haecceitistic difference. Perhaps this pair-wise structure and the fact that the
argument does not involve the actual maximal possibility explains Anti’s success in
meeting the arguments already considered. To see whether this is so, let us consider
an argument that aims to show that there is a maximal possibility that differs haec-
ceitistically from the actual one. Bricker (2007) presents this Replacement Argument
as follows:
Indeed, it is perfectly legitimate to say: consider a possibility qualitatively
indiscernible from actuality but in which I do not exist. In the possibility
envisaged, I have a doppelganger, a person exactly like me in every quali-
tative respect, intrinsic and extrinsic; but that person isn’t me. I find this
intuition compelling, and think that any account of modality de re must
find a way to accommodate it.
If we take ACTUAL to be the purely qualitative description of the world, we can
formalize the Replacement Argument as follows:
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The Replacement Argument
P1. It is conceivable that ACTUAL be satisfied but that you fail to exist.
P2. If P1, it is possible that ACTUAL be satisfied but that you fail to
exist.
P3. If it is possible that ACTUAL be satisfied but that you fail to exist,
then alethic haecceitism is true.
C1. Therefore, alethic haecceitism is true.13
The Replacement Argument is an actuality-involving inside argument.14 Does it suc-
ceed where the Staring Contest Argument failed? Not really. Faced with the Re-
placement Argument, Anti has a plausible response.
Once again, Anti can deny the relevant conceivability premise, P1. But, unlike
with previous arguments, she need not invoke modal delusion to explain her denial
of P1. Instead, she can claim that you are unable to inside imagine that you do not
exist. While you can certainly imagine, say, a vast expanse of blackness, this is not
to imagine non-existence; it is merely to imagine that you exist in a vast expanse of
blackness. Anti can therefore comfortably deny P1.
Anti might also go further and attempt to explain the intuitive appeal of P1
by holding that, upon failing to inside imagine non-existence, some will lapse into
imagining the actual maximal possibility from the outside and then mistakenly believe
that they succeed in outside imagining their non-existence within a qualitatively
indiscernible maximal possibility. Here, however, Anti can appeal to modal delusion
that occurs in outside imagination and claim that, even if you have the persisting
13Bricker (2007: 130).
14Skow (2007) also discusses the distinction between Swapping and Replacement Arguments.
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intuition that P1 is true, it is likely a product of the same kind of modal delusion
that underwrites the Electron Argument.
In light of the failure of the Replacement Argument, something more than actuality-
involvement is needed to overcome Anti’s resistance. To see what this might be, let
us consider yet another argument.
2.5 The Swapping Argument
The problem with the Replacement Argument was that it required us to imagine
the unimaginable. Fortunately for the alethic haecceitist, there is another actuality-
involving inside argument that avoids this particular problem. This argument involves
actual individuals swapping their qualitative roles—the totality of their respective
qualitative properties—and is offered in Lewis (1986):
Consider the thought that I might have been someone else. Here am I,
there goes poor Fred; there but for the grace of God go I; how luck I
am to be me, not him. Where there is luck there must be contingency.
I am contemplating the possibility of my being poor Fred, and rejoicing
that is unrealised. I am not contemplating a possibility that involves
any qualitative difference in the world... Rather, I am contemplating the
possibility of being poor Fred in a world just like this one.15
Formalized, the argument runs as follows:
The Swapping Argument
P1. It is conceivable that ACTUAL is satisfied and that you occupy a
qualitative role that you do not actually occupy.
15Lewis (1986: 231).
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P2. If P1, it is possible that ACTUAL is satisfied and that you occupy a
qualitative role that you do not actually occupy.
P3. If it is possible that ACTUAL is satisfied and that you occupy a
qualitative role that you do not actually occupy, then alethic haecceitism
is true.
C1. Therefore, alethic haecceitism is true.
The Swapping Argument is an actuality-involving inside argument. Unlike the Re-
placement Argument, the imaginative task it requires us to perform is not an impos-
sible one. Furthermore, Anti’s earlier strategy of invoking modal delusion does not
seem to succeed here.
Suppose, for example, that the qualitative role that you inside imagine occupying
is the one actually occupied by LeBron James. So, when you inside imagine occupying
this qualitative role, you inside imagine sailing through the air for a reverse dunk and
being blinded by the camera flashes at a press conference.
The experiential content of your inside imagining is very different from the expe-
riential content of your actual life. But, in order for Anti’s modal delusion strategy
to be applicable here, the general or experiential content of your imagining must be
the same as the content of your actual experience. But, since these contents differ,
Anti’s modal delusion strategy will not succeed. It seems, then, that there is no way
to undermine the Swapping Argument by holding us to be modally deluded when we
imagine swapping roles with LeBron James. Arguments of this sort, which involve
imaginings that differ in terms of their general or experiential content, are therefore
differentiable arguments and arguments that do not, like those previously considered,
are non-differentiable arguments.
How might Anti block inside differentiable arguments like the Swapping Argu-
ment? I believe Anti’s best option begins by conceding that your LeBron-imagining
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and your actual life experience are indeed differentiable. Despite this, she can now
argue that the fact that these two contents are differentiable does not guarantee that
what you believe to be the content of your LeBron-imagining is its genuine con-
tent. In particular, Anti can hold that a different kind of modal delusion sinks the
Swapping Argument. This kind of modal delusion is not a confusion between the
LeBron-imagining and your actual experience. It is a confusion between what you
believe to be the content of the LeBron-imagining and the genuine content of the
LeBron-imagining. Specifically, Anti can hold that, in the act of imagining relevant
to P1, you do not imagine yourself to be otherwise—i.e., occupying LeBron James’
qualitative role. On the contrary, Anti holds that you imagine being LeBron James.
Intuitively, this distinction is between imagining yourself being otherwise and imag-
ining being someone else altogether. Represented formally, Anti holds that inside
imaginings have three constituents: the individual undertaking the imaginative act,
the individual that one imagines being, and the experiential content. So understood,
Anti holds that, since you cannot distinguish the general content of 〈you, LeBron
James, the experience of LeBron James’ actual life〉 and 〈you, you, the experience
of LeBron James’ actual life〉, you cannot know that you have succeeded in inside
imagining a possibility for you rather than a possibility for LeBron James.
According to Anti’s new strategy, the modal delusion that afflicts you is not a
confusion regarding the imaginings that are intended to represent two distinct max-
imal possibilities. It is confusion between two non-differentiable imaginings: the
imagining that purports to represent a non-actual world—one where you are LeBron
James-like—and the imagining that represents how the actual world is for another
individual, LeBron James. As with the previous kind of modal delusion, the content
of the confused imaginings is non-differentiable, but, in this case, the modal delusion
occurs at a different point in the dialectic. This putative delusion allows Anti to hold
that, despite having imagined a content differentiable from your actual experience,
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you have only conceived of a single maximal possibility—the actual one—but have
done so as a different individual. In one case, you have your own actual experience. In
the other case, you imagine being LeBron James in the very same actualized maximal
possibility. Your mistake is therefore a natural one. And, if Anti’s earlier appeal to
modal delusion sufficed to block previous arguments, her appeal to it here should be
sufficient to block the Swapping Argument.
Represented along the same lines as the previous responses, Anti’s new strategy
runs as follows:
Anti’s response to the Swapping Argument is not a modest one. Notice that, if
it is successful, the inside imagining of being LeBron James and that of occupying
his qualitative role are non-differentiable and therefore share the same experiential
character. But, if these imaginings share the same experiential character and we
cannot discern them, a skeptical problem arises: how are we to determine, for any
inside imagining, whether we imagine ourselves occupying a certain qualitative role
rather than imagining how things are for someone else altogether? If Anti is to deploy
this response to the Swapping Argument, it seems to guarantee inside imagination
can never be a guide to possibility, since we cannot know whether our imaginings have
54
anything do with what is possible for us. As a consequence, we cannot take inside
imaginability to provide evidence of what is possible for ourselves. In contrast, if
one rejects Anti’s view of inside imagination and holds that, when one imagines from
the inside, one imagines one’s self being otherwise, the skepticism about the content
of inside imagination can be set aside and the link between inside imagination and
possibility can be sustained.
Perhaps Anti can sustain the conceivability-possibility link by endorsing a kind of
cautionary principle that specifies how conceivability-evidence, when properly han-
dled, supplies us with evidence of what is possible. I take the best principle available
to Anti to be motivated by noting, first, that a possibility in which you occupy LeBron
James’ qualitative role is a possibility according to which you instantiate quite differ-
ent qualitative properties and relations than you actually have. Next, Anti assumes
that certain essentialist theses are prima facie plausible. In particular, she assumes
the prima facie plausibility of origin essentialism, according to which individuals
have their biological origins essentially. Given this assumption, Anti formulates the
following principle intended to avoid skepticism about the connection between inside
imagination and possibility:
Precaution: The genuine possibility of an apparently conceivable max-
imal possibility is the prima facie best explanation of conceivability ex-
cept in cases where (i) what is conceived of violates prima facie plausible
essentialist theses and (ii) there is some alternative explanation of the
conceivability.
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Intuitively, then, Anti’s strategy is to hold that inside imagination is a good guide
to possibility insofar as it does not flout prima facie plausible essentialist theses and
admit of alternative explanation.16
There is something intuitive about Precaution. In part, this is because many are
liable to resist the Swapping Argument precisely because it seems to run counter to
their essentialist leanings. Perhaps, then, Precaution is a plausible principle about
inside imagination and its role as a guide to possibility. As I will now argue, however,
it does not help Anti in responding to a final kind of conceivability argument for
alethic haecceitism.
2.6 The Global Destruction Argument
Granted Precaution, Anti’s response to the Swapping Argument turns on the
violation of prima facie plausible essentialist theses and subsequent anti-haecceitist
explanation in terms of modal delusion. What is needed, then, is an argument for
alethic haecceitism that Anti’s response cannot be marshaled against. As I will now
show, arguments of this sort are readily available.
Following Adams (1979), let us begin by imagining two globes that are qualitative
duplicates of one another. We occupy one of the globes, Castor. Our qualitative
duplicates occupy the other, Pollux. We can imagine a world where Castor and
Pollux exist forever, remaining qualitatively indiscernible throughout. Alternatively,
we can imagine a world where at a certain time Pollux smolders and explodes, while
we remain safe on Castor. But, if we can imagine this, we can equally well imagine
Castor and ourselves smoldering and exploding, while Pollux is spared. There is no
reason, however, to think that the latter two possibilities differ in any qualitative
16One might wonder whether the Replacement Argument also flouts essentialist commits. I suspect
that it does not do so directly, but it does make problems for so-called “Sufficiency Principles” often
employed in arguments for origin essentialism. For discussion, see McKay (1986).
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respect. Let us say, then, that these worlds both satisfy the qualitative description,
GLOBES. We can now offer the following argument:
The Global Destruction Argument
P1. It is conceivable that you occupy a world satisfies GLOBES and that
you smolder and explode.
P2. It is conceivable that you occupy a world that satisfies GLOBES and
that you do not smolder and explode.
P3. If P1, it is possible that you occupy a world satisfies GLOBES and
that you smolder and explode.
P4. If P2, it is possible that you occupy a world that satisfies GLOBES
and that you do not smolder and explode.
P5. If it is possible that you occupy a world satisfies GLOBES and that
you smolder and explode and it is possible that you occupy a world that
satisfies GLOBES and that you do not smolder and explode, then alethic
haecceitism is true.
C1. Therefore, alethic haecceitism is true.17
The Global Destruction Argument is a differentiable inside argument. For this
reason, the strategy used to block the Staring Contest Argument cannot be deployed
as a response. The best bet for Anti is to respond to it as she did to the Swapping
17See Adams (1979: 22). Melia (1999: 650) offers an analogue: “We could imagine a collection of
bald philosophers, sitting in a circle. It is a law that one of them will grow a single hair. But, by the
symmetry of the situation, any of the philosophers could be the lucky one. Again, our intuition is
that there are many qualitatively isomorphic but distinct possibilities, each representing a different
way in which the situation could evolve... What does it matter that he is part of a complex situation,
and that the various ways the situation will develop are all qualitatively the same? What difference
will this make to him?”
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Argument—i.e., by holding there to be a modal delusion between your imagining
that you yourself are smoldering and burning and you imagining being someone else
who is smoldering and burning. Recall, however, that Anti accepts Precaution in
order to ensure that her anti-haecceitist explanations are well-motivated and to avoid
skepticism about inside imagination as a guide to possibility. But, given Precaution,
Anti’s strategy cannot be deployed against the Global Destruction Argument. This
is because it does not violate any prima facie plausible essentialist theses and there
is therefore no principled reason to attempt to offer an anti-haecceitist explanation
of the apparent conceivability in question. For this reason, Anti seems to have only
two choices: accept full-blown skepticism about the link between inside imagination
and possibility or accept alethic haecceitism.
Before considering these final options, it is worth noting an alternative strategy
Anti might appeal to. She could claim that the situations involved in the Global
Destruction Argument are too exotic and therefore too “distant” from actuality for
our modal judgments—inside or outside—to be reliable guides. For this reason, the
“exotic character” of the relevant imaginings rather than their violation of prima facie
plausible essentialist theses is what allows us to hold the defender of the argument to
suffer from modal delusion and offer a principled anti-haecceitist explanation.
While I am skeptical of the claim that the relevant situations are particularly
exotic, it is important to note that this strategy is by no means general enough
to defuse another conceivability argument for haecceitism. This final argument is
imperfectly actuality-involving: it is actuality involving only for those who are actually
one of a pair of twins. Lewis (1986) presents it as follows:
To illustrate, consider these two possibilities for me. I might have been one
of a pair of twins. I might have been the first-born one, or the second-born
one. These two possibilities involve no qualitative difference in the way
the world is. Imagine them specified more fully: there is the possibility of
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being the first-born twin in a world of such-and-such maximally specific
qualitative character. And there is the possibility of being the second-born
twin in exactly such a world.18
The argument, offered to either of a pair of “identical” twins, can be formalized as
follows:
The Twins Argument
P1. It is conceivable that ACTUAL is satisfied and that you occupy the
qualitative role of your twin.
P2. If P1, it is possible that ACTUAL is satisfied and that you occupy
the qualitative role of your twin.
P3. If the actual world exists and it is possible that ACTUAL is satis-
fied and that you occupy the qualitative role of your twin, then alethic
haecceitism is true.
C1. Therefore, alethic haecceitism is true.
The Twins Argument is a differentiable inside argument. It is not plausibly
deemed “exotic” in the way that the Global Destruction Argument might be. Since
there are actually twins, the argument is, for some individuals, actuality-involving.
Finally, since it does not violate origin essentialism or any other prima facie plausible
essentialist theses, Anti has no principled reason to hold the defender of the argument
to suffer from modal delusion, given her commitment Precaution.
For this reason, Anti’s last alternative to alethic haecceitism is to embrace skepti-
cism about inside imagination as a guide to possibility. If she pursues this option, she
18Lewis (1986: 231).
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will not be alone. For instance, Nagel (2003) says: “one should be wary of intuitions
based on the first-person perspective, since they can easily create illusions of possibil-
ity.”19 In a similar vein, Nichols (2008) accepts skepticism about inside imagination
as a guide to metaphysical possibility.
Anti’s denial that inside imagination is a guide to possibility has interesting conse-
quences. The first is that it places the anti-haecceitist in the uncomfortable position
of having been pushed to a thesis in modal epistemology by what might now seem
to be a rather dogmatic commitment to alethic anti-haecceitism. It would be better,
I believe, to simply admit that anti-haecceitist intuitions are negotiable and that we
are better served to accept alethic haecceitism than to let our anti-haecceitism settle
open issues in modal epistemology.20
The second interesting consequence is that, if Anti denies inside imagination is
a guide to possibility because we can imagine haecceitistic differences from the in-
side, her position runs parallel to one regarding essentialism and anti-essentialism.
For example, Nichols (2008) argues that inside imagination is no guide to possibil-
ity because we can imagine what are alleged to be counter-essential situations (e.g.,
where you flout your essence by occupying Napoleon’s qualitative profile and having
different biological origins). It is unclear, however, what evidence is being offered
for the impossibility of the allegedly counter-essential situations. Absent compelling
independent argument, the anti-essentialist ought to be unconvinced by Nichols’ ar-
gument. Indeed, she can hold the fact that we can imagine the situation in question
to provide evidence of its possibility.
A similar moral applies here for the alethic haecceitist: if the anti-haecceitist
concludes that inside imagination is not a guide to possibility because of her com-
19Nagel (2003: 216).
20Notice, that if Peacocke (1985) is correct and all imagination is inside imagination, this thesis
proves even more striking, since the evidential connection between imagination and possibility is
entirely severed.
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mitment to anti-haecceitism, this claim will not be compelling unless independent
evidence against alethic haecceitism is offered. Moreover, for the haecceitist, the rel-
evant imaginability constitutes good evidence in favour of alethic haecceitism and
for the reliability of inside imagination as a guide to possibility. The alethic haec-
ceitist therefore requires no independent evidence. He can simply accept the working
assumption of our modal epistemology that conceivability provides evidence of pos-
sibility.21
As I suggested earlier, if there is a single successful argument for alethic haec-
ceitism, it would seem that the best explanation of apparently conceivable maximal
possibilities that differ haecceitistically is just their genuine possibility. For this rea-
son, Anti’s apparent failure to undermine the Twins Argument suggests that the
instances of conceivability relevant to all of the preceding arguments, from the Elec-
tron Argument to the Global Destruction Argument, are best explained, not by ap-
peal to modal delusion, but by taking each argument to provide evidence for alethic
haecceitism. So understood, Anti’s defense falls like a house of cards once a single
argument for alethic haecceitism like the Twins Argument cannot be successfully
undermined.22 Alethic haecceitism can therefore be supported by appeal to conceiv-
ability arguments.
Prior to concluding let me note an interesting feature of the preceding discussion:
it delivers a taxonomy of conceivability arguments for alethic haecceitism. Within this
taxonomy, the least powerful arguments were the outside arguments that Anti defused
21If one finds the anti-haecceitist’s or the essentialist’s case against inside imagination com-
pelling, a natural package of anti-haecceitist essentialism emerges as a competitor to haecceitist
anti-essentialism. For the alethic haecceitism, the more stable package deal is the latter.
22Dasgupta (2009) has recently argued against a metaphysics of individuals and in favour of
a generalist metaphysics that dispenses with individuals and replaces them with a conception of
reality as constructed out of general facts—i.e., facts that make no reference to individuals or non-
qualitative properties. For those wedded to anti-haecceitism, a generalist metaphysics might seem
attractive by virtue of ruling out haecceitistic differences. Here, I note the availability of the view
only to point out that, if generalism is required to sustain alethic anti-haecceitism, such a view
should seem that much more extreme.
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with modal delusion and the most powerful were those that seemed least plausibly
defused by accusing their defender of modal delusion. As we have seen, however,
these are inside arguments that do not violate essentialist intuitions.23 Among these
arguments, some are actuality or imperfectly-actuality involving, but the evidential
significance of this particular feature is somewhat unclear. Finally, the Replacement
Argument was seen to have the unique feature of being effectively unimaginable from
the inside. Drawing upon these features, we get the following taxonomy:
2.7 Conclusion
I have examined a number of conceivability arguments for alethic haecceitism.
After surveying the alethic anti-haecceitist’s response, I have argued that, while modal
delusion-based explanations of apparently conceivable maximal possibilities that differ
haecceitistically meet with some success, the best available explanation—one that
avoids skepticism about inside imagination as a guide to possibility—is to accept
alethic haecceitism. There is therefore a strong case to be made for alethic haecceitism
23Note that, if inside arguments are the most persuasive for haecceitism, then there is a natural
explanation for why some find haecceitism more plausible than the property-theoretic analogue,
quidditism, since the latter does not admit of conceivability arguments from the inside.
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on the basis of conceivability arguments. And, with this in mind, I will now turn
to questions about the scope of haecceitistic differences and the prospects for ontic
haecceitism.
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CHAPTER 3
PLENITUDE DE RE
3.1 Introduction
There are countless actualized possibilities, but there is only one actualized max-
imal possibility. This maximal possibility includes possibilities like the possibility
that Herman Melville wrote novels, the possibility that trees sprout leaves, and the
possibility that something spherical exists.1
The possibilities included within maximal possibilities divide into two categories.
There are non-qualitative possibilities that are possibilities for individuals. The pos-
sibility that Barack Obama is President or that Herman Melville is the tallest human
are both of this kind. There are also qualitative possibilities like the possibility that
something red exists or that something is to the left of a round object. These pos-
sibilities do not depend upon any specific individual for their actualization. They
require only that some individual—any individual at all—instantiates certain quali-
tative properties.2
By distinguishing these kinds of possibilities, we raise the following question: Are
there maximal possibilities that include the very same qualitative possibilities yet
differ with respect to the non-qualitative or, alternatively, de re possibilities they
1Here, I understand possibilities to include other possibilities by entailing them. Accordingly, for
any possibility, a maximal possibility will include that possibility or its negation.
2Intuitively, non-qualitative properties like being Henry VIII or being the wife of Henry VIII are
distinguished by their tie to specific individuals. For more on the distinction between the qualitative
and the non-qualitative, see Chapter Four.
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include? To take one example: Is there a maximal possibility wherein Napoleon has
all the qualitative properties that Nefertiti actually has and vice versa?3
If maximal possibilities can differ in this way, then alethic haecceitism is true.4
Alethic haecceitism holds that some maximal possibilities differ in terms of the non-
qualitative possibilities they include without differing in terms of the qualitative pos-
sibilities they include. We can call the difference that separates maximal possibilities
of this kind a haecceitistic difference.
Alethic haecceitism presents a puzzle for our best theory of plenitude: the Humean
approach developed in Lewis (1986).5 Like all accounts of plenitude, the Humean
approach aims to characterize the space of possibilities and thereby determine what
is and what is not possible. According to this approach, the space of possibilities can
be characterized in terms of one or more principles of plenitude. Intuitively, these
principles provide a recipe for “generating”—metaphorically, mind you—the entire
space of maximal possibilities.
A puzzle arises, however, because the Humean approach is silent about the truth
or falsity of alethic haecceitism. Although Lewis’s development of the Humean ap-
proach characterizes the space of qualitative possibilities, it says nothing regarding
non-qualitative possibilities. For this reason, the Humean approach—at least as pre-
viously developed—provides only an incomplete characterization of the space of pos-
sibilities.
My project here is to extend the Humean approach and, in doing so, provide a
complete characterization of the space of qualitative and non-qualitative possibilities.
3Setting aside this example, essentialism and haecceitism are perfectly compatible views.
4Recall that alethic haecceitism not be confused with the more controversial thesis of ontic haec-
ceitism, according to which maximal possibilities—some of which differ haecceitistically—correspond
to unique possible worlds.
5For discussion of the Humean approach, see Bricker (1991), Nolan (1996), Hawthorne et al
(2003), and Efird and Stoneham (2009).
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After briefly rehearsing the case for alethic haecceitism by presenting several argu-
ments in its favour, I aim to clarify the central commitments of the Humean approach
in Section Three. I then indicate why the Humean Approach is silent on the question
of haecceitism and motivate the extension of the Humean Approach to matters de re.
I then take up the challenge of formulating a principle of de re plenitude—a principle
of plenitude for non-qualitative possibilities. After examining various principles of
this kind, I conclude by briefly discussing the potential implications of principles of
de re plenitude for the metaphysics of possible worlds.
3.2 The Case for Haecceitism
The notion of logical space will be important in what follows. On the view I assume
here, possible worlds are identified with maximal possibilities and logical space is
therefore built out of possible worlds.6 Note, however, that my assumed identification
of possible worlds and maximal possibilities is a harmless convenience. To be sure,
one might accept maximal possibilities but deny the existence of possible worlds.
But, if my assumption is mistaken, the following discussion will be unaffected except
insofar as my talk of possible worlds will need to be recast in the more cumbersome
terminology of maximal possibilities. For this reason, the discussion in this chapter is
neutral—except where noted—between any number of views about the metaphysics
of possible worlds.7
In the language of possible worlds, haecceitism is the thesis that some possible
worlds represent the same qualitative possibilities but different de re possibilities. In-
6On one understanding, logical space is the mereological sum of all possible worlds. On another,
it is the set of all possible worlds. Depending on one’s favored view, non-maximal possibilities are
either identified with sets or sums of possible worlds.The differences between these views are not
relevant to our immediate purposes.
7Here, I do my best to set aside the difficulties arise by virtue of Lewis’s particular treatment of
haecceitism. See Chapter Five for discussion.
66
tuitively, these worlds are qualitatively indiscernible yet differ in some non-qualitative
respect—i.e., with respect to facts about the identity of the individuals.8 As I ar-
gued in the previous chapter, conceivability arguments provided strong support for
haecceitism. These arguments proceed by having us imagine or conceive of worlds
that differ haecceitistically, noting that the conceivability or imaginability of these
worlds is evidence of their possibility, and concluding that some possible worlds dif-
fer haecceitistically.9 Let me now briefly present three conceivability arguments for
haecceitism:
The Cylinder Case: Imagine a possible world consisting of only an
infinite homogenous plane and a single homogeneous cylinder. Suppose
that, at a certain time, the cylinder falls over. Intuitively, there are many
ways for the cylinder to fall, but, for any way it might fall, that outcome
will be qualitatively indiscernible from any other possible outcome. So, if
there are distinct ways the cylinder could fall, there are possible worlds
that differ only with respect to the de re possibilities that obtain.10
The Global Destruction Case: Imagine a world consisting of only two
globes that are qualitative duplicates of one another. We occupy one of
the globes, Castor. Our qualitative duplicates occupy the other, Pollux.
We can imagine a world where Castor and Pollux exist forever, remaining
qualitatively indiscernible throughout. Alternatively, we can imagine a
8See Chapter One for discussion.
9Note that the Humean approach does not deny imagination a role in modal epistemology. Lewis
(1986: 90) says: “We sometimes persuade ourselves that things are possible by experiments in
imagination. We imagine a horse, imagine a horn on it, and thereby we are persuaded that a
unicorn is possible. But imaginability is a poor criterion of possibility... We get enough of a link
between imagination and possibility, but not too much, if we regard imaginative experiments as a
way of reasoning informally from the principle of recombination.” The moral to draw here is that
our commitment to the Humean approach is no obstacle to holding imagination to inform our best
treatment of plenitude.
10This case is presented in Melia (2003: 162).
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world where, at a certain time, Pollux smolders and explodes, while we
remain safe on Castor. But, if we can imagine this, we can equally well
imagine Castor and ourselves smoldering and exploding, while Pollux is
spared. There is no reason, however, to think that the latter worlds differ
in any qualitative respect.11
The Twins Case: Suppose that you are the firstborn of two monozygotic
twins. Imagine, however, a world where events unfold in all the same
qualitative respects as the actual world, but where you are the secondborn
of the twins. Since matters are qualitatively the same, these worlds differ
only with respect to the de re possibilities that obtain at them.12
Having examined these and other arguments in the preceding chapter, I will assume
here that they supply us with sufficient evidence for the truth of haecceitism. And,
as I will now argue, this presents a significant puzzle for the defender of the Humean
Approach.
3.3 Principles of Plenitude
Let us now turn to principles of plenitude. The role of these principles is to show
that logical space extends beyond the actual world. More specifically, their role is
to furnish us with a complete logical space—one that includes all the possibilities we
ought to countenance. These principles aim to ensure that logical space is without
omissions, so that it includes every genuine possibility. And, while it is controversial
what possibilities must be included, examples of incomplete logical spaces are clear
enough. For example, no satisfactory principle of plenitude would hold that there
are possibilities according to which six and eight giraffes exist, but none according to
11This case is presented in Adams (1979: 22).
12This case is presented in Lewis (1986: 231).
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which seven giraffes exist. The task of our principles of plenitude is therefore to “fill”
logical space and rule out omissions of this objectionable sort.
For Lewis, the development of principles of plenitude takes its cue from Hume’s
denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. Lewis summarizes his
commitment to a principle of recombination as follows:
Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything can coexist with anything
else, at least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions. Like-
wise, anything can fail to coexist with anything else. Thus, if there could
be a dragon, and there could be a unicorn, but there couldn’t be a dragon
and a unicorn side by side, that would be an unacceptable gap in logical
space, a failure of plenitude.13
This passage expresses the basic insight underlying the Humean approach to plen-
itude: logical space can be characterized in terms of the various recombinations of
possible individuals, which are parts of various possible worlds.
Although this guiding insight is simple enough, challenges arise in developing it
in detail. In the remainder of this section, I single out the primary features of the
Humean approach. This is needed in order to show, first, why the Humean approach
as developed by Lewis is incomplete and, second, to give some idea of how it might
be naturally extended to provide a plenitude of de re possibilities.
Before considering the first main feature—combinatorial units—let me briefly ad-
dress an epistemic worry regarding the Humean’s appeal to non-actual combinato-
rial units like the dragons and unicorns just mentioned. One might worry that the
Humean approach, in allowing mere possibilia as combinatorial units, presupposes
the kind of modal knowledge that principles of plenitude are thought to provide a
foundation for. We ought to note, however, that this is where the Humean’s epistemic
13Lewis (1986: 87).
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conservatism regarding modal judgements comes into play. The Humean aims to sys-
tematize and extend our modal knowledge, not provide an infallible foundation from
which it flows. In this way, the Humean helps herself to pedestrian modal knowledge
of the kind that we typically assume ourselves to have. And, granted this knowledge,
the Humean aims to subsume it and the rest of our modal knowledge within a broader
theoretical framework.
Combinatorial Units: Since the Humean aims to characterize logical space in
terms of the recombination of entities, they must specify which kinds of entities are
subject to recombination. Here, we can call the entities to be recombined combina-
torial units.
According to Lewis, combinatorial units are spatiotemporal parts of possible
worlds. But, in opposition to Lewis, one might take events, objects, properties,
states of affairs, or some combination thereof to be the combinatorial units.14 Here, I
remain neutral with respect to what entities are best identified as the combinatorial
units and, in what follows, use ‘combinatorial units’ as a terminological placeholder
for whatever entities are subject to recombination. It is important to note, however,
that the Humean’s combinatorial units are drawn from more than one possible world.
So, for example, if there is a unicorn at some possible world and a dragon at another,
these entities are nevertheless ripe for recombination.
Modal Independence: The second feature of the Humean approach concerns
modal independence. For the Humean, combinatorial units are modally independent;
they stand in no relations of necessary connection or exclusion. Lewis (1986) charac-
terizes modal independence as follows: “Anything can coexist with anything else, at
14Some of Lewis’s remarks suggest that he was tempted by a more general view about combina-
torial units. See Lewis (1986: 181). Armstrong (1989) takes states of affairs to be the appropriate
combinatorial units. See Lewis (1986b) for the case against Armstrong’s account on the grounds
that it violates the Humean demand of modal independence. See also Sider (2005) for discussion of
Armstrong’s combinatorialism.
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least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal regions. Likewise, anything can
fail to coexist with anything else.”15 We are better served, however, to generalize
Lewis’s claim and note that it divides into two distinct theses. The first of these rules
out relations of necessary exclusion:
No Exclusions: For any combinatorial unit, x, and any distinct combina-
torial unit, y, there is a possible world where x and y coexist.
No Exclusions guarantees that, for any distinct combinatorial units, there is some
possible world where they coexist. So, for example, if there is a golden mountain at
some world, w, and a bronze statue at another world, w*, there is at least one world
wherein both a golden mountain and a bronze statue coexist.
The second part of the modal independence thesis rules out relations of necessary
connection. Unlike No Exclusions this claim concerns combinatorial units that are
worldmates (i.e., inhabitants of the same possible world). It can be formulated as
follows:
No Connections: For any combinatorial unit, x, and any distinct combina-
torial unit, y, such that x and y are worldmates, there is a possible world
where x exists but is not a worldmate of y.
No Connections guarantees that, for two worldmates, Cain and Abel, there is a pos-
sible world where Cain exists without Abel and vice versa. Together, No Exclusions
and No Connections capture the thesis of modal independence central to the Humean
approach.16
15Lewis (1986: 88).
16Here, we should be careful to distinguish the intended sense of distinctness qua disjointness
from mere numerical distinctness. For example, the region occupied by my body and the sub-region
occupied by my torso, while numerically distinct, are not disjoint and therefore not distinct in the
sense relevant here. For this reason, their connection is unproblematic: to recombine the region that
contains me is just to recombine a duplicate of the sum of all my sub-regions.
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Arrangements: We can now turn to the third piece of the puzzle: arrangements.
The modal independence of combinatorial units guarantees that, for any two units,
there is some world where those units coexist. It does not, however, guarantee that,
for every way for combinatorial units to coexist, there is some world where they coexist
in that way. Notice that a unicorn and dragon could coexist by being five feet apart
or by being five light-years apart. For this reason, the Humean must ensure that, for
any way for combinatorial units to be arranged (e.g., being five feet as opposed to
five light-years apart), there is some possible world where they are so arranged.
A satisfactory approach to plenitude must therefore appeal to entities that will
ensure a plenitude of arrangements for combinatorial units.17 And, while appeal to
arrangements is unavoidable, it raises questions about the generality of the Humean
approach. After all, if our best account of plenitude must appeal to them, then we
also need a guarantee that there is a plenitude of arrangements. Since addressing this
issue would take us too far afield, I will simplify matters here by following Lewis and
others in straightforwardly assuming the possibility of quantification over a plenitude
of arrangements.18
Interpreting Recombination: We are now in a position to consider the final
piece of the Humean puzzle: the interpretation of recombination claims. Here, it
is crucial to note that, as Lewis develops the Humean approach, claims about the
recombination of combinatorial units are not de re claims: they do not require that
one and the same combinatorial unit exist at various possible worlds. Instead, the
17While Lewis downplays the significance of arrangements, he does say the following: “Anything
alien can coexist, or fail to coexist, with anything else alien, or anything else not alien in any
arrangement permitted by shape and size.” Lewis (1986: 92). In a similar vein, Hawthorne et al.
(2003) plug this gap by quantifying over “ways of being adjacent”.
18In adopting quantification over possible arrangements in a principle of plenitude, I assume that
among the possible arrangements are arrangements within alternative spatiotemporal structures or
“world-structures”. For discussion, see Bricker (1991) for discussion of how a principle of plenitude
for world-structures is best formulated.
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principle of recombination is to be understood, not in terms of individuals themselves,
but rather in terms of duplicates of individuals.19 Lewis says:
It is right to formulate our principle of recombination in terms of similarity.
It should say, for instance, that there is a world where something like the
dragon coexists with something like the unicorn. But extrinsic similarity is
irrelevant here, so I should not speak of coexisting counterparts. Instead,
I should say that a duplicate of the dragon and a duplicate of the unicorn
coexist at some world, and that the attached talking head has at some
world a separated duplicate.20
An illustration: A complete logical space will include a possible world where
the Eiffel Tower is the only material object. It will also include a possible world
that includes only two Eiffel Towers. For this reason, the principle of recombination
must entail that, just as any distinct combinatorial units can coexist, any number of
duplicates of a given combinatorial unit can coexist. Such a principle must, therefore,
permit “self-duplication” and ensure that there are possible worlds according to which
there are millions upon millions of Eiffel Towers.21
Intuitively, one might now wonder, if there is a possible world with millions of Eiffel
Towers, which among them is our actual Eiffel Tower? But, on Lewis’s treatment of
recombination, this question is ill-formed. This is because the principle characterizes
logical space in exclusively qualitative terms. It therefore remains silent about non-
qualitative possibility (i.e., what is possible for the Eiffel Tower) and whether our
19See Lewis (1986: 89) for discussion.
20Lewis (1986: 89).
21Notice that, on the present proposal, quantification over a plenitude of possible arrangements
ensures a plenitude of arrangements that involve self-duplication. So, for example, there is a plurality
of possible arrangements for the Eiffel Tower, since the Eiffel Tower might have only one duplicate
or instead a vast number of duplicates. In this way, quantification over numbers of duplicates of
combinatorial units is replaced by quantification over arrangements.
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Eiffel Tower exists at any world other than the actual one. Because Lewis holds that
recombination is understood in terms of duplication, the space of possibilities can be
characterized only in qualitative terms.
We are now able to formulate and interpret the Humean Principle of Recombina-
tion:
The Humean Principle of Recombination (HPR): For any possible
arrangement, A, of any possible combinatorial units, x1, x2, ... , xn, there
is a possible world where, x1, x2, ... , xn, are arranged A-wise.
22
This principle and its interpretation are neutral on a number of issues relevant to the
Humean Approach. It is, for instance, an open question whether HPR is reducible to
some more natural principle or principles. For illustration’s sake, one natural way to
develop HPR—in fact, Lewis’s preferred approach—holds that, for any possible non-
overlapping arrangement of any possible spatiotemporal regions, there is a possible
world where those regions are so arranged. Unsurprisingly, the constraints and quali-
fications on HPR will vary with one’s preferred choice of combinatorial units, but, as
I will argue shortly, something more must be added to HPR in order to achieve the
aims of the Humean Approach.
3.4 Problems with Plenitude
The Humean approach presented above cannot be the whole story about logical
space. Since HPR does not recombine combinatorial units themselves but only qual-
itative duplicates of those units, it characterizes the space of possible worlds only
up to qualitative indiscernibility. It is therefore silent about what non-qualitative
22Here, I assume that quantification over arrangements ensures that there are possibilities accord-
ing to which any combinatorial unit might exist alone and, in this way, incorporate No Connections
without doing so explicitly.
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possibilities there are. So, as a consequence, it neither affirms nor denies the truth of
haecceitism—a thesis regarding both qualitative and non-qualitative possibilities.
In one sense, the silence of HPR regarding haecceitism is unsurprising. Lewis, the
chief proponent of the Humean approach, accepts an ontology of possible worlds that
rules out the genuine transworld identity of individuals.23 So, in order to account
for our de re modal thought and talk, Lewis develops counterpart theory, which
analyzes de re modal claims—those involving non-qualitative possibilities—in terms
of qualitative resemblance (e.g., a is possibly F if and only if a bears some qualitative
resemblance to an individual that is F.) So, for Lewis, questions about the space of
qualitative possibilities are of deep metaphysical interest and need to be settled by
principles of plenitude. But, in contrast, de re modality, which is most intimately
tied to haecceitism, proves to be largely a matter of convention, reducible to more
fundamental facts about relations of qualitative resemblance that hold between parts
of possible worlds. On this interpretation, HPR—in concert with a suitable treatment
of arrangements—answers all the difficult modal questions—i.e., those concerning
qualitative possibility—and, in concert with our modal conventions, also manages to
settle any remaining questions about de re modality.
In another sense, the silence of HPR regarding haecceitism signals a considerable
failure of the Humean approach. Notice that Lewis’s commitment to counterpart
theory is motivated primarily by his particular views about the nature of possible
worlds. And, in turn, it is counterpart theory and convention that end up settling
what non-qualitative possibilities there are. It is unclear, however, that the Humean’s
treatment of de re modality ought to be determined by any particular view of possible
23For Lewis, genuine transworld identity is untenable because of the problem of accidental in-
trinsics. Roughly, if a single individual exists at distinct possible worlds, but has distinct intrinsic
properties at those worlds, then that individual will have incompatible intrinsic properties. So, upon
pain of holding all contingent intrinsic properties to be mere relations to worlds, Lewis denies that
a single individual can exist at distinct possible worlds. See Lewis (1986: 198-209). For discussion,
see Chapter Five.
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worlds—much less Lewis’s controversial one—or that this broadly conventionalist
treatment of de re modality is true to the core Humean motivations. Furthermore,
since the initial allure of the Humean approach was to provide a uniform way to
characterize the entirety of logical space, a more natural and theory-netural approach
is to treat non-qualitative possibility in lockstep with qualitative possibility by using
principles of de re plenitude.
Once we notice the bifurcation in Lewis’s treatment of qualitative and non-qualitative
possibilities, the prospect of a more unified version of the Humean approach begins to
seem attractive. Indeed, a number of considerations suggest that we ought to prefer a
unified approach of this kind. It enjoys general theoretical virtues of unity, elegance,
and simplicity, since it would be better if qualitative and non-qualitative possibili-
ties were to be treated in a unified fashion. Moreover, it remains unclear why the
Humean ought to tackle questions about plenitude in exclusively qualitative terms
and let Lewis’s views about possible worlds and counterpart theory settle questions
about what non-qualitative possibilities there are.
There is an additional motivation for pursuing a plenitude-driven treatment of
de re modality: sustaining the connection between plenitude and fundamentality.
This motivation emerges because many defenders of the Humean Approach take the
combinatorial units to be, not just any class of entities, but all and only the fun-
damental ones.24 Furthermore, the truth of haecceitism is evidence that there are
fundamental entities other than those involved in Lewis’s qualitative conception of
plenitude. Notice, for example, that a central platitude about fundamentality is that
the fundamental properties or facts suffice to fix all the properties or facts. But,
if haecceitism is true, then qualitative properties or facts do not exhaust the range
24Sider (2007: 53) expresses precisely this insight: “Concerning possibility, I have in mind a
combinatorial principle requiring, roughly, that any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation
be possible.” See also Armstrong (1989) for the role of fundamental atomic facts in recombination.
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of fundamental properties or facts, since worlds can differ without differing qualita-
tively. For this reason, if plenitude traffics in all and only fundamental entities, then
the non-qualitative features of the world—the features tied to de re modality—are
fundamental and therefore due to be accounted for via principles of plenitude.
On the Humean approach that I will now develop, the first order of business is
to determine what qualitative and non-qualitative possibilities there are. Only after
doing so, should we turn to the task of providing a metaphysics of de re representation
like counterpart theory. In this way, my preferred version of the Humean approach
reverses the direction of theorizing that Lewis assumes in letting counterpart theory
and convention settle matters de re. It therefore treats qualitative and non-qualitative
possibility in lockstep, and allows for a unified modal epistemology that affords prin-
ciples of plenitude a central position. And, unless one is inclined to think that our
qualitative and non-qualitative modal knowledge have radically different sources, a
disunified account like Lewis’s should seem less attractive in comparison. As a conse-
quence, Humeans who reject Lewis’s particular metaphysical views are likely to find
the view I develop a more natural way to answer questions about the plenitude of
non-qualitative possibilities.
3.5 Providing a Plenitude
I will now turn to the project of formulating and defending a principle of de re
plenitude. I suspect that there are several ways one might develop a principle of this
sort. For instance, if one takes fundamental properties to be combinatorial units,
one might allow for the recombination of both fundamental qualitative properties
and fundamental non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon. Perhaps such a view
would prove attractive, but, following Lewis, I will opt for an approach that avoids
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appeal to the recombination of properties.25 In doing so, I will begin by assuming
that HPR succeeds in providing us with the complete space of qualitative possibilities.
Granted this assumption, we can help ourselves to two helpful notions.
The first notion is that of a maximal qualitative possibility, which includes, for
every qualitative possibility, either that possibility or its negation. Intuitively, maxi-
mal qualitative possibilities are just total ways for things to be qualitatively, but are
indeterminate with respect to non-qualitative matters. As such, they can naturally
be thought of as Ramseyfied descriptions of possible worlds.26
A second useful notion is that of a qualitative profile, where an individual qual-
itative profile is the set of each and every qualitative property, intrinsic, extrinsic,
and relational, that an individual instantiates according to a maximal qualitative
possibility. Qualitative profiles can, for our purposes, be thought of as Ramseyfied
qualitative descriptions of individuals that encode only qualitative information about
individuals and the world. Intuitively, they specify the qualitative properties some-
thing instantiates without specifying the identity of the particular individual that
instantiates them.
Granted these two notions, the most natural way to extend the Humean approach
is to develop a principle of de re plenitude that “generates” possibilities by mapping
individuals into the qualitative profiles that make up maximal qualitative possibilities.
In developing a principle of this sort, a number of issues arise. Let us begin, however,
by considering the following principle as a first attempt:
25See Lewis (1986: 92).
26We generate a Ramseyfied description by replacing all the individual constants that occur in a
given description with variables and introduce corresponding existential quantifiers to bind them.
For more on Ramsey sentences, see Lewis (1970).
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Simple Plenitude: For every individual and every qualitative profile,
there is some maximal possibility according to which that individual in-
stantiates that qualitative profile.
Simple Plenitude raises question about the five following issues: actualism and pos-
sibilism, joint possibilities, essence, distinct indiscernibles, and contingent identity. I
will now consider these issues, and, by examining them in turn, move towards the
best available principle of de re plenitude.
3.6 Actualism & Possibilism
The first issue Simple Plenitude raises is whether it should be understood along
actualist or possibilist lines. Notice that Simple Plenitude employs quantification
over “every individual”. How should we interpret the domain of this quantifier?
According to an actualist interpretation, the quantifier ranges over only actual
individuals, since only actual individuals exist. According to a possibilist interpre-
tation, the quantifier ranges over both actual and merely possible individuals, since
both actual and merely possible individual exist. Although an exhaustive discussion
of actualism and possibilism is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it will
be helpful to sketch a few of the crucial points in the debate between actualists and
possibilists in trying to settle the question at hand.27
The most familiar worries about possibilism revolve around conceptual incoher-
ence and ontological profligacy. According to analytic actualists, actuality is a pre-
condition for existence, so the concept of a merely possible albeit existent individual
is flatly incoherent.28 Other opponents of possibilism find the charge of conceptual
incoherence too strong, but still maintain that there is something unattractive about
27For discussion of complications in defining and interpreting actualism, see Bennett (2005).
28See, for example, Loux (1979: 47).
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the possibilist’s commitment to mere possibilia or the disregard for parsimony that
possibilism seems to require.29
For actualists, possible worlds are constructions out of actually existing entities
that represent maximal possibilities. But, if only actually-existing resources are avail-
able for the construction of possible worlds, it is unclear whether actualists can dis-
criminate between intuitively distinct maximal possibilities. The crux of the problem
arises when we consider aliens—individuals that might exist, but do not actually ex-
ist.30 If we accept the possibility of aliens, we ought to also accept that there could
have been two more individuals than there actually are. Let us suppose, for exam-
ple, that there could have been, in addition to all actual individuals, two additional
bronze cubes that are intrinsic duplicates of one another. Given such a possibility,
there is reason to believe that either cube could have been the lone individual that
exists. There are therefore two maximal possibilities: one according to which one of
the bronze cubes exists, another according to which the other bronze cubes exists.
But, how is the actualist to distinguish these maximal possibilities?
Since neither bronze cube actually exists, she cannot discriminate them by nam-
ing them. And, since the two worlds with only bronze cubes are qualitatively indis-
cernible, she cannot do so in qualitative terms. Here, the possibilist fares better than
the actualist. She can distinguish the two cubes by name, since, unlike the actualist,
she admits these bronze cubes exist even while they do not actually do so. In this
respect, she avoids the actualist’s problems regarding aliens.
Just as possibilism allows for a relatively easy way to discriminate between various
maximal possibilities, it also allows an easy way to interpret our principles of de re
plenitude. If we suppose the relevant quantifiers to range over all possible individuals,
we can guarantee the full range of non-qualitative possibilities for both actual and
29For a possibilist response to these charges, see Lewis (1986: 135-165).
30For discussion, see Lewis (1986: 136-192).
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alien individuals. But, if we opt for actualism, we cannot straightforwardly accom-
modate non-qualitative possibilities involving aliens. In light of this consideration, I
will help myself to a commitment to possibilism with three caveats.
First, notice that our primary competitor, Lewis, also endorses possibilism, so the
present proposal is no better or worse off for taking on a commitment to possibilism.
Second, if actualists find they cannot set aside their worries about commitment to
merely possible entities, they are welcome to employ a principle of de re plenitude
that quantifies over only actual individuals. Such a principle will secure a plenitude
of qualitative possibilities as well as a plenitude of non-qualitative possibilities for
actual individuals, but leave open precisely what non-qualitative possibilities, if any,
there are for aliens. This is noteworthy, in part, because it allows for the defender of
the present approach to de re plenitude to handily represent views like Adams (1981),
which deny there are haecceitistic differences regarding alien individuals. Third, even
while we can follow Lewis in accepting possibilism, we need not commit to his par-
ticular version of possibilism (i.e., one that accepts a plurality of concrete possible
worlds). We might, for example, view possible individuals as abstracta or as a sui
generis ontological category. In this respect, the nature of the merely possible can be
left open even while we help ourselves to possibilist quantification.
3.7 Joint Possibilities
A second issue, which presents serious problems for Simple Plenitude, concerns joint
possibilities—possibilities for more than one individual—like the possibility that you
and I are made of gold. Although Simple Plenitude ensures that there is some world
in which I am sitting and that there is some world in which you are standing, it does
not guarantee that there is some world in which you are sitting and I am standing. To
remedy this worry, we need to strengthen our formulation by appealing to mappings
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of sets of individuals into sets of qualitative profiles rather than mere mappings of
individuals into qualitative profiles. The following principle results:
Full Plenitude: For every set of qualitative profiles included in a max-
imal qualitative possibility, P, and for every set of possible individuals,
S, and for every one-to-one mapping from S into P, there is a maximal
possibility where members of S instantiate the qualitative profile in P that
they are mapped into.
Full Plenitude accommodates joint possibilities. In doing so, it guarantees a plenitude
of haecceitistic possibilities. It requires, for instance, that not only is there a possi-
ble world where you and I have the actual qualitative profiles of Bush and Obama
respectively, there is also a world where you and I have the qualitative profiles of
Obama and Bush respectively. This is because the mappings from S into P are or-
dered in such that any way to distribute S throughout P is an admissible mapping.
By guaranteeing a plenitude of both individual and joint possibilities, Full Plenitude
secures a broad range of haecceitistic differences that, as I will argue later, a suitable
principle of de re plenitude should accommodate.
3.8 Essence
Simple and Set Plenitude raise questions about essence. Since they forego any
restrictions on the qualitative possibilities for individuals, they preclude any indi-
vidual from having (non-trivial) essential qualitative properties.31 Furthermore, the
Humean’s commitment to modal independence rules out the de re necessary connec-
tions between individuals defended by essentialists (e.g., the connection between a
biological organism like George W. Bush and its biological origins in George H.W.
31Here, I understand essential properties to be those properties individuals have in all possible
worlds in which they exist. See Chapter Seven for discussion.
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Bush). For these reasons, it is unlikely that any substantive form of essentialism is
compatible with principles like Simple or Full Plenitude.32
Within the debate over essentialism, Humeans are liable to fall firmly on the anti-
essentialist side. Since my interest here is in developing the strongest version of the
Humean approach to plenitude, I will simply follow the current and assume anti-
essentialism. In the present context, this assumption is well-warranted. Recall that
Lewis’s approach to plenitude is the primary competitor to the approach I defend
here and that Lewis’s version of counterpart theory also precludes a commitment to
substantive truths about essences. For this reason, my preferred view is no better or
worse off than Lewis’s own view with regard to flouting essentialist scruples.33
Now, while I will assume anti-essentialism in proceeding, it is worth noting that
there is no formal obstacle to reconciling principles of de re plenitude with essen-
tialism. If we suppose that some independent account of the essential properties of
individuals has been supplied, we can introduce an essentialist-friendly principle of
de re plenitude as follows:
Essentialist Plenitude: For every set of qualitative profiles included in
a maximal qualitative possibility, P, and for every set of possible individ-
uals, S, and for every one-to-one mapping from S into P that is essence-
compatible, there is a maximal possibility where members of S instantiate
the qualitative profile in P that they are mapped into.
32An interesting open question regarding the Humean’s commitment to modal independence is
whether necessary connections are flatly incoherent or merely theoretically vicious. If they are
flatly incoherent, there is an unqualified stricture against them. If they are theoretically vicious,
something like what Forrest (2001) calls Hume’s Razor ought to be adopted: given otherwise equally
good theories, we ought to prefer whichever theory is committed to the fewest necessary connections
between distinct existences.
33The primary difference that arises between these views is that, for Lewis, what de re possibilities
there are varies with how context selects counterpart relations, while, on the present approach, what
possibilities there are will also vary with context, but this need not require an appeal to counterpart
relations.
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The appeal to essence-compatible mappings in Essentialist Plenitude allows us to
reconcile principles of de re plenitude and essentialist scruples. Intuitively, essence-
compatible mappings only generate possibilities consistent with the specified essences
of individuals. For instance, something that is essentially a lion will not be mapped
into a qualitative profile belonging to a park bench.34 So, while I set aside worries
about essence in what follows, there is still ample room to endorse essentialism and
something like the present treatment of de re plenitude.
3.9 Indiscernibles
The fourth issue that arises concerns the relation between haecceitism and distinct
indiscernibles. Consider, for example, a maximal qualitative possibility according to
which there are only two qualitatively indiscernible iron spheres arranged five feet
from one another.35 Since we aim to accommodate the full range of haecceitistic
possibilities, our principle of de re plenitude must include sufficient structure to dis-
criminate between various haecceitistic possibilities regarding this maximal qualita-
tive possibility. If we focus upon only two possible individuals—Lois and Clark—our
principle of de re plenitude, must discriminate between the two possible ways that
Lois and Clark might be located.36 Intuitively, the puzzle that arises is how to ensure
that, despite the fact that there is only a single qualitative profile, there are two ways
for Lois and Clark to fit into this maximal qualitative possibility.
34The essentialist will also likely place non-qualitative constraints on the essence-compatible map-
ping such that only certain individuals (e.g., a table and the tree from which it was made) are jointly
mapped into profiles that stand in certain relations like being made from.
35I unabashedly assume the falsity of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. See Adams
(1979) for discussion.
36There are a number of competing views about the kinds of possibilities that ought to be discrim-
inated. Here, my aim is not to settle among them, but only two show how distinct indiscernibles
and haecceitism can, in principle, be accommodated.
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I take this puzzle to concern how we ought to interpret talk of qualitative profiles.
For our purposes, we need some way to distinguish between a world where Lois
occupies Q1 and Clark occupies Q2 and vice versa.
37 But, unless we have a way to
discriminate Q1, Q2, there is no way to guarantee the desired plenitude.
Here, the easiest way to proceed is to hold that, strictly speaking, there is only
a single qualitative profile, Q, whose instances can be represented by pairing Q with
ordinal numbers. Since we can determine how many indiscernible qualitative profiles
are realized within a world by considering the cardinality of the set of entities that
satisfy the Ramsey sentence that describes the world, we can go on to represent the
various possibilities using ordered pairs of numbers and sets of properties. So, strictly
speaking, the sequences that individuals are mapped into are pairs of a single qualita-
tive profile and a real number like 〈Q, 1〉, rendered more simply as Q1. This provides
the resources needed to distinguish possibilities involving distinct indiscernibles.38
3.10 Contingent Identity
The fifth and final issue I will consider concerns contingent identity. For those
who accept contingent identity, facts about the identity and distinctness of individu-
als vary from world to world. So, while you and I are actually distinct, we might not
37To be sure, the structure imposed by the sequences of qualitative profiles will be arbitrary,
but arbitrariness in this regard is not objectionable. Notice, for example, the pervasive appeal to
sequences in our representation of propositions. We distinguish 〈Mary, John, was kissed by 〉 from
〈John, Mary, was kissed by 〉 as the distinct contents of “Mary was kissed by John” and “John was
kissed by Mary”, but there is no intrinsic or principled nature to this specific ordering. It is a matter
of convention which sequences represents which content. So, too, with our appeal to sequences of
qualitative profiles. No principled ordering is needed, since any ordering with sufficient structure
will suffice.
38There is a related family of questions concerning the cardinality of the entities involved in
principles of plenitude. For example, if there are worlds with proper class-many qualitative profiles
or if there are proper class many possible individuals, Full Plenitude will have to be formulated
in terms of proper classes rather than sets. While this gives rise to various complications—most
notably, how to make sense of quantification over proper classes—I will set these kinds of concerns
aside here. See Nolan (1996) for discussion.
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have been. Note, however, that contingent identity is ruled out by Full Plenitude,
given that the only admissible mappings are one-to-one. That said, if we wish to
accommodate contingent identity, a simple generalization of Full Plenitude is avail-
able: admit many-to-one (and perhaps one-to-many) mappings from individuals onto
sequences of qualitative profiles and interpret contingent identity as distinct individ-
uals occupying the very same qualitative profile.39 According to this proposal, the
following principle results:
Contingent Identity Plenitude: For every set of qualitative profiles in-
cluded in a maximal qualitative possibility, P, and for every set of possible
individuals, S, and for every many-to-one or one-to-one mapping from S
into P, there is a maximal possibility where members of S instantiate the
qualitative profile in P that they are mapped onto.
Contingent Identity Plenitude is a strange and powerful principle. For example, it
admits a mapping that takes the entire domain of possible individuals onto a single
qualitative profile and thereby guarantees, for all possible individuals, there is a world
where they are a single individual.
Whether one accepts contingent identity, it remains noteworthy that the present
approach provides a way to interpret talk that presupposes contingent identity. This
is because one of the putative advantages of Lewis’s counterpart theory is that it
accommodates that apparent contingent identity of, say, a statue and the clay it is
composed of. Notice, however, that, since Lewis holds individuals to be worldbound,
there is a sense in which, strictly speaking, he denies that what one might consider
“genuine” contingent identity ever takes place. (Lewis would, of course, deny there is
a “genuine” sense of contingent identity over and above the kind he accommodates.)
And, given that Contingent Identity Plenitude interprets talk of contingent identity
39See Yablo (1987) for a distinct yet related proposal.
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in terms of occupation of the very same qualitative profile, it also avoids commitment
to “genuine” contingent identity, and offers a metaphysically well-behaved surrogate
instead.
3.11 Alternatives to Full Plenitude
I have now developed a principle of de re plenitude and indicated how competing
principles can capture various metaphysical commitments. To be sure, there are al-
ternative principles that warrant additional consideration. For example, one might
consider principles that restrict the kinds of entities subject to Full Plenitude.40 Alter-
natively, one might hold that different principles of de re plenitude apply to different
kinds of entities.
Before proceeding, let me briefly mark one especially interesting view that emerges
in considering the relation between haecceitism and plenitude. Suppose that one finds
the Cylinder Case, presented in Section Two, entirely unconvincing, but takes both
the Global Destruction and Twins Cases to provide compelling evidence for haec-
ceitism. Further suppose that one explains their differing assessment of these cases
by noting that only in the latter cases is the difference between worlds a difference
in what it’s like for the individuals involved. On such a view, the putative haecceitis-
tic differences are therefore genuine only when they are differences for individuals to
experience. Call this view about the scope of haecceitistic difference, perspectivalism,
since it holds that haecceitistic differences between worlds must be differences for
individuals with perspectives upon the world.41 For the perspectivalist, no worlds
40Arguably, the most natural restriction holds Full Plenitude to apply only to concrete objects
and remain silent on the modal features of abstracta. Another example: Suppose that the Hole
Argument given by Earman and Norton (1987) pushes us towards the view of Maudlin (1988) that,
while material objects are subject to Full Plenitude, individual spacetime points have all of their
properties essentially and therefore fall outside the scope of Full Plenitude. The natural way to
represent such a view is to simply restrict the domain of the principle to material objects.
41See Chapter Two for discussion of the various arguments for haecceitism.
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without individuals that bear perspectives and enjoy conscious experience are ever
separated by a haecceitistic difference.
Perspectivalism can be naturally represented by restricting the scope of Full Plen-
itude to apply only to those individuals with perspectives upon the world. In doing
so, the perspectivalist can leave open what the proper principle of de re plenitude for
other non-perspectival individuals might be. But, granted this distinction, perspec-
tivalism is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it marks a non-arbitrary view of the
scope of haecceitistic difference. Second, it delivers a novel kind of modal dualism.
Specifically, it secures a metaphysical difference between individuals that bear per-
spectives and those that do not, since only the latter give rise to possibilities that differ
haecceitsitically. Furthermore, this modal dualism distinguishes the perspectival and
non-perspectival parts of the world without a commitment to a Cartesian dualism
of material and immaterial individuals.42 Here, I draw attention to perspectivalism
only in order to illustrate the fertility of principles of de re plenitude for suggesting
and developing novel views in the metaphysics of modality.
3.12 Interpreting Full Plenitude
My aim in the previous section was to develop a complete Humean Approach
that characterized the entirety of logical space. While my discussion was intended
to be broadly neutral with respect to a variety of competing metaphysical views,
there is a natural tendency to wonder how this framework is best realized within a
metaphysics of modality. Prior to concluding, I will briefly outline what I believe to
be the most natural implementation of this framework.43 My remarks here will be
42On the simplest view, a divide between perspectival and non-persepectival individuals is assumed
and, as a consequence, certain broadly Cartesian intuitions are ratified. Most notably, perspectival
individuals are essentially perspectival.
43I motivate and defend this implementation on the basis of other considerations in Chapter Five.
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cursory and partisan, glossing over a number of standing controversies. They also look
forward to Chapter Five where I develop in detail the view sketched here. Even so, I
believe that for those ammenable to the framework developed, the following represents
an attractive and novel conception of possible worlds and de re representation for
interpreting the preceding framework.
Recall that our complete Humean Approach employs two principles of plenitude—
HPR and Full Plenitude.44 Intuitively, the former concerns the qualitative features of
the world, while the latter concerns non-qualitative or de re matters. And, while one
interpretation of this approach takes both of these principles to concern fundamental
properties—qualitative and non-qualitative, respectively—a more natural interpreta-
tion holds the former to concern the ontological category of properties (specifically,
fundamental qualitative properties) and the latter to concern the “thin” or “bare”
particulars that instantiate these properties.45 This interpretation therefore assumes
a view of particulars according to which they have a binary rather than unary struc-
ture. On this binary conception (alternatively, “substratum theory”), particulars
have two kinds of constituents: qualitative properties—here, I assume them to be
universals—and bare particulars. So, unlike a unary conception (alternatively, “bun-
dle theory”) which holds particulars to be exhaustively composed of properties, the
binary conception posits a fundamental instantiation relation between bare particu-
lars and sparse universals.46 There is a further component to this view. It holds that
thick particulars are most naturally interpreted as the entities that have or instantiate
properties and that, in our ordinary thought and talk, the instantiation relation is
just the internal relation that thick particulars bear to their universal constituents.
44Here, I set aside concerns about the relation of a plenitude of arrangements assumed in HPR.
45See Sider (2006) for a recent discussion and defense of a bare particular metaphysics.
46As I argue in Chapter Five, there is an ambiguity in our talk of instantiation between the
fundamental external relation universals bear to bare particulars and the internal relation that thick
particulars bear to the constituent universals.
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On the resulting view, bare particulars have no accidental intrinsic properties, since
their relation to universals, unlike thick particulars, is an external one.
Granted this binary conception of particulars, the preceding framework admits of
a natural interpretation: HPR characterizes the space of possible worlds in all quali-
tative respects, while Full Plenitude (or one’s preferred principle of de re plenitude)
determines the distribution of bare particulars across this space of possible worlds.
Notice that this interpretation restores the desired connection between recombina-
tion and fundamentality, since each principle concerns one of the two fundamental
ontological categories, universals and bare particulars that intuitively represent de re
possibilities for us. And, while it is tempting to think that this interpretation requires
us to identify ourselves with bare particulars, this is not so. There is good reason to
believe that we are, in fact, thick particulars—i.e., the sum of our bare particulars
and qualitative properties. After all, bare particulars have no accidental intrinsic
properties, but we have myriad accidental intrinsic properties.47 How, then, can this
metaphysics of particulars and interpretation of principles of plenitude make sense of
our de re modal properties?
To fully answer this question, sides must be taken with respect to issues of actu-
alism and possibilism. Here, I will simply mark my affinity for possibilism and note
that, for the modal realist who accepts the existence of merely possible worlds, a
novel proposal emerges. This proposal falls comfortably between Lewisian counter-
part theory and the acceptance of our literal identity across worlds. On this view,
bare particulars enjoy numerical “transworld identity”, since, by virtue of having
no accidental intrinsic properties, they do not succumb to Lewis’s argument for the
worldbound status of individuals.48 Furthermore, these bare particulars determine
47Indeed, the fact that we have accidental intrinsic properties is precisely why Lewis (1986) denies
that we can be numerically identical across worlds. See Chapter Five.
48See McDaniel (2004) for another way to preserve literal transworld identity within the modal
realist framework.
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non-qualitative relations between thick particulars, since the non-qualitative relation
of having a common bare particular can now be used to analyze de re representation.
And, while these relations are not counterpart relations in the Lewisian sense—after
all, they are non-qualitative—they are ideal candidates for determining de re represen-
tation. On the intuitive picture that emerges, the persistence of our bare particulars
across worlds determine what is possible for us even while we are not identical to bare
particulars. So, while there is numerical identity across worlds for bare particulars,
we as thick particulars remain worldbound entities. The resulting view is therefore
properly viewed as a kind of non-qualitative counterpart theory and as an attractive
way to realize the framework of de re plenitude outline above.
3.13 Conclusion
I have argued that the Humean approach to plenitude as developed in Lewis (1986)
delivers an incomplete characterization of logical space. For those of us attracted to a
unified treatment of plenitude, the Humean approach ought to be supplemented with
a principle of de re plenitude like Full Plenitude. Such a principle, in conjunction
with HPR, characterizes the complete range of qualitative and non-qualitative possi-
bilities. Furthermore, it provides a conception of logical space in which haecceitistic
differences are commonplace, where, for example, there is a possible world in which
you and I swap qualitative roles and yet another where you and my favorite mug
swap qualitative roles. This is an extreme view of the scope of haecceitistic differ-
ence, and, in subsequent chapters, I elaborate on how it might be reconciled with
a version of modal realism. Prior to doing so, I turn to the challenge of clarifying
the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties which underlies a
proper understanding of haecceitism.
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CHAPTER 4
NON-QUALITATIVE PROPERTIES
4.1 Introduction
The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter, PII) enjoys a storied
history. In a fairly recent chapter, Max Black presented what is now commonly taken
to be a decisive counter-example to PII.1 Rather intuitively, Black suggested that we
can conceive of a world including only two iron spheres—perfect duplicates of one
another—located a small distance apart and, since we have no problem conceiving of
such a world, there is good reason to believe it to be a possible one. And, if such a
world is possible, PII no longer enjoys the status of a necessary truth and is thereby
robbed of most, if not all, of its metaphysical significance.
Along with making problems for PII, Black’s argument also brings to salience
an important metaphysical distinction: the distinction between qualitative and non-
qualitative properties and relations. (Hereafter, I mostly ignore relations and speak
primarily of properties.) This distinction is relevant to the present case because
Black’s spheres—let’s call them ‘Bruce’ and ‘Clark’—agree with respect to all of
their qualitative properties, and disagree only with respect to their non-qualitative
ones. Not only are Bruce and Clark duplicates, since they share all the same intrin-
sic qualitative properties like being spherical and being made of iron, they are also
indiscernibles. They share all the same extrinsic and relational qualitative properties
like being next to another sphere and being one of two iron objects. The sole differ-
1See Black (1952).
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ences between Bruce and Clark are non-qualitative: they involve only properties and
relations like being Bruce and being distinct from Clark.
By considering Black’s sphere case, we get a rough account of the distinction
between the qualitative and the non-qualitative. Qualitative properties like being
made of iron are what Bruce and Clark share; non-qualitative properties like being
Bruce are what they do not share. This rough account is widely assumed and near-
universally employed. Unfortunately, our rough grip on the distinction does not
provide us with knowledge of the nature of non-qualitative properties (e.g., whether
they are universals, tropes, or something else altogether) or knowledge of the precise
contours of the distinction (e.g., whether properties like being an even number or
being a tiger are qualitative). Instead, it supplies us with only a very rough account
typified in remarks like the following:
[H]aecceitistic properties—such as being identical to John or being the
daughter of Jim—are those which, in some intuitive way, make direct
reference to a particular individual(s).2
[A] qualitative property or relation is one which can be adequately speci-
fied without reference to any particular individual.3
These remarks suggest that only non-qualitative properties depend upon individuals
in some unspecified way, and that properties like being Saul Kripke are paradigmati-
cally non-qualitative. Unfortunately, they tell us remarkably little else.
It is surprising that rather little attention has been paid to the distinction between
qualitative and non-qualitative properties.4 (Hereafter, I call this “the qualitative
2Hawthorne (2006: 8).
3deRossett (2010: 74 fn. 4).
4For example, Divers (2002: 349) says “I know of no detailed discussion of the qualitative/non-
qualitative distinction for properties.” His ignorance is easily explained: there is no detailed discus-
sion of the qualitative distinction.
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distinction”.) So, in what follows, I aim to take some initial and overdue steps
towards clarifying the nature and scope of the qualitative distinction. Alongside this
clarificatory undertaking, I will also offer a partisan defense of a certain reductionist
analysis of the distinction.
The discussion runs as follows: In Section Two, I demonstrate the importance of
the qualitative distinction for a range of philosophical projects, and consider certain
kinds of potentially non-qualitative properties. In Section Three, I discuss the three
views of the qualitative distinction: eliminativism, primitivism, and reductionism. In
Sections Four through Eight, I examine various forms of reductionism. After detailing
their respective virtues and vices, I defend the view that non-qualitative properties are
distinguished by their failure to supervene upon natural properties. In Section Nine,
I draw upon this view of non-qualitative properties to defend a novel thesis about
the nature of non-qualitative properties. Specifically, I argue that there are non-
qualitative properties that are no more or less fundamental than the fundamental
qualitative ones. I conclude in Section Ten.
A terminological note before proceeding: rather than switching between famil-
iar but non-standard terms for non-qualitative properties (e.g., “haecceities”, “this-
nessnes”, “impure properties”, and “identity properties”), I take “non-qualitative
property” to subsume all properties of these kinds. That said, I do suggest a specific
use of “haecceities” and “impure properties” in Section Two that singles them out as
a distinct kind of non-qualitative properties.
4.2 The Distinction in Action
In this section, I demonstrate the relevance of the qualitative distinction for two
core philosophical issues. In doing so, I show that we cannot reasonably go with-
out some account of this distinction. Furthermore, since appeal to the qualitative
distinction is commonplace in metaphysics, I leave aside discussion of its more eas-
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ily recognized importance for understanding concepts like intrinsicality, resemblance,
parthood, identity, modality, and so on.
Laws and Explanation The qualitative distinction plays a central role
in debates regarding both laws and explanation. In particular, it is widely
(although tendentiously) assumed that fundamental laws are purely qual-
itative property-involving such that no explicit appeal to non-qualitative
properties or specific individuals is admissible in the formulation of fun-
damental laws.5 This commitment traces back (at least) to Hempel and
Oppenheim (1948) where they defend this stricture in order to sustain the
covering law view of explanation:
[T]he idea suggests itself of permitting a predicate in a funda-
mental lawlike sentence only if it is purely universal, or, as we
shall say, purely qualitative, in character; in other words, if a
statement of its meaning does not require reference to any one
particular objects or spatio-temporal location. Thus, the terms
‘soft’, ‘green’, ‘warmer than’, ‘as long as’, ‘liquid’, ‘electrically
charged’, ‘female’, ‘father of’, are purely qualitative predicates,
while ‘taller than the Eiffel Tower’, ‘medieval’, ‘lunar’, ‘artic’,
‘Ming’ are not.6
Although we may disagree with both this particular conception of the
qualitative distinction and the attendant view of laws and explanation,
it is clear that, for Hempel and others, a suitable account of laws and
scientific explanation will require some account of the distinction.
5For discussion, see Lange (1985). See Tooley (1977) for a defense of the possibility de re laws,
which posit nomic connections involving non-qualitative properties.
6Hempel (1948: 155-156).
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Content and Attitudes According to descriptivism, the semantic con-
tent of names and certain predicates are synonymous with definite descrip-
tions that express only qualitative properties.7 The moral of Kripke and
Putnam’s Twin Earth arguments is that descriptivism is false, and that
names and predicates, unlike any putatively synonymous descriptions, can
divide individuals and kinds that are qualitatively indiscernible.8 In this
context, the qualitative distinction proves crucial because, unless the re-
striction to qualitative properties is added to thesis of descriptivism, the
view is immune to Kripke and Putnam’s arguments. This is because the
descriptivist can appeal to descriptions expressing non-qualitative prop-
erties like “the blahs on Earth” or “near me” and thereby divide qualita-
tively indiscernible individuals and kinds. More generally, the fact that
attitudes and reference relations can divide qualitatively indiscernible in-
dividuals is useful for illustrating and diagnosing the uniquely de re status
of certain attitudes and relations.
Given its importance for philosophical concerns like those just considered, we have
good reason to pursue a suitable account of the qualitative distinction. But, before
evaluating these competing accounts, let me lay the groundwork for this evaluation
by considering some properties that might reasonably be deemed non-qualitative9:
Haecceities: Haecceities like being Saul Kripke are paradigmatic non-
qualitative properties associated with the identity of specific individuals
like Saul Kripke. Sometimes called “individual essences”, haecceities are
uniquely instantiable by a specific individual.
7See Kripke (1980) for discussion.
8See Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975).
9I leave open whether some of these properties might ultimately prove to be qualitative or that
their status is to be settled only after adopting a specific account of the qualitative distinction
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Negative Haecceities: If being Saul Kripke is non-qualitative, it is plau-
sible that negative haecceities like being distinct from Saul Kripke are sim-
ilarly non-qualitative. Notice, for example, that the indiscernible spheres,
Bruce and Clark, differ with respect to the negative haecceities being dis-
tinct from Bruce and being distinct from Clark.
Disjunctive Haecceities: If being Saul Kripke and being David Kaplan
are non-qualitative, it is plausible that there is a disjunctive haecceity of
being Saul Kripke or David Kaplan that is also non-qualitative. Notice
also that, if there were two additional indiscernible spheres in Black’s
world, disjunctive haecceities would divide Bruce and Clark from those
other spheres without any of the spheres differing qualitatively.
Impure Properties: Impure properties like being the same height as
Saul Kripke or being next to David Kaplan seem non-qualitative by virtue
of involving specific individuals. It is unclear, however, precisely what
kind of involvement makes for a non-qualitative rather than qualitative
property. For example, if Kripke is actually five feet tall, then being the
same height as Saul Kripke actually is might still be identified with the
qualitative property being five feet tall. Despite this, it is uncontroversial
that at least some impure properties are non-qualitative.
Species Properties: Species properties like being a tiger behave like
haecceities.10 This is because Twin Earth cases suggest that species terms
like ‘tiger’ function much like proper names like ‘Saul Kripke’. And, since
proper names and their associated properties like being Saul Kripke divide
10Indeed , some have argued that species are individuals and, as a consequence, the species property
of being a tiger is analogous to the impure property of being a part of the tiger-species. See Lange
(1985) for an overview.
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qualitatively indiscernible individuals, there is some reason to believe that
species terms and their associated properties like being a tiger do the same.
Species properties are therefore plausibly held to be non-qualitative.
Tense and Modal Properties: Suppose, for a moment, that you ac-
cept both eternalism—roughly, the existence of non-present times—and
possibilism—roughly, the existence of non-actual words—but hold that
there is a fundamental ontological distinction between both present and
non-present entities and between actual and merely possible entities.11 In
order to make sense of this distinction, you ought to accept the existence
of fundamental non-qualitative properties that divide what presently or
actually exists from what non-presently or merely possibly exists. After
all, if these properties—being present and being actual—are qualitative,
then there is a qualitative difference between any present or actual things
and non-present or merely possible things. But, since present or actual
things can be qualitatively indiscernible from non-present or merely pos-
sible things (e.g., in a world of eternal recurrence), you and those like you
who accept distinctions of this kind ought to accept that these sorts of
tense and modal properties are non-qualitative.
Structural Properties: Some structural properties are bound up with
facts about identity, distinctness, composition, coexistence and other struc-
tural facts about the world. Intuitively, these properties like being distinct
from something or being a part of something contribute nothing to the
“qualitative character” of the world. At the same time, these structural
properties do not depend upon any specific individual, and, in the case of
11I have in mind the view according to which temporal passage is explained in terms of a funda-
mental tense property and the view that actuality is distinguished by a fundamental modal property.
See Zimmerman (2008) for discussion of the former and Bricker (2006) for discussion of the latter.
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being self-identical, never divide qualitatively indiscernible individuals.12
The qualitative status of these structural properties is therefore an open
question for any account of the qualitative distinction.
Mathematical Properties: The qualitative features of the world are
bound up with relations of qualitative resemblance. But, when we turn to
questions regarding abstract entities—in particular, mathematical proper-
ties of mathematical entities like being even—it is unclear what mathe-
matical entities might contribute to the qualitative character of the world.
Mathematical properties are therefore potentially viewed as non-qualitative.
But, since the status of these properties will turn on the controversial is-
sues regarding the nature of mathematical entities, whether mathematical
properties are qualitative is reasonably viewed as an open question.
I have now introduced the kinds of properties that a view of the qualitative distinc-
tion ought to deliver a verdict about. Furthermore, any view of the distinction that
runs afoul of our core intuitions about these properties incurs a theoretical vice. With
this in mind, I will now consider the various options for understanding or analyzing
the qualitative distinction.
4.3 Eliminativism and Primitivism
The qualitative distinction can be approached from one of two directions. We
might target the concept of a qualitative property for analysis and understand non-
qualitative property as merely its negation. (Again, I omit discussion of relations for
convenience’s sake.) Alternatively, we might reverse the order of conceptual priority
and proceed by analyzing non-qualitative property. Since it is unclear whether any
substantive issues turn on which direction one opts for, I will remain neutral and
12See Bricker (2006) for discussion of structural properties.
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proceed in somewhat broad strokes. The main question is therefore the following:
What is required for a property to be a qualitative or non-qualitative property?
Drawing on paradigm cases, we might also put the question as follows: What feature
of being red entails that it is qualitative, and what feature of being Saul Kripke entails
that it is non-qualitative?
Within philosophical analysis, there are three stances one might take towards a
concept or, in this case, a distinction: (i) Eliminativism: There is no distinction—or
at least not a metaphysically interesting one—between qualitative and non-qualitative
properties. (ii) Primitivism: There is a metaphysically interesting distinction, but
it cannot be analyzed without appeal to the concepts at issue—here, the concepts of
qualitative and non-qualitative properties—and therefore resists reductive analysis.
(iii) Reductionism: There is a metaphysically interesting distinction, and it can be
analyzed without appeal to the concepts in question. Before considering the prospects
for reductionism, I briefly consider both the merits of eliminativism and primitivism.
The case against eliminativism is compelling. Consider once again Black’s lonely
iron spheres. Intuitively, there is some metaphysically interesting respect in which
they are alike, but, despite this commonality, they differ by virtue of their numerical
distinctness. Here, our grip on the distinction is especially clear. The only respects
in which the spheres differ are non-qualitative respects, so, while they are discernible
in the broadest sense, they are not qualitatively discernible.
If the eliminativist is to deny that there is a genuine distinction, she must either
accept PII and hold that “qualitative” indiscernibility is just indiscernibility sim-
pliciter. Alternatively, she can deny that there is an interesting difference between
the properties the spheres share and those they do not. Neither of these options is
attractive. Black’s example succeeds in showing PII to be counter-intuitive and un-
motivated, and denying these properties differ in kind is tantamount to denying that
notions like duplication—understood in terms of qualitative properties—are meta-
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physical interesting.13 We should, therefore, reject eliminativism and its strange kind
of conceptual blindness and accept the distinction as both genuine and metaphysically
interesting.
The remaining non-reductionist option, primitivism, enjoys some promise. After
all, the distinction between being red and being Saul Kripke strikes most as “metaphys-
ically deep” and such distinctions provide good candidates for theoretical primitives.14
But, like any primitivist view, primitivism about the qualitative distinction is difficult
to motivate. This is because the case for primitivism requires us to show, first, that
all available accounts—as well as any that might be forthcoming—are inadequate,
and, second, that the concept in question is a suitable and useful primitive that we
cannot dispense with.
Given the paucity of discussion about the qualitative distinction, there is little
reason to think the project of analyzing it has already been confounded. So, while
primitivism remains as a last resort, we ought to turn to our most attractive and
well-worn primitives in an attempt to provide a reductive analysis of the distinction.
In subsequent sections, I will therefore introduce and argue against several versions
of reductionism: the linguistic view, the modal view, the definability view, and the
grounding view. After arguing against these analyses, I examine and defend the
supervenience view.
13For discussion, see Adams (1979).
14Diekemper (2009: 1) accepts primitivism. He says “The distinction between a qualitative and a
non-qualitative property is one that belongs to that family of philosophical distinction which, though
not admitting of analysis, can be made easily enough through the use of a loose definition and some
intuitive examples.”
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4.4 The Linguistic View
The linguistic view of the distinction is suggested in Adams (1979).15 And, al-
though it is unclear that he takes his remarks to aim at a genuinely reductive analysis,
he says the following:
We might try to capture the idea by saying that a property is purely
qualitative—a suchness—if and only if it could be expressed, in a lan-
guage sufficiently rich, without the aid of such referential devices as proper
names, proper adjectives and verbs (such as ‘Leibnizian’ and ‘pegasizes’),
indexical expressions, and referential uses of definite descriptions.16
A view that these remarks suggest—I do not claim it to be Adams’ own—analyzes
the distinction in terms of the elements of possible languages. Such a view might
be motivated by the intuition that certain types of expressions like ‘Saul Kripke’ are
necessarily connected to the non-qualitative features of the world and the identities
of individuals. When made explicit, the linguistic view amounts to the following:
a property, F, is qualitative if and only if, for any possible and “sufficiently rich”
language, L, F is expressible in L without employing any items of lexical type, T,
where T includes proper names, proper adjectives and verbs, indexicals, and so on.
There are a number of reasons why this linguistic view is untenable. Some con-
cern the specifics of the proposal. For example, the specification of the relevant lexical
types is incomplete, and, absent this specification, the proposal is unsatisfactory. Fur-
thermore, it is unclear how, given that we are concerned with all possible languages,
one might exhaustively specify which lexical types are to be included within T. In
addition, without providing some account of “sufficiently rich” possible languages,
15What Adams’ exact view is is unclear. In addition to a linguistic “definition”, he also offers a
second definition, but, since it explicitly appeals to non-qualitative “thisnesses” to define qualitative
properties, such a view would constitute a form of primitivism.
16Adams (1979: 7).
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the proposal fails to give an exhaustive procedure for determining whether properties
are qualitative or not.
The more serious worries about this view are methodological in nature. Since it
employs language to analyze a fundamental metaphysical feature of reality, the pu-
tative order of explanation seems mistaken. For the metaphysical realist, the notion
that language—something plainly mind-dependent—perfectly carves this distinction
in reality—something plainly mind-independent—seems misguided or implausibly op-
timistic. Furthermore, even if the linguistic approach proved to be extensionally ad-
equate, one might worry that this proposal leads to a form of eliminativism: the
distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties is just the distinction
between which lexical items express them. But—the worry continues—there is some-
thing metaphysically deep about the distinction that is not reducible to mere facts
about which lexical items express which properties. For these reasons, this Adams-
style view and, more generally, any linguistic view is liable to be unsatisfactory. An
analysis of the distinction should, therefore, be offered in terms of fundamental meta-
physics. With this in mind, I will now turn to those views that employ metaphysical
notions like modality, naturalness, and grounding.
4.5 The Modal View
The modal view aims to analyze the qualitative distinction in terms of the unique
modal dependence of non-qualitative properties upon specific individuals. For exam-
ple, Hawley (2009) characterizes the qualitative distinction in explicitly modal terms:
‘Qualitative’ more usually picks out those properties and relations whose
instantiation does not require the existence of any specific object: thus
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composing something usually counts as qualitative, while composing the
Eiffel Tower is non-qualitative.17
Hawley’s remarks do not aim at analysis of the qualitative distinction, but there is
reason to consider whether one might be developed along these lines. And, since
the nature of this modal connection is clearest in the case of individuals and their
haecceities, the defender of the modal view is well-served to look to haecceities for an
analysis of the qualitative distinction.
A good candidate for an analysis of haecceity is the following: a property, F, is a
haecceity if and only if, for some specific individual, a, necessarily, F is instantiated
only if a exists.18 While this might be a tenable analysis of haecceity, it is clearly
inadequate as an analysis of non-qualitative properties in general. Consider, for
example, the disjunctive haecceity of being Saul Kripke or being David Kaplan. Since
this property can be instantiated in worlds without Kripke or without Kaplan, but not
without both, it does not depend upon the existence of both individuals, but rather
on the existence of one of the plurality of Kripke and Kaplan. So, while we cannot
use our analysis of haecceity to reduce the qualitative distinction, we can build upon
it to offer a version of the modal view that accommodates the non-qualitative status
of disjunctive haecceities. Let the modal view therefore be the following thesis: a
property F is non-qualitative if and only if, for some individual or individuals, the as,
necessarily, F is instantiated only if the as exists.
Is the modal view a plausible analysis of the qualitative distinction? Probably
not. Consider a possible world where Saul Kripke does not exist. At such a world, all
individuals instantiate the negative haecceity, being distinct from Saul Kripke. Since
the modal view can only use existence to single out non-qualitative properties, this
17Hawley (2009: 102).
18Some will prefer to include a uniqueness clause: only a can instantiate F. Humeans like myself
who hold that a can exist without any other individuals need no such clause.
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property will either be qualitative or will be uninstantiable in worlds without Kripke.
But, since it is very plausible that some Kripke-less worlds are such that individuals
in them instantiate being distinct from Saul Kripke, the biconditional in the analysans
of the modal view fails in the left-to-right direction.
Notice, in addition, that the modal view guarantees that the tense and modal
properties discussed in Section Two are qualitative. These properties—held to dis-
tinguish the present and the actual from the non-present and merely possible—do
not depend upon the existence of any specific individuals. For this reason, the modal
view cannot accommodate their intuitively non-qualitative status and therefore de-
livers another undesirable result.
Along with the two problems just noted, the modal view also faces a threat from
necessary existents. Suppose that some individual, Rex, exists necessarily. Since the
modal view holds properties to be non-qualitative when they have the existence of
a particular individual as a necessary condition, the necessary existence of Rex—
a trivial necessary condition for the instantiation of any property—would seem to
guarantee the objection result that all properties are non-qualitative.19
In light of these difficulties, the resources of the modal view, while apt for distin-
guish haecceities, seem inadequate for analyzing the qualitative distinction in general.
For this reason, I will turn now to reductionist approaches that help themselves to
resources other than modality alone.
19Perhaps this problem arises even if no specific individual is a necessary existent. For example,
if we assume there is a plurality of all possible individuals and that plurality exists at a world so
long as some of the plurality exists, then the necessary existence of this maximal plurality will also
trivialize the above formulation by virtue of a being a necessary condition for the instantiation of
any property.
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4.6 The Definability View
For those who accept the distinction between natural and non-natural properties,
not all properties are created equal. Only a certain number of properties carve nature
at its joints.20 These properties play several unique theoretical roles. They comprise
a supervenience base that fixes the distribution of other properties. They place con-
straints on the interpretation of language and thought. They serve as the value of
the predicates of our ideal physical theory. Furthermore, they guarantee objective
similarity between objects that instantiate them.
Following Lewis (1983), we can call the properties that play these and other im-
portant theoretical roles natural properties. Among these natural properties, we can
also distinguish certain properties as perfectly natural insofar as they are the ultimate
grounds of resemblance and the deepest joints in nature.21 In contrast to these sparse
natural properties, other properties are abundant. Abundant properties are not part
of the supervenience base formed by the natural properties. They need not make
for objective similarity between objects. They need not figure in our best physical
theory.
Lewis employs the primitive distinction between natural and non-natural proper-
ties to offer a wide and impressive range of philosophical analyses.22 It is reasonable,
then, to look to natural properties for the makings of an analysis of the qualitative
distinction. (As I will discuss in Section Eight, there are several ways such an analysis
might be developed and several views of the distinction Lewis seems to have consid-
20See Lewis (1983) and (1986) for discussion and defense of the indispensability of naturalness.
21I ignore the subtle but orthogonal issues that divide views that reject perfect naturalness in
favor of a comparative primitive of “more natural than”.
22Lewis (1983) considers whether we might analyze the distinction between natural and non-
natural properties in terms of the members of the sets identified with natural properties as sharing
tropes or universals. On such a view, the distinction is no longer primitive, but turns on facts about
tropes and universals.
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ered.) Here, I want to consider the prospects for one such approach: the definability
view.
The definability view aims to distinguish the qualitative and the non-qualitative
in terms of relations of definability they bear to perfectly natural properties. I take
this view to be suggested by some remarks made in Lewis (1986). There, Lewis says
the following about non-qualitative properties:
I am no haecceitist; but I hold that (on one legitimate conception of
properties among others...) there is a property for any set whatever of
possible individuals. This property I identify with the set itself. So we get
properties that are in no way qualitatively delineated, and some of these
are haecceities of this- and other-worldly individuals. A unit set of an
individual is one especially strict sort of haecceity. Also, for any individual
and any counterpart relation, there is the set of that individual together
with all its counterparts, and this is a less strict sort of haecceity.23
This passage expresses Lewis’s commitment to the existence of non-qualitative
properties—most notably, haecceities—and his denial that they play a role in de
re representation. It also marks Lewis’s assumption that, in at least one sense of
“property”, properties are sets of possible individuals. Elsewhere, Lewis says more
about how exactly to distinguish non-qualitative properties while clarifying the notion
of indiscernibility:
Two things are indiscernible iff they have the same intrinsic and extrinsic
qualitative character. Extrinsic qualitative character, wherein duplicates
may differ, consists of extrinsic properties that are, though not perfectly
natural, still somewhat natural in virtue of their definability from perfectly
23Lewis (1986: 225).
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natural properties and relations. Indiscernibles share all their somewhat
natural properties. They do not, of course, share all their properties
without exception...24
I take the definability view suggested by these remarks to run as follows: Per-
fectly natural properties are qualitative. Whether a given property is “somewhat
natural” and therefore qualitative turns on how, if at all, that property is definable in
terms of perfectly natural properties. Since some properties—e.g., haecceities—are
not “appropriately definable”, they are not “somewhat natural” and are therefore
non-qualitative. So understood, there is a qualitative cut-off point of what I have
called “appropriate definability” in terms of the perfectly natural properties, and cer-
tain paradigmatic non-qualitative properties like Saul Kripke’s unit set are held to
fall on the non-qualitative side of this cut-off point.
To take an example: being a primary color—understood as a first-order property—
is qualitative, since it can be constructed out of the disjunction operation on what
we might suppose to be reasonably natural properties, being red, being blue, and
being yellow. In contrast, sets with arbitrary members drawn from various worlds—
“haecceities”, on one understanding—will be non-qualitative, since there is either no
way or only gruesome ways to define these sets through operations on the sets asso-
ciated or identified with natural properties. As Lewis says, certain of the abundant
properties “pay no heed to the qualitative joints but carve up things every which
way.”25 Made explicit, the definability view is as follows: a property, F, is non-
qualitative if and only if it is not appropriately definable in terms of operations upon
perfectly natural properties.
24Lewis (1986: 63).
25Lewis (1986: 59).
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One might reasonably wonder why Lewis cannot hold that any and all proper-
ties definable in terms of perfectly natural properties are qualitative. This option is
precluded by Lewis’s desire to remain agnostic about whether or not there are quali-
tatively indiscernible worlds.26 If there are no such worlds, any and all properties—
including haecceities—will be definable in terms of perfectly natural properties. So,
in order to accommodate his neutrality on this issue, Lewis is forced to appeal to
either what I have called “appropriate definability” or the comparably sketchy notion
of a property being “somewhat natural”.27
Unsurprisingly, the commitments of the definability view are not as clear one
might hope. Consider properties like being five or thirty feet from an iron sphere
or a brass triangle. Such a property seems prima facie qualitative, but it is not
clear that it is appropriately definable by Lewis’s lights. For this reason, we might
worry, first, whether the definability view is extensionally adequate with respect to
more gerrymandered yet intuitively qualitative properties, and, second, whether it
can supply us with definitive answers to questions about the qualitative status of
certain properties. Unfortunately, it is unclear how to settle these questions for the
definability view. Furthermore, these issues point us towards a more serious problem
that afflicts the view: arbitrariness.
Since the definability view draws the distinction in terms of what we have called
“appropriate definability”, how this notion is to be understood is of crucial impor-
tance. But, not only is Lewis silent about what might distinguish “appropriately
definable” properties, it is unclear what any satisfactory account of “appropriate de-
finability” would look like. Proposals that turn on the mere number of operations
performed on the perfectly natural properties will be inadequate in light of logical
26See Lewis (1986: 220-247).
27One might prefer the latter approach, but my objections to the definability view can equally
well be extended to this alternative.
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equivalences.28 Other proposals that turn on definability within a language will en-
counter the same problems as linguistic approaches to the distinction canvassed above.
In addition, proposals that invoke some primitive notion of “appropriateness” forgo
the ideological virtue of analyzing the distinction through naturalness alone.
In light of these problems, it seems that the definability view is saddled with
drawing some arbitrary distinction between the appropriately and inappropriately
definable. Given this, it remains unclear whether the defender of the definability
view is, in fact, entitled to assert that unit sets or intuitively gerrymandered sets are
non-qualitative. This is worrying insofar as the definability view would seem to count
being Saul Kripke as non-qualitative by virtue of stipulation alone rather than by
some informative account of what is needed for appropriate definability. Furthermore,
even if we did know where to draw the line in the qualitative/non-qualitative sand,
there would be no principled explanation for why the proposal delivers the result
it does. I take this to show the definability view is unsatisfactory for providing a
complete characterization of the distinction. And, although the definability view is
unattractive, it is worth noting that Lewis (2003) suggests an alternative analysis
that also appeals to natural properties. Before examining this alternative analysis, I
consider a view that analyzes the distinction via the primitive metaphysical relation
of grounding.
4.7 The Grounding View
In metaphysics, claims of dependence are pervasive. Properties are said to depend
upon their bearers. Wholes are said to depend on their parts. Sets are said to depend
upon their members. One way to make sense of this talk is to accept that there is a
28One might appeal to the shortest definition using natural operations available, but then the
question arises of what determines the “shortest definition” or “natural operations”. Here again, it
looks as though arbitrariness will arise.
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primitive relation of metaphysical dependence—the grounding relation—that unites
entities together in the relevant dependence relations.29 Furthermore, in light of the
orthodox gloss of non-qualitative properties as depending upon specific individuals,
the grounding view of the distinction suggests itself: a property F is non-qualitative
if and only if it is grounded in a specific individual.
If the grounding view is to be at all plausible, the following objection must be re-
butted: Suppose Kripke is the only material object, and further suppose that Kripke
therefore grounds the property of being a material object.30 From this and the ground-
ing view, it would seem that being a material object is non-qualitative, but, intuitively,
this is incorrect. How, then, can the grounding view count being Saul Kripke but not
being a material object as non-qualitative? Here, we must include the proviso that a
property F is non-qualitative if and only if it is grounded in a specific individual and
could not be grounded by any other individual. In this way, the grounding view must
avail itself of the resources employed by the modal view in addition to a primitive
grounding relation.
Despite overcoming this initial obstacle, the grounding view still encounters several
problems. First, it is not obvious that the grounding relation is of the right meta-
physical kind to do this work. Notice that the analysis just proposed requires that
properties are grounded in individuals, so if one holds grounding to be a relation only
between, say, propositions or facts or between properties and other properties, the
analysis will not get off the ground. The grounding view of the distinction therefore
requires a liberal conception of the possible relata of the grounding relation.
Second, the grounding view must be generalized in order to accommodate disjunc-
tive haecceities like being Saul Kripke or David Kaplan. This property cannot be said
29The case for primitive grounding is made in Schaffer (2010).
30The defender of grounding could of course deny that properties are grounded by the individuals
that instantiate them. Fortunately, my interest in this example is illustration rather than refutation.
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to be grounded exclusively by Kripke, Kaplan, or their mereological sum. Rather, it
requires that the grounding relation take plural individuals as its relata if these sorts
of properties are to qualify as non-qualitative. Again, this raises difficult questions
about the nature and logic of pluralities, but I will simply assume, for the sake of the
grounding view, that a suitable account can be offered.
Third, the grounding view fares poorly in making sense of negative haecceities
like being distinct from Saul Kripke. It will not suffice to say that this property is
grounded by Saul Kripke and it is counterintuitive to hold that it is grounded by all
other individuals. Indeed, any view that would accept this consequence invites an
oddly monadological metaphysics in which everything grounds the negative haecceity
of everything else.
Fourth, it is not clear what individuals could be the ground of impure properties
like being between Saul Kripke and David Kaplan. If the grounding relation holds
of necessity, neither Kripke, Kaplan, whatever falls between them, or the sum of all
these individuals will be plausible candidates for grounding this property. Since, on
their own, none of these individuals necessitate the instantiation of being between
Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, there is no obvious candidate individual for being the
ground of this property. Furthermore, if one appeals to facts as the grounds for these
properties, the intuitive appeal of the grounding view is lessened, since it aimed to
make good on the intuition that non-qualitative properties were grounded in specific
individuals rather than facts.
Fifth, what is the status of the grounding relation itself? Is it a qualitative relation
or a non-qualitative one? If it is non-qualitative, then it must be grounded in a specific
individual. But suppose that there is a grounding relation that holds between two
properties (e.g., a mental property and a physical one). Since this grounding relation
is not itself grounded in a specific individual, it must be qualitative; however, it is
far from clear that the grounding relation is properly viewed as qualitative. And,
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while there may be a plausible account the grounding view can provide here, this
much is clear: employing the grounding relation raises difficult and potentially costly
questions about its own relation to the qualitative distinction.
Despite these concerns, there are two considerable virtues the grounding view
enjoys—virtues one might reasonably hold to outweigh the potential vices just noted.
The first virtue is that the grounding relation is a primitive one. It is therefore open
to those who accept it to hold that, for whatever pattern of grounding one wants for
the purposes of analyzing the qualitative distinction, grounding exhibits that very
pattern. After all, the notion is a primitive one, so, within the bounds of consistency,
it must do the bidding of those who deploy it. As such, it is unclear that any charge
of extensional inadequacy against the grounding view can be made to stick.
The second virtue is that grounding is plausibly viewed as a hyperintensional
relation and fits naturally with a hyperintensional conception of properties.31 Such
an account allows for the distinctness of properties like being trilateral and being
triangular that are necessarily coextensive and, in doing so, allows for an account of
the qualitative distinction that could, in principle, hold that being the actual height
of Michael Jordan and being six foot six are necessarily coextensive while only one
of them is qualitative. The resources of hyperintensionality are considerable and, in
the face of the many difficult question that arise around the qualitative distinction,
this aspect of the grounding view provides room to assuage a number of difficult
intuitions.
In light of these virtues, I take it that, if one is antecedently committed to a
grounding relation, there is reason to hope that some grounding-based analysis of the
qualitative distinction—perhaps one that is revisionary in certain respects—can be
provided. Even so, I reject the proposed account. I do so for two reasons. First,
31For discussion of the hyperintensional conception of properties, see Eddon (2011).
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I do not accept a primitive grounding relation of the sort required to analyze the
distinction. Insofar as I accept talk of dependence, it is properly conceived of as either
a family of cross-categorial relations like the instantiation and singleton relations that
unify distinct ontological categories (e.g., objects, properties, and sets), or it is to be
captured in terms of supervenience and degrees of naturalness. On such a view,
dependence might be the right notion for making sense of the distinction, but it will
not be dependence understood along the lines of grounding.
Second, there is reason to believe that our talk of properties and relations vacillates
between at least two different conceptions of property. On the first conception, prop-
erties are individuated only intensionally, so their identity and distinctness is wholly
independent of our linguistic intuitions. This conception naturally comports with our
concerns of fundamental metaphysics—i.e., concerns about resemblance, sparseness,
and so on. On the second conception, properties are individuated hyperintensionally,
so they track the distinctions language inclines us to draw between, say, trilaterality
and triangularity.32 This second conception gives precedence to the role properties
play in semantics as semantic values for predicates.
I take it that concerns about the qualitative distinction are, at bottom, issues that
concern properties on the first conception. Furthermore, I believe a suitable account
of properties—conceived of as non-hyperintensional—will also afford us the resources
needed to provide entities that can satisfy the demands of the hyperintensional con-
ception of properties. Following Lewis (1986), once we have sufficient ontological
resources, we can construct “structured properties” via set-theoretic constructions
that provide them with what Lewis calls a “quasi-syntactic structure”.33 In light of
this, I take it that, by focusing on the intensional conception of properties, there is
32I do not claim that the hyperintensional distinctions depend upon language. I hold only that our
intuitions that count in favor of hyperintensional distinctions are motivated by semantic intuitions.
33See Lewis (1986: 55-59).
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reason to think we can nevertheless secure the putative advantages of a hyperinten-
sional view of properties. To be sure, this is an open matter of some controversy;
however, for present purposes, I am content to mark my rejection of the grounding
view as partisan against the primacy of the hyperintensional conception of properties.
Having surveyed the prospects for the grounding view, I now turn to a final pro-
posal for reducing the qualitative distinction.
4.8 The Supervenience View
Natural properties figured prominently in the definability view, but, in that case,
worries about arbitrariness proved fatal. In this section, I turn to another view
that employs the concept of natural properties but in a different fashion. Lewis
(2003) offers remarks that suggest sympathy for a view of this sort. After drawing
a distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative propositions (understood as
properties of entire worlds), where the latter are miscellaneous classes of worlds that
might divide qualitatively indiscernible worlds, he says:
Likewise, when we said that less-than-fundamental properties of things
supervened on the fundamental properties and relations of things, we
meant less-than-fundamental qualitative properties. Again our superve-
nience thesis was not meant to apply to non-qualitative ‘properties’ de-
termined by miscellaneous classes of possible individuals. Again, what at
first seemed to be a substantive supervenience thesis turns into a defini-
tion, this time of ‘qualitative property’.34
34Lewis (2003: 26). Lewis puts forward these remarks as one of two possible replies to concerns
about propositions whose truth does not supervene on being. Since he also considers an alternative
reply that dispenses with qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds and ultimately remains neutral
on this matter, it is not clear what should count as Lewis’s “considered view”.
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If we take Lewis to intend natural properties by his talk of “fundamental proper-
ties”, the resulting view holds non-qualitative properties (and therefore non-qualitative
propositions) to fail to supervene upon the natural properties. Whether Lewis offi-
cially endorses such a view is unclear. Even so, it warrants closer scrutiny and has
been endorsed by others. For example, Bricker (1996) formulates and endorses the
supervenience view as follows: “the qualitative supervenes upon the natural: fix-
ing the natural properties and relations suffices to fix all the qualitative properties
and relations.”35
In certain respects, the supervenience view is a hybrid of the modal and definability
views. It employs modality—in the form of supervenience—as well as naturalness to
analyze the qualitative distinction. Intuitively, it holds that worlds that share the
same distribution of natural properties are like Black’s spheres, Bruce and Clark.
They and their parts share all the same qualitative properties and relations and differ
only with respect to their non-qualitative ones.
The most obvious concern with the supervenience view is that it requires a commit-
ment to either natural properties or some cognate primitive like “being more natural
than”.36 If one objects to this distinction, one will find nothing attractive about the
current view. But, as Lewis (1983) persuasively argues, a notion of naturalness is
needed for our core philosophical projects. There is therefore little that can be done
here to overcome this worry that has not already been done. Note, however, that if
the supervenience view is satisfactory, it further strengthens Lewis’s case by showing
naturalness to be useful for yet another purpose.
35Bricker (1996: 227). See also McDaniel (2007: 250).
36If one accepts the latter view and holds that every property stands in the “being more natural
than” relation to some other property, problems will arise in the formulation of supervenience theses.
Here, I assume that there are maximally natural properties that are such that no properties bear
this relation to them.
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A second concern is that an illicit circularity arises when we analyze the qualitative
distinction in terms of naturalness, since the primitive concept of naturalness can
only be grasped by appeal to the conceptually prior notion of a qualitative property.
I take this objection to be flatly mistaken. While the pattern of distribution of
natural properties throughout the concrete world may be intimately bound up with
its qualitative features, the concept of naturalness can also be grasped by considering
whether there are more or less natural mathematical properties and relations.37 And,
while it is both unclear whether mathematical properties are qualitative and whether
naturalness extends to mathematicalia, the fact that we can grasp the concept of
naturalness along those lines shows it to be, in principle, separable from qualitative
concerns. Furthermore, some have defended a view on which naturalness carves the
world up, not only at the level of properties and relations, but also at the level of
quantificational structure.38 If such a view is correct, we have even better evidence
that naturalness need not be understood only through an antecedent grasp of the
qualitative distinction. Setting these worries aside, I now turn to concerns about the
extensional adequacy of the supervenience view.
In order to determine which properties the supervenience view deems non-qualitative,
we need to fix upon the relevant kind of supervenience relation between the natural
and the qualitative. The most plausible candidate notion is global supervenience,
but global supervenience admits of two main flavors and therefore delivers two com-
peting versions of the supervenience view. The first candidate employs weak global
supervenience39:
37See Lewis (1983).
38See Sider (2009).
39Here, I largely follow Bennett (2004) on weak and strong versions of global supervenience.
117
Weak Version: A property F is qualitative if and only if F is such that,
for any worlds w1 and w2, if there is a natural property-preserving iso-
morphism between w1 and w2, then there is an F-property-preserving
isomorphism between them.
The second candidate employs strong global supervenience:
Strong Version: A property F is qualitative if and only if F is such that,
for any worlds w1 and w2, every natural property-preserving isomorphism
between w1 and w2 is an F-property-preserving isomorphism.
Crucial to both the Weak and Strong Version is the notion of a ψ-preserving isomor-
phism: a one-one isomorphism µ between the inhabitants of w1 and w2 is ψ-preserving
if and only if, for every ψ-property F, Fx in w1 if and only if Fµ(x) in w2. Intuitively,
then, property-preserving isomorphisms ensure sameness of the pattern of distribu-
tion of a relevant class of properties. And, as I will now show, Weak and Strong
Versions differ in significant respects.
In order to mark their differences, let us begin by considering a world that exhibits
two-way eternal recurrence such that there are qualitatively indiscernible “epochs”
laid side-by-side and extending infinitely far into the past and future.40 Let us further
suppose that we occupy a certain epoch, Sooner, that is followed by a distinct epoch,
Later.
If we formulate the supervenience view using the Strong Version, the existence
of worlds of this kind shows why the non-qualitative fails to supervene upon the
natural.41 This is because, within this world, there is a isomorphism that preserves
natural properties but fails to preserve non-qualitative ones: the isomorphism that
40See Sider (1999) for discussion of this point.
41As Sider (1999) notes, any worlds that exhibit the relevant kind of symmetry like those including
Black’s spheres suffice for this purpose.
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takes the properties and relations of any epoch (and its parts) to those of the sub-
sequent one (and its parts). So, while there is an isomorphism between the natural
properties strewn throughout Sooner and Later, this isomorphism will not preserve
non-qualitative properties, since the individuals occupying Later have distinct non-
qualitative properties (e.g., their respective haecceities) than we do. So, if we reject
PII—thereby allowing for worlds of eternal recurrence with indiscernible epochs—and
accept the Strong Version, we can demonstrate the failure of the non-qualitative to
supervene on the natural.
In contrast, if we accept the Weak Version, we require the existence of qualita-
tively indiscernible worlds—not merely individuals within worlds—to avoid the result
that all properties are qualitative. To see why, notice that, on the Weak Version, the
non-qualitative will supervene upon the natural so long as there is at least one iso-
morphism between worlds that preserves the pattern of distribution for the natural
and the non-qualitative. And, in worlds of eternal recurrence, there will be a triv-
ial isomorphism of each individual’s properties and relations onto themselves. For
this reason, the Weak Version requires qualitatively indiscernible worlds where dif-
ferent non-qualitative properties are instantiated to generate a failure of weak global
supervenience of the non-qualitative on the natural.
One might conclude from the preceding that the defender of the Strong Version of
supervenience view can avoid commitment to qualitatively indiscernible worlds, but
doing so comes at a cost. To see why, let us name the actual world, ‘Doug’. Since
Doug is an individual, there is reason to believe Doug has a haecceity, being Doug.42
But, if there is no world qualitatively indiscernible from Doug, then being Doug will
count as qualitative on both the Weak and Strong Versions. For this reason, those
42Following Lewis (1986), it is natural to view properties of entire worlds like Doug’s haecceity
as propositions. So understood, the present issue can be recast as an issue of whether there are
non-qualitative propositions that differ in truth-value between qualitatively indiscernible worlds.
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who eschew qualitatively indiscernible worlds and accept the Strong Versions, will
incorrectly classify being Doug as qualitative.43
For the defender of the Strong Version, the need to count being Doug as non-
qualitative supplies reason to accept qualitatively indiscernible worlds. Furthermore,
qualitatively indiscernible worlds also prove attractive if one prefers to remain agnostic
between Weak and Strong Versions. So long as there are such worlds, both views will
deliver the same results and taking sides is therefore unnecessary. The supervenience
view therefore invites commitment to qualitatively indiscernible worlds, which, in
turn, suggests that the supervenience view requires a kind of haecceitism, according
to which some worlds are qualitatively indiscernible.44
While some might hold a commitment to haecceitism to be a cost, I have defended
haecceitism elsewhere and am content to assume it here.45 This point is also of
particular interest, since Lewis (1986) maintained a studied neutrality about whether
there are qualitatively indiscernible worlds. In particular, Lewis claimed to have
found nothing that would count for or against a commitment to them. Here, we have
evidence that the tie can be broken: by accepting that, for each world, there is a
distinct world qualitatively indiscernible form it, we can offer an attractive analysis
of the qualitative distinction.
The supervenience view faces no problems with haecceities, negative haecceities,
or impure properties. It does, however, encounter a puzzle that arises with respect to
disjunctive haecceities. Recall that our intuitive conception of non-qualitative proper-
ties holds that each haecceity is non-qualitative and, since disjunctive haecceities are
43I assume here that worlds are individuals. If one accepts the Strong Version and denies worlds
are individuals, they avoid the problem at hand.
44For Lewis, “haecceitism” amounts to the denial that de re representation supervenes upon the
qualitative character of worlds. Since the denial of haecceitism, so understood, is compatible with
accepting the existence of qualitatively indiscernible worlds, it does not require haecceitism as Lewis
conceives of it.
45Omitted for blind review.
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built out of haecceities, they, too, should count as non-qualitative. Consider, however,
the disjunction of the haecceities of all possible individuals that are qualitatively in-
discernible from you, strewn across an equivalence class of indiscernible worlds. Since
the property of being one of these myriad individuals is a disjunctive haecceity, it is
liable to seem non-qualitative. But, since each and only those things that instantiate
it are qualitatively indiscernible with one another, it also seems qualitative. What to
do?
Proponents of hyperintensionality will hold that this kind of case requires us to dis-
tinguish cointensive properties. For the hyperintensionalist, there are two properties:
the non-qualitative property of being you or your first doppelganger or your second
doppelganger and so on and the qualitative property of being qualitatively such-and-
so. On the supervenience view, we cannot admit this hyperintensional distinction at
a fundamental level, and must therefore hold the relevant property to be a qualitative
one by virtue of its supervenience upon the natural. I take this to be a satisfactory
result, but, for some, it will be a strike against the view.
Notice, however, that it is a principled bullet to bite, since the view holds that
disjunctive haecceities are non-qualitative except for the limit case of the disjunctive
haecceity of all individuals that are qualitatively indiscernible from one another (or
any of a plurality of individuals). So, for example, if we took the disjunctive haec-
ceity of all possible individuals qualitatively indiscernible from you with exception
of yourself, the resulting property would still be non-qualitative according to the
supervenience view.46
46Notice also that the defender of the supervenience view can appeal to structured properties—
set-theoretic constructions out of individuals and properties conceived of non-hyperintensionally.
One might, for example, distinguish the fundamental qualitative property shared by all individuals
qualitatively indiscernible from you as the set of all the relevant individuals. At the same time, one
could cook up an ordered sequence of the very same individuals to serve as the semantic value of
the intuitively non-qualitative predicate “being you, or your first doppelganger, Pat, or your second
doppelganger, Kelly...” that picks out each individual by name. In this way, the present view can
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Let me now consider how the natural supervenience view bears upon structural
properties like being self-identical, being such that there is a property that seven other
things instantiate and being composed of three things. At first pass, some of these
properties come out as uniformly qualitative: since being self-identical is had by all
possible individuals, it will never divide any individuals and is therefore intuitively
qualitative. Similarly, no worlds will be the same with respect to their natural prop-
erties yet differ with respect to the distribution of properties like being distinct from
something, so those structural properties also emerge as qualitative. While these
results are tenable, I believe there is more that the supervenience view can do to
illuminate the interesting status of structural properties. Specifically, once we em-
ploy natural properties in describing the world, we can clarify the difference between
structural properties and qualitative properties in general.
The idea is this: consider a “mighty language”, L, which has a unique constant
for each individual and a unique predicate for each natural property. Sentences of L
encode different kinds of information. They encode haecceitistic or non-qualitative
information, since they include individual constants that pick out specific individuals.
They also encode qualitative information, since they include predicates that pick out
the natural and therefore qualitative properties. In this respect, there is a parallel
in the information encoded and the corresponding kinds of properties: individual
constants are typically associated with non-qualitative properties, while predicates
typically express qualitative properties.
Now take the complete and correct description of the actual world provided in L.
Remove each constant and replace it with a variable and then attach a corresponding
existential quantifier. By doing so, all the non-qualitative or haecceitistic information
go some distance to capturing the hyperintensionalist intuition that there are distinct “properties”
at issue here.
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is removed, but the qualitative information remains.47 This is a first-order Ramsey
sentence. Now repeat the process using second-order quantifiers to replace each of
the predicates. The result is a second-order Ramsey sentence that expresses purely
structural information about the pattern of instantiation throughout the world: that
there is something, that that thing is distinct from seven things, and that something
instantiates some property that something else does.
Although the supervenience view holds these structural properties to be qualita-
tive, it is useful to distinguish them from non-structural qualitative properties. In
the present framework, this is handily accomplished by singling out structural prop-
erties as the only properties about which second-order Ramsey sentences can express
information. In light of this, one might be tempted hold that the space of properties
ought to be divided, not between just qualitative and non-qualitative properties, but
instead between structural, qualitative, and neither structural nor qualitative prop-
erties. Here, I take it that so long as these distinctions can be drawn there is little
harm in subsuming the structural under the more familiar aegis of the qualitative.
Structural properties therefore present no obstacle for the supervenience view.
Let me now consider the status of the tense and modal properties discussed in
Section Two that some views hold to divide past and actual individuals from non-
present and merely possible ones. These properties require careful attention because
their status with respect to the qualitative distinction is most likely to depend upon
one’s particular views about naturalness.
Consider, first, a conception of naturalness that holds natural properties to be
whatever carve at nature’s joints, where joint-carving amounts to figuring into laws or
involving fundamental distinctions. On this joint-carving conception, it is difficult to
resist the view that, if there is a fundamental property of being actual or being present
47For more on Ramseyfication, see Lewis (1970).
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that merely possible and non-present things lack, this property will be natural, since
it is surely joint-carving. But, as noted earlier, if these properties are deemed natural
and therefore qualitative, implausible results follow (e.g., there are no merely possible
duplicates of anything actual).48 Accordingly, we ought to resist the blind application
of the joint-carving heuristic for discerning naturalness and deny that the relevant
distinctions are marked by natural and therefore qualitative properties. Properly
understood, then, modal and tense properties of the aforementioned sort need not
qualify as qualitative.
The final properties I will consider are mathematical ones. On the supervenience
view, these are liable to emerge as trivially qualitative, since mathematical objects
and their properties (the pure ones, anyways) are typically thought to exist and bear
their properties necessarily. One might hold, however, that they are not trivially
qualitative, since certain mathematical properties are natural and some mathematical
properties are therefore non-trivially qualitative.
There is likely to be some hesitancy in deeming mathematical properties qualita-
tive. That said, mathematical objects and properties are strange and controversial
creatures, so there is also liable to be a countervailing hesitancy in claiming mathemat-
ical properties to be non-qualitative. For example, if one accepts a robust platonism,
it is natural to view the non-qualitative properties of numbers as broadly analogous
to the non-qualitative properties of concrete individuals. But, since platonism is far
from mandatory, the status of mathematical properties still remains unclear. In light
of this, the interaction of the qualitative distinction with mathematical ontology re-
48Furthermore, if one accepts de re laws, which involve specific individuals (e.g., anything five feet
from a spacetime point, Dan, will rapidly decelerate), non-qualitative properties like being Dan will
seem to carve at the joints, but would also threaten the adequacy of the supervenience view. Here,
again, we need to resist blindly taking joint-carving to be a sufficient condition for naturalness. See
Tooley (1977) for discussion of de re laws.
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mains a live issue. There is therefore no reason to believe a compelling or non-partisan
objection to the supervenience view can be offered.
I have now considered a battery of issues with and objections to the supervenience
view. None of these objections proved compelling and none of the issues threaten the
view. It therefore stands as an attractive option for extending the analytic ambitions
of naturalness and as a serviceable way to understand the qualitative distinction.
Furthermore, the view enjoys a healthy measure of neutrality since the primitive
concept of naturalness is itself neutral with respect to the nature of properties. It is
compatible with views on which properties are universals, tropes, classes or whatever.
So, in this respect, the supervenience view requires no partisanship about what kinds
of things properties are.
In a less modest vein, it likely commits us to the existence of qualitative indis-
cernible possible worlds. And, prior to concluding, I will argue that, given the this
commitment and the supervenience view, it is very plausible that there are funda-
mental non-qualitative properties.
4.9 Fundamental Non-Qualitative Properties
The necessary and sufficient conditions for being a fundamental property are, at
best, controversial, but a core platitude that fundamental properties ought to satisfy
is that they jointly determine the distribution of all other properties. Specifically, the
plurality of fundamental properties ought to satisfy the following:
Completeness: Possible worlds that do not vary in terms of their fun-
damental properties do not vary in terms of the distribution of any prop-
erties.
There is some temptation to hold natural properties to be fundamental in light
of their central role in metaphysical inquiry. But, if the supervenience view is cor-
rect, natural properties cannot exhaust the stock of fundamental properties. This
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is because the distribution of non-qualitative properties is not jointly determined by
the distribution of natural properties. Indeed, non-qualitative properties are precisely
those properties that fail to supervene upon the natural ones. As a consequence, natu-
ral properties can satisfy Completeness only in conjunction with some non-qualitative
properties. In particular, it seems that only the haecceities distributed throughout
the world, along with the natural properties, are capable of satisfying Completeness.
It therefore follows that at least some non-qualitative properties must be fundamental
in nature.
Now, if one rejects qualitatively indiscernible worlds, qualitative properties alone
will satisfy Completeness. But, as I indicated earlier, we have good reason to ac-
cept qualitatively indiscernible worlds and retain the supervenience view. So, given
Completeness, we ought to accept that, along with qualitative properties like mass
and charge, there are fundamental non-qualitative properties—perhaps those like be-
ing Saul Kripke. And, while I will not pursue the question of which non-qualitative
properties are fundamental here, it is suggestive that impure properties like being
between Saul Kripke and David Kaplan supervene upon the conjunction of qualita-
tive properties and haecceities being Saul Kripke and being David Kaplan. On what
is perhaps the most intuitive view, it is therefore haecceities like being Saul Kripke
that emerge as and are uniquely distinguished by their status as fundamental non-
qualitative properties.
4.10 Conclusion
I have surveyed a number of ways to conceive of the distinction between qualitative
and non-qualitative properties. After arguing that various proposals for reductively
analyzing the distinction are inadequate, I examined and defended the supervenience
view according to which non-qualitative properties are all and only those properties
that fail to supervene upon natural properties. While the supervenience view emerged
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as a strong candidate for successfully reducing the qualitative distinction, a host of
open and difficult questions remain about the nature and limits of this distinction.
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CHAPTER 5
COUNTERPARTS AND BARE PARTICULARS
5.1 Introduction
Metaphysical commitments are often challenged on the grounds that they are
superfluous or theoretically troublesome. Faced with these charges, the best response
for those who take on the commitments in questions is to illustrate their value by
showing them to be especially useful. Here, in light of familiar accusations that
bare particulars are superfluous or theoretically troublesome, I aim to show that bare
particulars are remarkably useful for a core metaphysical enterprise: the analysis of
modality.1
This partial defense of bare particulars is offered with the moral of Lewis (1986)
firmly in mind: concrete possible worlds are also remarkably useful for the analysis
of modality and other concepts. Following Lewis, I assume the existence of concrete
possible worlds in what follows. My aim is therefore to show not only that the
defender of concrete possible worlds ought to accept bare particulars, but also that,
taken together, concrete possible worlds and bare particulars deliver an attractive
analysis of modality preferable even to Lewis’s own.
Along with this partial defense of bare particulars, the following discussion speaks
to an independently interesting question: what happens when bare particulars are
introduced into the metaphysics of modal realism? While Lewis remained agnos-
tic about bare particulars, what follows can be viewed as an attempt to trace the
1See, for example, Lowe (2003: 86): “Few philosophers now think that bare particulars, or
substrata, are theoretically fruitful additions to our ontology.”
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consequences of abandoning this agnosticism for a metaphysics of bare particulars.
As I will argue, the consequence are considerable and have significant implications
for counterpart theory, the problem of accidental intrinsics, and the metaphysics of
haecceitism.
My project is as follows. After presenting bare particular theory in Section Two,
I present Lewisian Modal Realism—the reductive metaphysics of modality presented
in Lewis (1986)—in Section Three. In Section Four, I examine the interaction be-
tween haecceitism and counterpart theory within Lewisian Modal Realism (hereafter,
LMR). In Section Five, I present Lewis’s argument against non-qualitative counter-
part theory. In Sections Six and Seven, I demonstrate the utility of bare particulars by
taking on three challenges: addressing the problem of accidental intrinsics, answering
Lewis’s objections to non-qualitative counterpart theory, and improving upon LMR’s
treatment of haecceitism. I then conclude in Section Eight.
5.2 Bare Particulars
Bare particular theory is a theory about the metaphysical structure of particu-
lars. It holds particulars to have a binary structure that divides into two ontological
categories: bare particulars and properties.2
Bare particular theory has one main rival: bundle theory. According to bundle
theory, particulars have a unary metaphysical structure and are composed or consti-
tuted entirely out of properties.3 On this view, there is no underlying substratum to a
given particular. There is only a single ontology category, property, and only certain
2For more on bare particular theory, see Armstrong (1978), Giberman (forthcoming) and Sider
(2006).
3For more on bundle theory, see Armstrong (1978), Campbell (1990) and Paul (2002).
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collections of properties—typically, fusions of maximal compresent properties—are
identified with particulars.4
The arguments for and against bundle theory and bare particular theory are diffi-
cult to assess and much-discussed. Here, I aim to add to this debate by demonstrating
the utility of bare particulars. I will therefore set aside bundle theory and assume
bare particular theory in what follows.
Bare particular theory is most naturally paired with and understood alongside
universal theory. Universal theory is a theory about the nature of properties. Ac-
cording to universal theory, properties like redness are universals, repeatable entities
instantiated by particulars. Like bare particular theory, universal theory has many
competitors: trope theory, class theory, and so on. There are also many competing
versions of universal theory.5
Competing universal theories can be divided in two ways. The first division con-
cerns the multiplicity of universals. Sparse theories hold that, of the world’s prop-
erties, only an elite few are universals. In contrast, abundant theories hold that
almost all predicates express universals.6 The second division concerns the nature of
universals. Aristotelian theories hold that universals are immanent or in re. They
are located wherever they are instantiated. In contrast, Platonist theories deny the
immanence of universals.7 They hold universals to exist outside of space and time,
lacking any location in the concrete world.
4A third rival—the no-structure theory—denies that particulars have any internal metaphysical
structure and rejects both bundle and bare particular theory for positing structure where there is
none. I set aside such a view in what follows.
5For more on universals theory and competitors, see Armstrong (1978).
6See Lewis (1983) for discussion of the sparse and abundant conceptions.
7See Armstrong (1978) for a defense of Aristotelianism and Jubien (2009) for a defense of Pla-
tonism.
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Here, I assume the truth of sparse Aristotelian universal theory. Other views of
properties could be employed for present purposes, but sparse Aristotelian universal
theory is especially well-suited to the task at hand. In what follows, my talk of uni-
versals ought to be understood accordingly. And, with this conception of universals,
we can now easily express the commitments of bare particular theory.
According to bare particular theory, ordinary objects—the referents of natural
language—are thick particulars. Thick particulars have two kinds of non-spatiotemporal
parts: universals and bare particulars.8 So, for example, the electron, Sparky, has
the universal, electronhood, as a non-spatiotemporal part.
Bare particular theory aims to explain the fact that Sparky is an electron by
positing a fundamental relation, instantiation, that unifies particulars with their uni-
versals. This fundamental instantiation relation holds between universals and bare
particulars, but talk of “instantiation” within bare particular theory requires careful
attention. This is because bare particular theory should treat our talk of “instantia-
tion” as ambiguous between the relation bare particulars bear to universals and the
relation thick particulars bear to universals. These relations differ significantly.
The relation a thick particular bears to any universal it “instantiates” is an internal
relation.9 Since the universal electronhood is a part of the thick particular, Sparky, the
fact that these entities stand in what is sometimes called an “instantiation relation”
supervenes upon the thick particular, Sparky. In contrast, the instantiation relation
a bare particular—Sparky’s bare particular—bears to a universal like electronhood
is external. While this latter “instantiation” relation is fundamental and external,
8Bare particular theory owes a suitable account of the composition relation between bare par-
ticulars, universals, and the thick particulars they are parts of. Here, I assume that the relevant
composition is mereological in nature. Officially, I leave open whether bare particular theory requires
a commitment to a non-mereological composition relation.
9See Lewis (1986: 174-191) for discussion of internal and external relations.
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the former relation, between Sparky and electronhood, is neither fundamental nor
external.
Since a bare particular can fail to instantiate any given universal, facts about
instantiation do not supervene upon the intrinsic natures of the bare particular and
the universal alone.10 The world must cooperate in unifying these entities through
instantiation. So, while the relation between thick particulars and the universals they
are said to “instantiate” is internal, only the external relation that holds between
universals and bare particulars is an external relation suitable for explaining the
fundamental tie between particulars and their properties.
For the bare particular theorist, thick particulars are therefore anchored together
by the external instantiation relation between bare particulars and universals. So,
while universals supply the world with its qualitative character, bare particulars pro-
vide the metaphysical foundation in which this character inheres. Put metaphorically,
bare particulars are the hooks on which the coats of quality are hung.11
Prior to demonstrating how bare particulars contribute to the analysis of modality,
I present the main features of LMR and its analysis of de re modality. I will then
turn to the interaction between LMR and bare particulars.
10A familiar challenge to bare particular theory is that the notion of something existing without
properties is incoherent. As Sider (2006) shows, bare particular theory requires no such commitment.
Bare particulars, while they might fail to instantiate any qualitatively or sparse universals, will
invariably instantiate—in some attenuated sense that does not appeal to universals—properties like
being a bare particular, being self-identical, and so on.
11A familiar motivation for positing bare particulars is to hold them to “individuate” substances.
I ignore this motivation in what follows and focus instead on what I take to be a considerably less
opaque and confusing enterprise: analyzing modality. See Lowe (2003) for more on the putative role
of bare particulars as sources of individuation.
132
5.3 Lewisian Modal Realism
LMR is a theory of possible worlds that aims at a reductive analysis of our modal
concepts.12 It begins by taking on an enormous ontological commitment: a plurality
of concrete, maximal spatiotemporal sums. These sums are identified as “possible
worlds”. On the resulting view, there is no difference in ontological kind between the
actual and the merely possible. All worlds are concrete, qualitatively determinate
particulars. As a consequence, actuality proves to be an indexical notion rather than
a metaphysically fundamental distinction.13
LMR offers an interpretation of our de dicto modal thought and talk in terms of
these possible worlds. Most notably, the box and diamond of modal logic are analyzed
as quantifiers over these possible worlds rather than taken as theoretical primitives.
According to this analysis, for it to be possible that there are blue swans is just for
it to be the case that some world has blue swans as parts. Similarly, for it to be
necessary that there are blue swans is just for it to be the case that all worlds have
blue swans as parts.14
The final component of LMR is the most complicated: a reductive analysis of de re
modality. LMR’s analysis of de re modality proceeds by way of counterpart theory.15
Counterpart theory holds that an individual, x, might be F if and only if there is
some counterpart of x which is F. Our de re modal claims are therefore analyzed in
terms of counterpart relations that hold between individuals strewn across the various
possible worlds. Interestingly, counterpart theory does without the numerical identity
of individuals across possible worlds. For example, a de re modal claim about Herman
12Throughout this section, I follow the presentation of LMR in Lewis (1986).
13See Bricker (2006) for an alternative to LMR that upholds a fundamental distinction between
the actual and merely possible.
14I set aside a number of complications regarding the proposed analysis. See Divers (2002) for
discussion of the niceties of LMR’s analysis of modality de dicto and de re.
15See Lewis (1968), (1971), and (1986) for the development of counterpart theory.
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Melville is analyzed in terms of the properties instantiated by an individual distinct
from Melville located in an entirely different possible world.16
Counterpart theory is a powerful philosophical tool, but why should we accept it
instead of an analysis that allows for the numerical identity of particulars across pos-
sible worlds? For Lewis, the motivation for counterpart theory and the commitment
to possible individuals as “worldbound”—never part of more than a single world—is
the problem of accidental intrinsics.17
The problem of accidental intrinsics begins simply enough: Suppose that Rube
exists at two possible worlds, w and w*. Further suppose that at w, Rube has the
accidental property of squinting, and that at w* Rube has the accidental property of
not squinting. Given that Rube at w is identical to Rube at w*, Rube is both squinting
and not squinting. But, since nothing can be both squinting and not squinting, the
assumption that Rube exists at two possible worlds must be mistaken.
Faced with this initial argument, the natural response is to hold that the con-
tradiction is merely apparent: Rube simply stands in two distinct albeit perfectly
consistent relations. He bears the squinting at relation to w and the not squinting at
relation to w*. In this way, his accidental squinting is no more contradictory than his
squinting now and his failure to squint five minutes ago.
The problem with this response is that it requires us to recast intuitively intrinsic
properties as mere relations to worlds (or times). Suppose Rube is actually five feet
tall, but Rube could have been six feet tall. Given the proposed solution, this is
just to say Rube bears the being five feet tall relation to the actual world and the
being six feet tall relation to another world. But this seems mistaken. To be five feet
tall is not merely to bear a relation; it is to instantiate an intrinsic property. But,
16As discussed shortly, Melville’s worldmates might also be his counterparts.
17Since Lewis accepts unrestricted mereological composition, some individuals—transworld
fusions—are “impossible” and have parts at distinct worlds. Here, the prohibition on having parts
at distinct worlds applies only to “possible individuals”.
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if Rube or any other individual exists in distinct worlds, their accidental intrinsic
properties must be recast as mere relations to worlds in order to avoid contradiction.
For Lewis, this result is untenable and provides sufficient grounds to hold individuals
to be worldbound and analyze de re modality via counterpart theory.
Having rehearsed the basics of LMR, I turn now to haecceitism and its treatment
within the framework of LMR.
5.4 Haecceitism for Modal Realists
Possibilities can be distinguished in many ways. For our purposes, two distinc-
tions are of particular importance. The first distinction is between maximal and
non-maximal possibilities. Intuitively, maximal possibilities are total ways for the
world to be. For any possibility, a maximal possibility includes that possibility or its
negation.18 Non-maximal possibilities are possibilities that are not maximal. For ex-
ample, the possibility that there is a brown dog or that money grows on trees are both
non-maximal, but only the former is included in the actualized maximal possibility.
The second distinction is between non-qualitative and qualitative possibilities.
Non-qualitative possibilities are possibilities for specific individuals like the possi-
bility that Herman Melville is the tallest human. These possibilities are to be an-
alyzed through counterpart theory, since non-qualitative possibilities are intimately
connected with de re modality. In contrast, qualitative possibilities are general: they
depend upon no specific individuals, and require no appeal to counterpart theory to
make sense of. The possibility that there is a massive sphere or that something—
anything at all—is red are therefore qualitative rather than non-qualitative possibil-
ities.
18For present purposes, we can understand “inclusion” as entailment.
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Once we distinguish between these kinds of possibilities, we can introduce the
following thesis:
Alethic Haecceitism: There are maximal possibilities that differ only
in terms of the non-qualitative possibilities they include.
Alethic haecceitism places demands upon modal reality. It guarantees that there are
maximal possibilities that agree in all qualitative respects yet differ non-qualitatively.19
Maximal possibilities that differ in this way can be said to differ haecceitistically.
To get a better sense of haecceitistic difference, we can introduce the notion of a
qualitative profile, where the qualitative profile of an individual is the set of all the
qualitative properties—intrinsic, extrinsic, and relational—it instantiates according
to a maximal possibility.
Consider now a maximal possibility that differs from actuality only insofar as
Bush occupies the qualitative profile Obama actually occupies and vice versa. If
there is such a maximal possibility, alethic haecceitism is true, since that possibility
will differ haecceitistically from the actualized maximal possibility. Intuitively, this
sort of haecceitistic differences involves actual individuals “swapping” their qualitative
profiles.
In characterizing alethic haecceitism, I have helped myself to talk of possibilities.
For those like Lewis, who accept possible worlds theory, possibilities are to be reduced
to or identified with possible worlds. The following thesis therefore follows naturally:
Modal Correspondence: Each maximal possibility is identical with a
unique possible world.
As I argue in Section Seven, modal correspondence is an attractive commitment of
any analysis of modality. And, while the inference from alethic haecceitism to modal
19For discussion of haecceitism, see Lewis (1986: 220-247) and Fara (2009).
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correspondence is highly intuitive, LMR denies modal correspondence yet accepts
alethic haecceitism.
LMR’s denial of modal correspondence flows from LMR’s view of counterpart
relations and commitment to the following thesis:
Qualitative Counterpart Theory: The de re modal properties of indi-
viduals are to be analyzed in terms of relations of qualitative resemblance
they bear to individuals.
Qualitative counterpart theory requires that each and every counterpart relation is
a relation of qualitative resemblance. De re modality is therefore analyzed solely by
appeal to counterpart relations of qualitative resemblance that never divide qualita-
tively indiscernible individuals. To see precisely what this requires, consider a world
like the one considered in Black (1952) that contains only two duplicate iron spheres,
Castor and Pollux, located five feet apart.
According to LMR, the possible world including Castor and Pollux represents
three non-qualitative possibilities for an actual individual, Herman Melville. Since
there is some degree to which Melville resembles the fusion of Castor and Pollux,
there is at least one counterpart relation that holds between Melville and that fusion.
Provided that context selects one of these counterpart relations, it is true that Herman
could have been qualitatively just as that fusion is.
Melville also resembles each of Castor and Pollux and, by virtue of their qualitative
indiscernibility, he resembles them to the very same degree. And, since there is
some degree to which Melville resembles each of Castor and Pollux, there is at least
one counterpart relation that holds between Melville and Castor as well as Melville
and Pollux. Again, provided the right context, it is true that Melville could be
qualitatively just as Castor is and it is also true that he could be qualitatively just
as Pollux is.
137
In one respect, LMR’s acceptance of counterpart relations is generous: a single
counterpart relation—provided it is qualitative—delivers distinct non-qualitative pos-
sibilities for an individual. In another respect, LMR is stingy: it denies there is any
counterpart relation that holds between Melville and Castor that does not also hold
between Melville and Pollux and vice versa. This is because any relation that would
divide Castor and Pollux would be non-qualitative and at odds with LMR’s reduction
of de re modality to facts of qualitative resemblance.
Since LMR denies that qualitatively indiscernible individuals can differ with re-
spect to the counterpart relations they stand in, LMR denies such individuals can
differ in the non-qualitative possibilities they represent. This denial has a significant
consequence: if there are any qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds, those worlds
cannot differ with respect to the de re possibilities they represent. As Lewis some-
times puts this point: which de re possibilities a world represents supervenes upon
the qualitative character of that world.
How, then, does LMR aim to accommodate haecceitism? Conveniently, the above
example perfectly illustrates LMR’s accommodation of haecceitism. Consider the
possibility that Meville is just as Castor is and the alternative possibility that Melville
is just as Pollux is. Since these possibilities, which we can assume to be included
within distinct maximal possibilities, differ only non-qualitatively, LMR has a clever
tactic for making sense of alethic haecceitism: allow one and the same possible world
to represent distinct maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically. Accordingly,
a single possible world represents the possibilities that Melville is like Castor, that
Melville is like Pollux, and that Melville is like their fusion.
Lewis (1986) presents this view as follows:
To illustrate, consider these two possibilities for me. I might have been one
of a pair of twins. I might have been the firstborn one, or the secondborn
one. These two possibilities involve no qualitative difference in the way
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the world is. Imagine them specified more fully: there is the possibility of
being the firstborn twin in the world of such-and-such maximally specific
qualitative character. And there is the possibility of being the secondborn
twin in exactly such a world.... I say: two possibilities, sure enough. But
they are two possibilities within a single world. The world in question
contains twin counterparts of me. Each twin is a possible way for a person
to be, and in fact is a possible way for me to be. I might have been one, or
I might have been the other. These are two distinct possibilities for me.
But they involve only one possibility for the world: it might have been
the world inhabited by two such twins.20
Lewis’s solution preserves qualitative counterpart theory and alethic haecceitism by
holding a single world to represent various non-qualitative possibilities for a given
individual. As Lewis’s example indicates, the world of the twins represents not only
the non-qualitative possibility that Lewis is the youngest twin but also that Lewis is
the oldest one.
A natural way to generalize Lewis’s view is to distinguish between possible worlds
and the maximal possibilities they represent, where the latter are the various maxi-
mally consistent non-qualitative and qualitative possibilities represented by a world.
According to this generalization, there is a many-one relation between maximal pos-
sibilities and possible worlds, since every possible world represents each and every
maximal possibility consistent with the qualitative character of the world. So, for
example, the actual world represents both the actualized maximal possibility as well
as any maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically from it (e.g., the maximal
possibility where you and I swap qualitative profiles). I believe there is very little
that separates this generalization from the view Lewis’s remarks endorse. And, while
20Lewis (1986: 231).
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this is best marked as an open interpretive question, it will be a useful simplifying
assumption to interpret Lewis in this way. In proceeding, I do precisely this.
The motivation for LMR’s denial of modal correspondence can now be made ex-
plicit: alethic haecceitism, qualitative counterpart theory, and modal correspondence
form an inconsistent triad. So, if one accepts alethic haecceitism and qualitative
counterpart theory, one must reject modal correspondence.
Consider the argument for the incompatibility of these three theses: If alethic
haecceitism is true, there are maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically. If
modal correspondence is true, each maximal possibilities is identical with a distinct
possible world. But, since maximal possibilities differ haecceitistically, these possible
worlds must be qualitatively indiscernible. But, if qualitative counterpart theory is
true, these possible worlds represent the same maximal possibilities. And, if these
possible worlds represent the same maximal possibilities, the maximal possibilities
that differ haecceitistically cannot be identified with unique possible worlds, since
each world will represent many maximal possibilities. We must therefore abandon
either alethic haecceitism, qualitative counterpart theory, or modal correspondence.
For Lewis, the choice is easy. Alethic haecceitism and qualitative counterpart
theory stay; modal correspondence goes. This decision to abandon modal correspon-
dence in favor of qualitative counterpart theory is buttressed by Lewis’s rejection of
non-qualitative counterpart theory. This is because the adoption of non-qualitative
counterpart theory would allow us to uphold alethic haecceitism as well as modal
correspondence.21 In the next section, I present Lewis’s arguments against non-
qualitative counterpart theory. I then show how a commitment to bare particulars
allows us to undermine Lewis’s arguments and gives rise to an alternative to LMR
that preserves modal correspondence.
21See Heller (2005) for an argument for the necessity of non-qualitative counterpart relations.
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Before proceeding, let me note two assumptions. First, I follow Lewis and many
others in accepting alethic haecceitism.22 Second, I assume the existence of quali-
tatively indiscernible possible worlds. A commitment to modal correspondence and
alethic haecceitism requires that there such worlds exist, and, while Lewis was content
with agnosticism about qualitatively indiscernible worlds, I aim to show that their
use for analyzing modality provides reason to decide in their favor.23
5.5 Non-Qualitative Counterpart Theory
Lewis (1986) offers two arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory.
The first concerns the isolation and unification of worlds; the second concerns the
intelligibility of non-qualitative counterpart relations. Since the second argument is
the more challenging, I begin by briefly addressing the first argument.
Lewis’s first objection to non-qualitative counterpart theory turns on the relations
that unify possible worlds. He argues:
I suggested that perhaps there are no natural external relations whatever
between parts of different worlds; and that if so, we could bypass the
idea of ‘analogically spatiotemporal’ relations and say simply that worlds
are unified by external interrelatedness. A non-qualitative counterpart
relation would presumably sink that hope.24
In order to evaluate this argument, we need to clarify the distinction between ex-
ternal and internal relations. Internal relations like being a duplicate of and being
22See Lewis (1986: 231) for a defense of alethic haecceitism. See Chapter Two for a defense of
alethic haecceitism.
23See Lewis (1986: 224) and Lewis (2003: 26). I argue in Chapter Four that qualitatively in-
discernible worlds serve an additional purpose: they furnish us with a reductive analysis of the
distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties.
24Lewis (1986: 230).
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shorter than supervene upon the intrinsic properties of the relata considered sepa-
rately. External relations like being five feet from one another and being incongruent
with one another supervene upon the intrinsic properties of the fusion of their relata.
Intuitively, the former kind of relations are fixed by the intrinsic natures of their re-
lata alone, while the latter kind of relations require that the world and the intrinsic
natures of the relata cooperate.
Spatiotemporal relations are paradigmatic external relations and, for Lewis, it is
spatiotemporal relations and their analogues that unify worlds. Specifically, individu-
als, x and y, are worldmates if and only if each and every part of x is spatiotemporally
related to each and every part of y.25 The worry Lewis raises here is that, if there
are non-qualitative counterpart relations, they would be external and, therefore, in-
consistent with this attractive generalization.
The non-qualitative counterpart theorist has a plausible response to the charge
that the isolation of worlds is jeopardized by non-qualitative counterpart relations:
accept the generalization but define the unification and isolation of worlds in terms
of qualitative external relations. This response squares well with the onus Lewis
places upon natural properties and relations, which are ex hypothesi qualitative in na-
ture. So, granted this amendment, there is little reason to worry that non-qualitative
counterpart theory threatens either the general commitments of modal realism or its
treatment of the isolation or unification of worlds. Having addressed this warm-up
objection, we can now turn to what I will call the Intelligibility Objection.
The Intelligibility Objection purports to show that any non-qualitative counter-
part theory is unintelligible. Lewis says, for example, that “there is no way to make
sense of a non-qualitative counterpart relation.”26 He adds that LMR avoids “buying
25As Bricker (1996) argues, an attractive way to generalize Lewis’s modal realism—a way that
Lewis himself finds appealing—is to define the worldmate relation in terms of external relations
rather than spatiotemporal relations and their analogues.
26Lewis (1986: 230).
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into any mysterious non-qualitative aspects of worlds”.27 Lewis then presents the
Intelligibility Objection as follows:
I ask what the non-qualitative determinants of representation de re are,
and how they do their work.... Perhaps the [non-qualitative counterpart
theorist] thinks that some of all these relations or properties or sums are
somehow special, and he mean to speak only of the special ones. (Perhaps
he also thinks that only the special ones exist.) Then he must tell me which
of all the relations and properties and sums I believe in are the special
ones. He cannot say that the special ones are the ones that carve along
the qualitative joints; that I can understand, but that does not meet his
need to single out some of all the ones that don’t carve along the joints.
He must avoid circularity. I do not think he can answer me. If he cannot,
he leaves it entirely mysterious what it could mean to say that things were
non-qualitative counterparts.28
In evaluating the Intelligibility Objection, it is important to note that Lewis’s ar-
gument does not turn on a denial of non-qualitative properties. Lewis is explicitly
committed to the existence of both non-qualitative properties and relations.29 The
problem with non-qualitative counterpart theory is not in the acceptance of non-
qualitative properties or relations, but in their employment for counterpart theory.
Lewis’s argument presents the non-qualitative counterpart theorist with a chal-
lenge: given the vast plurality of non-qualitative relations, some of these relations
must be singled out as the counterpart relations suitable for analyzing de re modal-
ity.
27Lewis (1986:230).
28Lewis (1986: 229)
29Lewis (1986: 232).
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According to Lewis, the non-qualitative counterpart theorist cannot meet the
challenge just posed. While she might stipulate non-qualitative counterpart relations
are those used for the analysis of de re modality, the resulting circularity forecloses
the possibility of reductively analyzing de re modality. And, without an alternative
specification of the elite relations, the non-qualitative counterpart theorist has no
theory of de re representation and their putative analysis will be wholly mysterious.
Rightly, Lewis finds this untenable.
There are two avenues for responding to Lewis’s challenge. The first kind of
response refuses the challenge that some elite relations be singled out. Instead, each
and every relation is viewed as a genuine counterpart relation. Since every relation
accomplishes the task of de re representation, nothing needs to be said about which
ones are the counterpart relations.30
The second response accepts the challenge and aims to meet it by fixing upon
some elite non-qualitative relations that can underwrite counterpart theory. I pursue
this second kind of response in the next section by drawing upon the resources of
bare particular theory.
5.6 New Work for Bare Particulars
Recall that bare particular theory admits two relations that have some claim to
being “the instantiation relation”. The first relation is the internal relation thick par-
30This proposal is barely a counterpart theory. Counterpart relations have distinctive logical
features. They are, for example, non-transitive and non-symmetric. Since some relations are tran-
sitive or symmetric, not all relations are counterpart relations. Let us suppose, then, that all
counterpart-ish relations—relations that satisfy the relevant logical criteria—are counterpart rela-
tions. Despite this, we still have more counterpart relations than we bargained for. Consider the
various relations we might define using concrete individuals as well as pure set theory. Some of these
relations will be counterpart-ish, but, if accepted as genuine counterpart relations, entail that you
or I could have been pure sets. We must therefore restrict counterpart relations to counterpart-ish
relations among concrete objects. Despite this further restriction, problems still arise. We can define
counterpart-ish relations involving “impossible objects”—transworld fusions—that are concrete, so
further restrictions—whatever they may be—are still needed.
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ticulars bear to the universals they have as parts. The second relation is the external
relation bare particulars bear to the universals that are also parts of a common thick
particular. Of these relations, the second is metaphysically fundamental, while the
first naturally comports with our talk of predication. Consider, for example, that an
electron, Sparky, is most naturally identified with a thick rather than bare particular.
Sparky therefore “instantiates” the universal, electronhood, by virtue of bearing an
internal relation to one of its own parts.
The difference between these instantiation relations is important for the defense
of non-qualitative counterpart theory. This is because the version of modal realism
that overcomes Lewis’s Intelligibility Objection invokes bare particulars to analyze
counterpart relations.
According to Bare Particular Modal Realism (hereafter, BPMR), counterpart re-
lations are analyzed as follows: x is a counterpart of y if and only if some bare
particular, z, overlaps x and y. The idea here is that bare particulars—entities that
make no qualitative difference in the world—will unify numerically distinct thick par-
ticulars that inhabit distinct possible worlds. And, by virtue of thick particulars
sharing a common bare particular, the thick particulars in question are counterparts.
Like LMR, BPMR posits a plurality of concrete worlds. In addition, BPMR holds
that, for any qualitative description of a world, there is a plurality of qualitatively
indiscernible worlds—all satisfying the same qualitative description. All of these
worlds are made up of thick particulars, and these thick particulars have two kinds
of non-spatiotemporal parts: universals, which determine the qualitative character of
the world, and bare particulars, which bear an external relation of instantiation to
universals.
Like LMR, BPMR identifies ordinary objects with thick particulars, and denies
thick particulars overlap possible worlds. Since the connection between thick par-
ticulars and universals is an internal relation, thick particulars have their intrinsic
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properties in virtue of themselves alone. For this reason, it is implausible to view
putatively intrinsic properties of thick particulars as being mere relations to worlds.
Unlike LMR, BPMR accepts bare particulars and denies they are worldbound. Ac-
cording to BPMR, bare particulars are numerically identical across possible worlds,
since the problem of accidental intrinsics does not apply to bare particulars. Since
bare particulars bear an external relation to universals, they do not have any uni-
versals as intrinsic properties. And, for any properties like being a bare particular or
being self-identical that bare particulars might be ascribed, those properties, which
do not correspond to universals, will be either relations or had essentially. So, while
the internal relation thick particulars bear to their universals provides reason to be-
lieve them to be worldbound, the external relation bare particulars bear to universals
provides no reason to believe bare particulars have universals as intrinsic properties.
BPMR accommodates the intuitions that underwrite the problem of accidental
intrinsics: these intuitions concern thick but not bare particulars.31 And, once we ac-
cept the numerical identity of bare particulars across possible worlds, we can use bare
particulars to define a non-qualitative counterpart theory between thick particulars.
An intuitive picture of BPMR can be presented as follows: suppose we have before
us the qualitative descriptions of all possible worlds. For any of these qualitative
descriptions, there are a plurality of ways the world might be non-qualitatively that
are consistent with these descriptions. Intuitively, then, we can view the qualitative
profile of a thick particular as a “slot” into which any bare particular might be
inserted. We can now stipulate that, for every qualitative description of a world and
31For more on overlap within modal realism, see McDaniel (2004). The view developed there,
Modal Realism with Overlap (hereafter, MRO), accepts the numerical identity of material objects
across worlds, but accepts counterpart theory for spatiotemporal regions. In contrast to MRO,
BPMR accepts the numerical identity of bare particulars across worlds, but accepts counterpart
theory for thick particulars. One consequence of MRO is that a dualism of material objects and
spatiotemporal regions is something like a necesary truth—perhaps some worlds have only one but
not the other—but, since non-dualist alternatives seem possible, MRO’s analysis of modality seems
at odds with the body of modal facts.
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every way of mapping or “inserting” bare particulars into those slots, there is some
world where those bare particulars occupy those very slots. Abstractly, there is a
plenitude of non-qualitative possibilities for every maximal qualitative possibility.
This intuitive picture can be further detailed by attending to the non-qualitative
counterpart theory for analyzing de re modal claims about thick particulars: a thick
particular, x, has a thick particular, y, as a counterpart if and only if there is a bare
particular, z, that overlaps both x and y. On the resulting view, the maximal possi-
bility according to which Bush and Obama swap qualitative profiles is identified with
the possible world where Bush and Obama’s actual bare particulars swap qualitative
profiles and all else remains the same. Notice, however, that Bush and Obama do not
overlap worlds. They are thick particulars incapable of overlapping worlds, and, for
this reason, counterpart theory is still needed to explain their modal properties.
The counterpart relations of BPMR make no qualitative contribution to the world.
Since all qualitative matters are fixed by universals, facts about bare particulars—the
facts which determine counterpart relations—are exclusively non-qualitative. BPMR
is therefore a form of non-qualitative counterpart theory capable of meeting Lewis’s
challenge: non-qualitative counterpart relations are relations of bare particular over-
lap. These relations are well-suited for the job of undewriting de re representation,
since they unify only those entities that share a fundamental ontological constituent—
a bare particular.
Why prefer BPMR to LMR? As I argue in the next section, BPMR’s commitment
to non-qualitative counterpart theory sustains modal correspondence and therefore
confers theoretical virtues upon BPMR that LMR lacks. Before turning to the virtues
of modal correspondence, let me consider three objections to BPMR.
A first objection: that two things share bare particulars provides no reason to
believe that they might represent possibilities for one another. A response: BPMR
holds that de re representation works by way of thick particulars sharing a funda-
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mental non-spatiotemporal part, a bare particular. In contrast, LMR holds the other
fundamental non-spatiotemporal parts of thick particulars, universals, do the work of
representation de re. I suspect that, if one rejects BPRM’s explanation of counterpart
relations, one has equal reason to reject LMR’s. Both proposals come as part of a
package deal, and neither are motivated on the basis of any pre-theoretic intuitions.
Furthermore, LMR does not hold that an individual represents a de re possibility for
something because of their qualitative resemblance; it holds only that the analysis
of de re modality proceed using these relations. Notice, for example, that even the
maximally qualitatively diverse individuals will be counterpart related according to
LMR. There is therefore little reason to think LMR squares with our intuitions about
what grounds representation de re in a way that BPMR does not.
A second objection: BPMR is tenable only if bare particular theory is coherent,
but BPMR has said nothing about, say, the relation of the bare particulars of com-
posite individuals and the bare particulars of their proper parts. It seems, then, that
BPMR is no theory, but rather a sketch of one. A response: Fair enough. Bare
particular theory comes with a number of open questions. For example, do only
fundamental or mereologically simple thick particulars have bare particulars are non-
spatiotemporal parts, or do all thick particulars—mereological composites included—
have bare particulars? If only simple thick particulars have bare particulars, BPMR
owes some extension of its counterpart theory to mereologically complex thick partic-
ulars. While such an account is likely to appeal to either fusions of bare particulars
or plural quantification over them, we ought to leave open whether such an account
is needed. This is because the open and more general question for bare particular
theory—whether bare particulars run throughout the hierarchy of particulars—need
not be settled here. And, without settling this matter, a theory sketch is the best that
can be offered and it suffices to provide reason for optimism about bare particular
theory as well as further impetus to develop and clarify the theory.
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A third objection: According to BPMR, thick particulars that share a common
bare particular are counterparts of one another, but no thick particular has more
than a single bare particular. The non-qualitative counterpart relations between
individuals will therefore never be many-one or one-many relations. So, when we
consider claims like “Bush and Obama might have been one and the same” or “I
could have been twins”, these claims will either be false or require analysis in terms
of something other than the non-qualitative counterpart relation defined using bare
particulars.
A response: the defender of BPMR might take this to provide evidence for ac-
cepting the necessity of identity. And, while I incline to do so, there is an interesting
alternative available. The defender of BPMR might accept a pluralism about the ways
in which modal thought and talk can be analyzed given the metaphysical resources of
BPMR. In particular, she can hold that BPMR affords (at least) two ways to analyze
modal claims and assign them truth-values. On the most natural one, which precludes
contingent identity and employs only non-qualitative counterpart relations, the above
claims are trivially false. On the less natural analysis, which allows for contingent
identity and employs both qualitative and non-qualitative counterpart relations, the
above claims are true. And, while BPMR’s use of bare particulars allows us to sustain
modal correspondence on this most natural analysis, it is no requirement that any
less natural analysis do the same. So understood, BPMR can provide a non-trivial
interpretation of contingent identity claims while marking these interpretations—in
addition to modal thought and talk that runs afoul of the necessity of identity—as
less natural, since the required interpretation does not uphold modal correspondence.
Having addressed these objections to BPMR, I now turn to the case in favor of
modal correspondence.
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5.7 Modal Correspondence
In this section, I defend the merits of modal correspondence. I begin by consid-
ering an objection from Fara (2009) that takes issue with LMR’s denial of modal
correspondence as it relates to the implementation of an actuality operator, ACT,
within LMR’s analysis of modality.32
Following Fara, let’s suppose that our world exhibits two-way eternal recurrence
such that qualitatively indiscernible regions of spacetime are connected in an infinite
series extending backwards and forwards in time. Let’s further suppose that the
only epoch in which we are located is epoch-A. Now, since Lewis accepts alethic
haecceitism, he accepts that some maximal possibilities differ from the actualized
maximal possibility only in terms of the non-qualitative possibilities they include. One
possibility that differs from our supposed actual maximal possibility is the possibility
according to which we inhabit epoch-B rather than epoch-A. Since the defender of
LMR accepts this possibility, she has good reason to accept the following premise:
(3) ACT Fara lives in epoch-A ∧ ♦ Fara lives in epoch-B.
From (3), Fara argues that there is good reason for the defender of LMR to accept
the following thesis:
(4) ACT Fara lives in epoch-A ∧ ♦ ACT Fara lives in epoch-B.
From (4), Fara then argues that a proposition being possibly actual entails its being
actual such that:
(5) ACT Fara lives in epoch-A ∧ ACT Fara lives in epoch-B.
This delivers the evidently inconsistent conclusion:
32Fara adopts the interpretation of ACT defended in Fara and Williamson (2005). There are a
number of issues about the proper semantics and inferential profile of actuality operators. For our
purposes, most of these issues can be set aside.
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(6) ACT (Fara lives in epoch-A ∧ Fara lives in epoch-B.)
Since both (5) and (6) contradict our earlier assumption that Fara lives only in epoch-
A, the defender of LMR is faced with a reductio.33
As Fara acknowledges, the defender of LMR has a natural response to her argu-
ment. The defender of LMR can deny that Fara could have actually lived in epoch-B.
And, indeed, when we consider Fara’s case for this premise, it appears to turn on
a confusion about the distinction between maximal possibilities and possible worlds.
Fara’s case for the inference from (3) to (4) runs as follows:
If every interval and region of the actual world that’s just like the interval
and region that I’m in contains a person who’s a counterpart of me—in the
sense that’s relevant for determining what’s possible for me—then since
this counterpart actually lives in [epoch-B], actually living in [epoch-B] is
a possibility for me.34
Fara argues that the possibility that Fara lived in epoch-B could have actually
obtained, since it is represented by the same possible world that represents the ac-
tualized maximal possibility. But it is crucial to LMR’s treatment of haecceitism
that due attention is paid to the distinction between possible worlds and maximal
possibilities.
33If the problem Fara has spotted is genuine, it is far more pervasive than she acknowledges. While
a world of eternal recurrence is a natural setting in which to consider haecceitistic possibilities, notice
that, for the defender of LMR, our own world is such that many individuals represent possibilities
for one another. For example, Bush, who is actually a man, has an actual woman, Thatcher, as a
counterpart. In virtue of this, Bush could have been just as Thatcher is even while things could
have been the very same qualitatively. In light of this, we can also run Fara’s argument involving
the actual Bush and Thatcher, (3*) ACT Bush is a man ∧ ♦ Bush is a woman. Employing the
same argument Fara offers, we would conclude, (5*) ACT Bush is a man ∧ ACT Bush is a woman.
It should be clear, then, that the purported problem does not turn exclusively on exotic worlds of
eternal recurrence, but would be a symptom of some more basic problem with LMR.
34Fara (2009: 292).
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According to LMR, the maximal spatiotemporal sums labelled as “possible worlds”
provide the resources to analyze modality. But, given LMR’s denial of modal corre-
spondence, possible worlds cannot be identified maximal possibilities. On the con-
trary, the defender of LMR must identify maximal possibilities with something like
set-theoretic constructions out of possible worlds and their parts. Accordingly, our
deployment of modal operators like ACT has inferential connections with maximal
possibilities rather than the spatiotemporal hunks that provide the resources for build-
ing up maximal possibilities.
Notice, however, that Fara defends (3) by arguing that “since [Fara’s counterpart]
actually lives in the 18th epoch, actually living in the 18th epoch is a possibility for
[Fara].” Here, Fara’s argument requires an inference about actuality that issues from
a fact about possible worlds rather than maximal possibilities. While we can grant
that Fara is indeed part of the same possible world as her counterpart and that the
world in question represents the actualized maximal possibility, it does not follow
from this that other maximal possibilities represented by that world might have been
actual.
Although Fara’s counterpart will indeed represent a possibility for Fara, this pos-
sibility is no more or less possibly actual than a maximal possibility represented by
an entirely distinct possible world. Facts about which possible world represents which
maximal possibility are irrelevant to which maximal possibilities are actual or might
have been actual. This is part and parcel of LMR’s resistance to identifying possible
worlds with maximal possibilities. As a result, the fact that two maximal possibilities
are represented by the same world provides no additional reason to believe that both
might have been actual but that some other maximal possibilities—represented by
other possible worlds—might not have been actual.
If the problem Fara has hit upon is geuine, it is therefore not one unique to LMR.
A commitment to LMR does not require that every maximal possibility represented
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by the the possible world that represents the lone actualized maximal possibility is
therefore possibly actual or that maximal possibilities represented by other worlds
are therefore not possibly actual. For the defender of LMR, maximal possibilities—
regardless of the possible world that represents them—are on the same footing. As
such, the problem that Fara hits upon is a problem for any view that licenses the
inference from (3) to (4); however, there is no reason to believe LMR provides any
better reason to endorse than inference than any ersatzist alternative.
Against this diagnosis, Fara argues as follows:
This brings to the fore the feature of Cheap Haecceitism that both gives
it its power and ultimately betrays it. The betrayl comes when we realize
that these possibilities must not be treated as actual, even though they
are parts of the actual world. They are genuinely alternative possibilities.
Given this, the Cheap Haecceitist has ceased to treat the actual world as
itself being a possibility. In letting in proper parts of worlds as possibilities
to be quantified over, he has kicked out improper parts of some genuinely
possible worlds (the repeating ones). Possible worlds themselves no longer
always represent a possibility. Cheap Haecceitism does not seem worth
this cost for the similarity-based counterpart theorist. He cannot coher-
ently admit Haecceitistic possibilities while retaining the very essence of
the theory of modality he shares with most of those who disagree with
him: possibility is truth in some possible world.35
I believe Fara’s response is more than mere question-begging against LMR but
less than a convincing case. Properly understood, it shows that the bifurcation of
possible worlds and maximal possibilities required by LMR is theoretically vicious.
This viciousness consists in the inelegance and revisionary character of analysis of
35Fara (2009: 296).
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modality that does without modal correspondence. This viciousness was a matter
Lewis himself was sensitive to. In considering the consequences of denying modal
correspondence, he says the following:
I think there is [a cost]—simply the cost of making a break with established
theory, on which all differences between possibilities are supposed to be
differences between possible worlds. It is chaos if too many questions come
open all at once, therefore theoretical conservatism is a good idea. There
should be a presumption in favour of the incumbent theory, and against
gratuitous substitutes.36
Although Lewis hastens to add that he views LMR as a suitably cheap substitute,
the point he concedes here remains: modal correspondence is part of our established
theory and therefore enjoys some presumption in its favour. The ubiquitous slide
between talk of possible worlds and talk of maximal possibilities is harmless if modal
correspondence is true, but problematic if LMR is adopted. So, if an equally attractive
alternative is available and this alternative upholds modal correspondence and allows
for interchangeable talk of possible worlds and maximal possibilities, we have reason
to prefer it to LMR. For this reason, we have evidence in favour of BPMR over LMR.
Along with this construal of Fara’s objection, there are further benefits to adopting
BPMR and upholding modal correspondence. Earlier, I alluded to the reduction of
logical space—the space of possibilities—to possible worlds. This reduction identifies
possibilities, maximal and otherwise, with sets of possible worlds in the much the same
way semantic theory reduces extensions of predicates to sets of individuals. A primary
cost of abandoning modal correspondence is that this reduction of logical space to
possible worlds is no longer available, since there will be insufficient worlds to issue
36Lewis (1986: 235).
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a full-scale reduction of maximal possibilities to possible worlds. The preservation of
this natural reduction is, therefore, a point in favour of modal correspondence.
Another reason for accepting modal correspondence emerges from the theoretical
unifications and simplifications it allows. If we treat abundant properties as sets of
individuals, we can unify our metaphysics of properties and propositions. Granted
modal correspondence, all propositions—even de se propositions—can be identified
with sets of possible worlds and, since possible worlds are individuals, propositions
prove to be mere properties of maximal individuals.37
In contrast, if we reject modal correspondence by accepting LMR, we are forced
to treat certain de se or “centered” propositions as ordered pairs of individuals and
worlds, since no possible worlds differ only non-qualitatively.38 This precludes an
appealing unification and generalization of our property and proposition theories.
Recently, Stalnaker (2008) makes a similar point in defending haecceitistic differences
between his own ersatz possible worlds:
Even though belief states are represented by sets of centered possible
worlds, the contents of belief can be taken to be ordinary propositions—
sets of uncentered possible worlds... By taking the contents of belief to be
(uncentered) propositions, we can straightforwardly compare the beliefs
of different subjects, and we can model the way assertions change the
context in a straightforward way. We can also model the dynamics of
belief for a single agent–the facts about preservation and change of belief–
in a straightforward way.39
37As Lewis (1986) notes, there are many conceptions of propositions and many roles associated
with these various conceptions. Here, my concern is with the conception of propositions sparsely
conceived such that no hyperintensional distinctions are admitted. I leave open that propositions,
conceived in some other fashion, might be needed for other theoretical purposes.
38See Lewis (1979) for discussion.
39Stalnaker (2008: 69-71).
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Perhaps there are still uses for which centered propositions are better suited than
a conception of propositions as sets of worlds alone. Even so, the availability of a
plenitude of propositions—understood as sets of possible worlds—is attractive and
allows for the natural identification of propositions with properties of entire worlds
and unifies our proposition and property theories.
More generally, the denial of modal correspondence seems at odds with the robust
realism about possible worlds that LMR accepts. By resisting the identification of
possible worlds with maximal possibilities, the “worlds” of LMR severs their natu-
ral analytic connection with modality.40 While LMR’s disconnected concrete spa-
tiotemporal sums supply a massive reservoir of concrete individuals for constructing
maximal possibilities, the denial of modal correspondence suggests that it is a dis-
tortion to call these sums, “possible worlds”. Recall, for example, that LMR holds
the concrete sum which we are parts of is the very same thing according to which
you swap qualitative profiles with Bush or Obama. By adopting a theory that sus-
tains modal correspondence, we can avoid this counter-intuitive commitment and go
a considerable distance towards restoring the analytic connection between modality
and concrete possible worlds.
Taken together, these considerations suggest that an analysis of modality that
preserves modal correspondence enjoys virtues that LMR does not. And, since BPMR
enjoys this virtue, it is to be preferred to LMR.
5.8 Conclusion
LMR is a powerful and reductive analysis of modality. I have argued that it has
a superior competitor, BPMR. BPMR reconciles alethic haecceitism and counterpart
40Some like Jubien (2009) find any proposed analytic connection incredible. I take the matter
to be by and large negotiable, but, as my remarks here indicate, less straightforward than Lewis
seemed to believe.
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theory while retaining the modal correspondence thesis. It therefore enjoys several
virtues that LMR does not. Furthermore, BPMR improves upon LMR by virtue of
employing bare particulars to ground non-qualitative counterpart theory. For this
reason, bare particulars afford us an analysis of modality superior to LMR. I take
this to be a point in their favor. I also take it to suggest that the best defense of bare
particulars is a good offense: demonstrating their usefulness for various metaphysical
enterprises.41 Naturally, some who accept modal realism will resist bare particulars
and some who accept bare particulars will resist modal realism. Better, I believe, to
help ourselves to the theoretical advantages ensured by commitment to both concrete
possible worlds and bare particulars.
41Most notably, since bare particulars help us with the problem of accidental intrinsics, it is natural
to think they have implications for the problem of temporary intrinsics as well.
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CHAPTER 6
QUIDDITISMS
6.1 Introduction
Haecceitism is not well understood. While most are convinced it concerns modality
and non-qualitative properties like being identical to Napoleon, there is considerable
disagreement about how exactly these pieces fit together. For this reason, the content
of haecceitism is best grasped by way of example. Consider a possible world, distinct
but qualitatively indiscernible from our own, that differs only with respect to facts
about the identity of individuals. So, for instance, suppose it is a world where two
twins “swap” their actual qualitative roles—the set of all their qualitative properties,
intrinsic, extrinsic, and relational, like being red or being round or being near a stop
sign—but all qualitative matters are the same. In a similar vein, suppose there is a
world where things are just as they actually are, but you are “replaced” with some
non-actual individual who occupies your qualitative role. If there are such worlds,
haecceitism is true. And, if no possible worlds differ in this way, anti-haecceitism is
true: there are no haecceitistic differences—exclusively non-qualitative differences—
between possible worlds.1
If haecceitism is not well understood, quidditism is in even worse shape. All
parties agree that quidditism concerns properties rather than individuals, and most
agree that it is an analogue of haecceitism, but, beyond this, it is far from clear
1For the moment, I set aside various complications regarding alethic and ontic versions of haec-
ceitism and quidditism. I take up these issues in Section Six. See Chapter One for extended
discussion.
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what quidditism amounts to. Fortunately, we can grasp the content of quidditism by
way of example. For Lewis (1986), it requires that “We can distinguish our world
from one in which, say, one of the quark colours has traded places with one of the
flavours.”2 Schaffer (2005) characterizes anti-quidditism along similar lines: “the
[anti-quidditist] does not allow that there is a world that differs from actuality solely
in that charge and mass swap powers.”3 Very roughly, then, quidditism involves
properties trading roles—either by swapping or replacement—in the natural order of
things just as haecceitism involves individuals trading—also, either by swapping or
replacement—qualitative roles.
In what follows, I have two aims. The first is to clarify the thesis of quidditism and
distinguish it from related theses often conflated with it. The second aim is to develop
a positive argument for quidditism. These aims dovetail, since the conception of
quidditism I defend holds it to be a strong analogue of haecceitism, and the argument
I offer is a variation of a familiar argument for haecceitism. After presenting an
argument for quidditism, I examine possible responses and, after considering how we
ought to accommodate quidditism within our metaphysics of modality, conclude that
no satisfactory anti-quidditist response is available.
One topic I will not address here is the epistemology of quidditism. In particular,
I set aside issues raised by Ramseyan Humility, the thesis that we are irremediably
ignorant of the world’s fundamental properties, which Lewis (2009) argues is a rather
striking consequence of quidditism. Since I set aside this and other epistemic issues,
2Lewis (1986: 162). Note that he does intend “distinguish” in an epistemologically interesting
sense.
3Schaffer (2005: 5). Schaffer’s remarks are not intended as a definition. After all, quidditistic
differences can be generated by both “swapping” properties between roles and “replacing” a property
with a property it is not co-actual with.
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my concerns here are exclusively metaphysical.4 I am therefore happy to remain
agnostic on these difficult epistemological matters.5
6.2 Quidditism and Properties
Since Shoemaker (1980), the relation between properties and their causal and
nomic roles—the totality of causal and nomological relations properties bear to one
another—has been at the forefront of inquiry into properties. A standard procedure
is to distinguish three views about the relation between properties and their causal-
nomic roles:6
Structuralism: Properties are individuated by their causal-nomic roles.
For example, occupation of the causal-nomic role associated with “mass”
is both necessary and sufficient for a property to be identical with mass.
Structuralism therefore holds the causal-nomic role of a property to be
its individual essence—i.e., an essence uniquely instantiable by that prop-
erty.7
The Double Aspect View: Properties are not individuated by their
causal-nomic roles, but they do have some or perhaps all of their causal-
nomic relations essentially. It is therefore a necessary condition of mass
4I also set aside the cardinality argument against quidditism offered in Black (2000: 96-99).
5See Lewis (2009) and responses in Hawthorne (2001), Whittle (2005), Schaffer (2005), and Locke
(2009).
6In what follows, I make a number of simplifying assumptions regarding causal-nomic structure.
I assume, first, that causal structure supervenes upon nomic structure such that worlds that are
nomically indiscernible are—in the sense relevant here—“causally indiscernible”. (Note: there many
and varying senses of “causal indiscernibility”.) I assume, second, that only fundamental properties
and relations occupy roles in the world’s causal structure. Finally, I assume that all causal relations
are general relations and thereby set aside worries about singular causation. These are blatantly
controversial assumptions that I take on for simplifying purposes. Even so, I take it that they can
be set aside without doing violence to inquiry into general content of quidditism. More importantly:
I outline the resources needed to parse these issues and their impact on quidditism below.
7My terminology follows Hawthorne (2001).
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that it occupy the causal-nomic role associated with “mass”, but it is not
a sufficient condition. On this view, the individuation of properties is a
primitive affair, but there are constraints on what is possible for properties
that flow from the essences of properties.
Neo-Humeanism: Properties are neither individuated by their causal-
nomic role nor do they have any of their causal-nomic relations essentially.
On this view, the relation between properties and causal-nomic roles is
extremely loose. Properties can occupy extremely diverse causal-nomic
roles and their individuation across possible worlds is a primitive matter.
These are theses about property individuation and the essences of properties. Pre-
sented with them, one might expect that quidditism turns out to be a thesis of this
sort. After all, if the individuation of properties is primitive, there seems to be
no obstacle to believing that mass could occupy the role actually associated with
“charge” and vice versa. And, while these views are close cousins, I will now offer
two arguments that show they are distinct.
Notice, first, that Neo-Humeanism is exclusively a thesis about individuation and
essence. It holds that the individuation of properties across worlds is a primitive
matter and that properties do not have their causal-nomic roles essentially. So put,
it neither entails nor precludes the existence of possible worlds that are distinguished
by a characteristically quidditistic difference (e.g., the difference that distinguishes
worlds where mass and charge swap roles). A further commitment is needed to
generate instances of quidditistic difference. This further commitment is a modal
one. It holds that, for some permutation of properties across causal-nomic roles,
there is a possible world where that permutation is realized.8 This thesis outstrips
8If one holds that, for any such permutation, there is a possible world where it is realized, one
accepts extreme quidditism. Further restrictions on the permutations that correspond to possible
worlds deliver progressively more modest forms of quidditism.
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Neo-Humeanism, since it posits possible worlds that exhibit quidditistic difference
rather than merely denying properties have causal-nomic essences.
There is a second reason for distinguishing quidditism from Neo-Humeanism:
quidditism can be accepted without Neo-Humeanism. For example, the Double As-
pect View, which accepts both the primitive individuation of properties and essential-
ism, is compatible with quidditistic differences between worlds. To see why, consider a
bilaterraly symmetric world where distinct properties exhibit a symmetric pattern of
instantiation yet stand in the same causal-nomic roles to other properties. Now con-
sider a world that differs only quidditistically, where those properties occupy the very
same causal-nomic roles but at different locations. Intuitively, these possible worlds
differ only quidditistically, but are perfectly compatible with the causal-nomic essen-
tialism of the Double Aspect View. We therefore have a second reason to distinguish
quidditism from Neo-Humeanism.
Quidditism is not merely a thesis about property individuation or essence. It is
a thesis that guarantees there are certain kinds of possibilities. It is unfortunate,
then, that several philosophers have made the mistake of conflating quidditism with
mere primitive property individuation. For example, Black (2000) characterizes quid-
ditism as “the acceptance of primitive identity between fundamental qualities across
possible worlds.”9 Similarly, Bird (2007) defines it as the acceptance of identity for
fundamental qualitative properties across worlds “that is not dependent on identity
of nomic or causal roles or powers more generally.”10
In both cases, it is alleged that quidditism is just primitivism about property in-
dividuation; however, the primitive identity of properties and quidditism come apart
in several ways. In large measure, this is because the primitive identity of proper-
ties carries no modal implications. To take the most extreme case, one might accept
9Black (2000: 92).
10Bird (2007: 71).
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necessitarianism—the thesis that actual truth entails necessary truth—and still be-
lieve that the individuation of properties is a primitive matter. But, since necessitari-
anism precludes any intuitive cases of quidditistic difference, there is reason to believe
that quidditism is in part a modal thesis: a thesis not solely about the individuation
of properties, but about the differences between possible worlds or possibilities.
Since quidditism is neither Neo-Humeanism nor primitivism about property indi-
viduation, let us introduce the following thesis as a first pass at defining quidditism:
Quidditism-CN: There are possible worlds that are alike in causal-nomic
structure, but differ only in terms of which fundamental properties occupy
which causal-nomic roles.
I believe Quidditism-CN improves upon any view that identifies quidditism with Neo-
Humeanism or primitive property individuation. Despite this, it raises a number of
issues.
The first issue concerns the scope of Quidditism-CN. It arises because Quidditism-
CN is restricted to fundamental properties rather than properties simpliciter. This re-
striction is widely accepted.11 It makes quidditism a thesis about properties “sparsely
conceived”’—most notably, fundamental physical quantities and qualities like mass
and charge—as opposed to properties “abundantly conceived”, where abundant prop-
erties include being to the left of a barn or being a dog or a sandwich and any other
disunified collection of individuals. For those who accept this distinction, not all prop-
erties are created equally: only sparse properties correspond to universals, tropes, or
privileged “natural classes” of individuals. In contrast, abundant properties corre-
spond any sets of individuals, gerrymandered or otherwise.
11See Hawthorne (2001), Lewis (2009), and Schaffer (2005).
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For some, this restriction means that quidditism concerns only perfectly natural
properties.12 For Lewis, the distinction between these and others properties is a
primitive matter, and it is only perfectly natural properties that carve at the world’s
causal and nomic joints, ground qualitative resemblance, and form a supervenience-
base for abundant properties. For others, the distinction between the natural and
non-natural properties is accepted, but is analyzed in terms of the divide between
universals or tropes and mere sets of individuals. While views of this kind avoid
Lewis’s primitivism, they require a partisan metaphysics of properties (e.g., universals
or tropes). It is fortunate, then, that the differences between these views can be set
aside in what follows; however, as we proceed, I will mark the differences as needed.13
By restricting quidditism to fundamental (alternatively, “sparse”, “natura”, or
“perfectly natural”) properties, Quidditism-CN fails to guarantee (or rule out) what
would be particularly strange quidditistic differences between worlds. For instance,
it is silent on whether being the number seven or a baseball could occupy the causal-
nomic role—whatever it might be—of being a barn located south of Chicago. Perhaps
some unrestricted quidditistic thesis could accommodate quidditistic differences for
these abundant properties. Certainly, such a view raises interesting questions. For
instance, would the resulting quidditistic differences be uniformly less plausible than
differences involving fundamental properties? Here, I will simply set aside this issue
and follow orthodoxy by restricting quidditism to fundamental properties. Having
marked this assumption, let me now turn to a second issue with Quidditism-CN: the
nature of quiddities.
Quidditism is sometimes interpreted as the thesis that properties themselves have
special second-order properties called “quiddities”. In some cases, these second-order
12See Lewis (1983) and (1986) for discussion.
13If one accepts a comparative notion of naturalness, one might hold that certain sufficiently natu-
ral properties, even while not perfectly natural, are relevant to quidditism. I set aside complications
of this sort here.
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properties are identified with the “nature” or “essence” of the property that instan-
tiates them. Unsurprisingly, views about quiddities—which vary in different ways—
have invited confusion with quidditism. While it would be preferable to avoid settling
questions about the existence or nature of quiddities, we can illuminate the possible
views by considering analogous views about haecceities. For example, one might ac-
cept the existence of haecceities for individuals insofar as one identifies them with the
singleton sets of individuals. On this view, Socrateity or being identical to Socrates is
just the singleton of Socrates. This lightweight conception of haecceities is to be con-
trasted with the heavyweight view that there are fundamental non-qualitative prop-
erties of individuals—perhaps universals, tropes, or something else altogether—that
Socrateity and other haecceities are to be identified with.
These light and heavyweight views of haecceities have analogues with respect to
quiddities. One might accept quiddities insofar as there is, say, a set that includes
just the universal mass or the set of all mass tropes and go on to identify this with the
quiddity of mass. At the same time, one might hold that, in addition to a fundamental
mass property, there is also a fundamental being identical to mass property. I believe
the former view is largely unproblematic, but that the latter is untenable. Not only
does it count against the economy of our metaphysics of properties, it seems to invite
a regress of fundamental quiddities being invoked to individuate other quiddities and
so on. Better, it seems, to hold that the individuation of properties does not require
us to move up the ontological hierarchy. With this in mind, I set aside a heavyweight
metaphysics of fundamental quiddities and assume that the individuation of proper-
ties is—as the quidditist ought to maintain—a primitive matter. Let me now take up
the third difficult issue that arises in defining quidditism: fixing upon the structure
relevant to the content of quidditism.
165
6.3 Quidditism and Structure
Given the focus on properties and the connection to their causal-nomic roles, it
is not surprising that some have taken quidditism to be exclusively concerned with
causal-nomic structure. For instance, Bird (2007) focuses his discussion of quidditism
on properties and their powers, where powers’ are exclusively causal powers and
dispositional features. On views of this kind, Quidditism-CN is likely to seem a
natural way to conceive of quidditism. I will now argue against these views by showing
that causal-nomic structure provides too narrow an understanding of quidditism as
well as one that is unduly partisan regarding certain metaphysical issues.
The first problem with defining quidditism in terms of causal-nomic structure is
that it strongly prejudices us against any Humean view of laws. To see how, notice
that, on this conception of quidditism, determining whether quidditistic differences
are genuine requires us to undertake the following project described by Hawthorne
(2001):
Assume, then, that a causal necessitation relation N holds between certain
universals. At the risk of oversimplication, let us look a simple world where
the lawbook for properties instantiated in that world is very small. There
are five properties A, B, C, D, E. Here are the laws in the lawbook: ANB,
ANC, BND, and DNE... Take the laws of the lawbook and conjoin them.
Replace each property name by a distinct variable (F1..., Fn) and prefix
each variable by a quantifier... Call this the Ramsified lawbook.14
Granted this Ramsified lawbook, questions about quidditistic difference now boil
down to questions about whether distinct worlds realize the Ramsified lawbook in
different ways (i.e., with different properties standing in different N-relations). So
understood, quidditistic difference is solely a matter of whether or not properties
14Hawthorne (2001: 369).
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can be permuted across causal-nomic structure. The process just described assumes,
however, that causal-nomic necessitation—the N-relation—is fundamental, either as
a piece of theoretical ideology or as a genuine metaphysical relation. Humeans about
causation and nomicality will, however, balk at the assumption that there is any
fundamental N-relation and, as a consequence, deny that causal-nomic structure is
of unique relevance to the more general content of quidditism.15 Although there
is almost certainly an Anti-Humean procedure that might serve as a surrogate for
the process Hawthorne describes, definitions like Quidditism-CN still threaten to
obscure the more general, theory-neutral sense that we can give to quidditism—a sense
that should require neither acceptance of fundamental causal-nomic necessitation nor
exclusive reference to causal-nomic structure.
Quidditism-CN also presupposes certain substantive constraints on the nature of
quidditistic difference. Notice, for example, that Quidditism-CN straightforwardly
rules out the possibility of quidditistic differences between worlds without any causal
or nomic structure (e.g., extremely simple worlds or massively chaotic ones). It is
far from obvious, though, that such worlds cannot exhibit quidditistic differences.
It therefore seems a further vice of Quidditism-CN that it holds causal and nomic
structure to be preconditions for quidditistic difference.
A third concern: it seems that permutation across locational structure often suf-
fices to secure quidditistic differences in the absence of causal-nomic swapping. To
see how, consider the following case alluded to earlier:
Suppose that our world is, rather surprisingly, bilaterally symmetric. There
is another half to our world, but, within this other half, there is a property,
schmass, that occupies the role that mass occupies on our half of the uni-
15Indeed, for those of us attracted to a combinatorial conception of modality, there is good reason
to believe that causal-nomic structure is far from fundamental and therefore not plausibly thought
to be the lone structure relevant to quidditistic difference. See Hawthorne (2001: 370-371) and
Schaffer (2005: 12-13) on the connection between combinatorialism and quidditism.
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verse. While mass and schmass are indiscernible in causal-nomic respects,
they differ with respect to their pattern of instantiation. Furthermore, it
seems possible that the pattern of instantiation might have been switched,
and we would be schmassive objects, while our doppelgangers are massive.
Intuitively, the difference between these worlds is a quidditistic one. That said, there
is no difference in the causal-nomic structure of these worlds. Instead, the difference
between these possible worlds is purely locational. It concerns where schmass and
mass are, not what schmass and mass do. So, if our definition of quidditism is to
be satisfactory, we require a broader conception of the relevant structure—one broad
enough to include at least locational structure, where this structure is determined by
primitive occupation relation, Uxx, that holds between spatiotemporal regions and
either objects or objects as well as properties and relations.16
Can we get by, then, by defining quidditism in terms of just causal-nomic and
locational structure?17 I do not believe so. Consider another case:
Suppose that our world is one where dualism of an unruly sort holds.
There are epiphenomenal, atemporal ectoplasmic souls. They have no
causal purchase in the world. Their existence is not connected in any
lawlike fashion to physical goings-on. They exhibit no nomological ties
to one another. Suppose that they have a chaotic existence, randomly
instantiating fundamental phenomenal properties akin to (perhaps even
identical to) pain and pleasure. Now, consider an alternative possible
world, where the distribution of phenomenal properties across epiphe-
16If one goes for the former approach, one will need some further structure to make sense of how
properties and relations occupy regions by being instantiated by objects. I prefer the latter approach
as it is neutral with respect to substantivalism and supersubstantivalism, which holds properties to
be “pinned directly into spacetime”. See Schaffer (2009b) for discussion.
17It seems as though Lewis (2009) and Schaffer (2005) think that this structure suffices for defining
quidditism.
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nomenal souls is isomorphic, but permuted such that all the “pains”are
swapped with “pleasures.
Intuitively, this difference is a quidditistic one. But, since the differences involve
properties that lack causal, nomic, and locational roles, it is a matter independent of
causal, nomic, and locational structure. So, if this sort of difference is quidditistic, we
require some more general notion of structure—one broader than causal-nomic and
locational structure—in order to define the nature of quidditistic differences between
possible worlds. What kind of structure might this be?
6.4 Quidditism and Fundamentality
Let me now suggest that correct conception of quidditism makes irreducible ap-
peal to fundamentality structure, where the fundamentality structure is determined
exclusively by the distribution of fundamental properties and relations, regardless of
what, if any, causal, nomic, or locational roles they occupy. In order to sharpen the
notion of a fundamentality structure, it will be helpful to bear in mind our assump-
tion of either Lewis’s primitive notion of perfectly natural properties or a reductive
account that distinguishes fundamental properties as uniquely corresponding to uni-
versals or tropes. On either account, we can help ourselves to a distinction between
an elite class of fundamental properties and the remaining abundant properties.
Once we help ourselves to this distinction, we can introduce an ontologically per-
spicuous language, L. Within L, there is a predicate that uniquely expresses each
fundamental property, and, for each individual, there is a unique constant that names
that individual.18 As a consequence, for any world, there is some sentence of L that
exhaustively and accurately states the facts about the fundamental properties and
individuals within that world—the structure that determines all the supervening facts
18I assume that fundamental properties are qualitative and therefore grounds of qualitative re-
semblance.
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about that world. L is a powerful language, and, by way of Ramsification, we can
now use L to define different kinds of structures, facts, and information.
To begin, consider, a possible world with a single object, Alpha, that instantiates a
single property, electronhood and an alternative possible world in which only a different
individual, Beta, exists and instantiates electronhood. The difference between these
worlds is a haecceitistic difference: they differ only with respect to which individuals
occupy which (i.e., the only) qualitative role. Using L, we can describe these worlds
as Fa and Fb. In doing so, these sentences encode haecceitistic information: they
tell us which individuals occupy which world, and expresses haecceitistic facts about
those worlds.
By Ramsifying sentences of L, we can remove different sorts of information. For
instance, by replacing individual constants with corresponding, unique existential
quantifiers, we can first-order Ramsify the sentences just considered and thereby
remove the haecceitistic information. The resulting sentences, ∃xFx, are the same.
And, while they include no haecceitistic information, they still encode qualitative
information: they tell us which properties are instantiated, and expresses qualitative
facts about worlds. Let the totality of qualitative information about a world constitute
that world’s quality structure. Granted this notion, we have a natural way to conceive
of haecceitism. It is the thesis that distinct possible worlds can realize the same
quality-structure. In a moment, I will argue that there is a similarly natural way to
conceive of quidditism.
Since we can first-order Ramsify any sentence of L and thereby remove the haec-
ceitistic information, we can also second-order Ramsify these sentences by replacing
each predicate with a unique second-order existential quantifier. Call this procedure
full Ramsification. Fully Ramsified sentences, which contain only strings of first- and
second-order quantifiers (e.g., ∃X∃xXx), are realized by many possible worlds. And,
while these sentences encode neither haecceitistic or qualitative information, they
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still encode structural information: they tell us how many individuals and how many
properties are instantiated and specify certain structural features about the relations
between individuals and properties.19
Suppose, however, that instead of fully Ramsifying our L-descriptions of worlds,
we only second-order Ramsify them. The resulting sentences therefore encode both
haecceitistic and structural information, but not qualitative information. They tell
us only about how many fundamental properties are instantiated and about various
structural relations between these properties and specific individuals. Let us say
that the resulting second-order Ramsey sentence expresses all the facts about the
fundamentality structure of a world.
Now consider once again the possible world where Alpha instantiates electronhood
and another possible world where Alpha instead instantiates protonhood. Intuitively,
these worlds differ quidditistically from one another, since they differ only in terms
of which fundamental property occupies a certain role in the world. Using L, these
worlds can be described as Fa and Ga, and, for this reason, they both realize the
same fundamentality structure—i.e., the second-order Ramsey sentence, ∃XXa—but
do so in different ways.
What emerges from the distinctions just drawn is that there are three ways for
any structurally-indiscernible worlds—i.e., worlds with L-descriptions that encode the
same structural information—to differ. Worlds that differ haecceitistically satisfy the
same first-order and full Ramsey sentences, but not the same second-order Ramsey
sentences. Worlds that differ quidditistically satisfy the same second-order and full
Ramsey sentences, but not the same first-order Ramsey sentences. And, worlds that
differ neither haecceitistically nor quidditistically satisfy only the same full Ramsey
19Perhaps this structural information is “qualitative” in some more generous sense. Here, I take
it that my preferred taxonomy differs only terminologically from one that posits an ambiguity in
“qualitative”.
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sentences. Intuitively, then, haecceitism and quidditism are theses about axes of
difference between possible worlds. Haecceitism allows for differences along the axis
of individuals, where these differences concern only haecceitistic facts. Quidditism
allows for differences along the axis of properties (specifically, fundamental qualitative
properties), where these differences concern only qualitative facts.
On the view just outlined, quidditism is a more general thesis than Quidditism-CN.
It concerns fundamental properties, regardless of their causal-nomic and locational
roles, and is best expressed by reference to fundamentality structure, understood
through metaphysically perspicuous L-descriptions. Let us define quidditism, in this
most general sense, as follows:
Quidditism: There are possible worlds that are alike with respect to
all structural and haecceitistic facts, but differ solely in terms of which
properties occupy which roles in fundamentality structure.
This definition of quidditism is likely to meet with three complaints. (Recall that I
am still setting aside until Section Five complications regarding the relation between
possibilities and possible worlds.) The first complaint is that it distorts the content of
quidditism by making certain quidditistic differences non-quidditistic. If, for example,
there is a possible world where mass and charge swap actual causal-nomic roles and, at
that same world, you and I are replaced by alien, non-actual individuals, the present
account denies that such a world differs either haecceitistically or quidditistically from
actuality. This is because, as I have defined fundamentality structure, sameness of this
structure requires sameness of haecceitistic and structural information. But, goes the
objection, it seems that worlds might differ both haecceitistically and quidditistically
as in the case just described.
I concede there is something puzzling about the connection between haecceitism
and quidditism if no worlds that differ haecceitistically ever differ quidditistically. At
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the same time, I take this puzzle to be largely a terminological one. On the above def-
inition, quidditistic differences are bare quidditistic differences, since they distinguish
worlds that agree both haecceitistically and structurally from one another. Similarly,
haecceitistic differences are bare haecceitistic differences, since they distinguish worlds
that agree both qualitatively and structurally from one another. Perhaps the more
natural terminology would be something like the following: worlds w and w* differ
quidditistically if and only if either w and w* are distinguished by a bare quidditistic
difference or there is a world, w**, such that w is distinguished by a bare haecceitistic
difference from w**, and w** is distinguished from w* by a bare quidditistic differ-
ence. (A similar sense can also be given to “haecceitistic difference”.) Here, I take
these matters to boil down to largely terminological book-keeping. Regardless of one’s
intuitions about how to talk about quidditism, the present framework affords us the
resources to clarify any differences we might like to, and, in this way, still marks an
improvement over definitions like Quidditism-CN.
A second complaint is that the present view makes quidditism too cheap. Since
almost all of us will accept that there are distinct worlds—one where Alpha is an
electron, another where Alpha is proton—almost all of us are quidditists. But, goes
the objection, this makes quidditism too cheap, since it ought to be a controversial
thesis.
I concede the first point. On this definition, almost all of us are quidditists—or, if
one resists even the weakest form of quidditism, their view will seem implausible. But
this is no vice. What would be a vice is if this definition settled the harder question
about the scope of quidditistic difference—e.g., whether, say, mass and charge could
swap their roles. Quidditism admits of many forms that differ regarding the scope
of potential quidditistic differences. And, while we should all be minimal quidditists
insofar as we accept both the Alpha-as-electron and Alpha-as-proton worlds, it is con-
troversial whether we should be extreme quidditists and allow that mass and charge
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might swap roles and preserve the fundamentality-structure of the actual world. Quid-
ditism, as I have defined it, is perfectly compatible with any number of views on this
matter.
The third complaint is that the proposed view of quidditism, by employing only
fundamentality to whittle down the structure relevant to quidditism, cuts out too
much. It leaves it unclear how we can ask or understand the interesting and difficult
questions about whether mass and charge could swap causal-nomic roles as an issue
independent of any concerns about fundamentality.
This complaint ignores the primary virtue of the present account: it makes quid-
ditism a general issue, independent of a narrow focus on causality and nomicality.
At the same time, this complaint is easily resolved by noting that we can add to the
apparatus we have employed in a way that reflects a commitment to fundamental
causal-nomic relations, and whatever else we might hold to distinguish the world’s
fundamentality structure.20
Recall the procedure Hawthorne (2001) describes according to which we posit a
fundamental causal-nomic relation, N, and take questions about quidditism to con-
cern permutations across N-preserving structure. On the present view, this merely
reflects a partisan commitment regarding causal-nomic structure that can be added
to, but is not constitutive of quidditism. Furthermore, we can ask questions about the
scope of quidditistic difference within views of this sort by straightforwardly adding
the N-relation into L and holding the fundamentality structure of world to be wholly
determined by Ramsifications of the sentence exhaustively and exclusively describ-
20There is additional virtue of the present approach: it straightforwardly accommodates quidditis-
tic differences that are solely locational in nature. Granted the assumption that spacetime points are
individuals, there will be sufficient structure to make sense of the permutation of properties across
locations, given that locations are individuation by haecceitistic information regarding spacetime
points. Perhaps worries about this result might push us towards the view considered in Maudlin
(1988), according to which all truths about spacetime points are general ones expressible through
the language of quantification over points but with no individual constants.
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ing the worlds various N-relations. Similarly, we can, if we care to, separate nomic
structure from causal structure by introducing distinct fundamental relations, C and
N. Moreover, we can introduce the relevant location structure, if we so choose, by
including the occupation relation, U, within our language, L.
I have now defended a way of conceiving and defining quidditism that I believe
improves upon existing alternatives. This framework offers an intuitive way of under-
standing the dispute between haecceitists and quidditists and their opponents. For
haecceitists, some worlds differ only along the axes of haecceitistic facts. In contrast,
anti-haecceitists hold that qualitative facts suffice to fix the haecceitistic facts, so
there can be no possible worlds that differ only along the haecceitistic axis. In a
similar vein, quidditists hold that some worlds differ only along the axis of qualitative
facts. While, for anti-quidditists, structural and haecceitistic facts suffice to fix all
the qualitative facts.
In addition to the intuitive treatment of our target concepts, the framework em-
ployed for defining quidditism also enjoys an additional benefit, since it allows us a
natural way to pose questions and formulate certain theses. Chief among these ques-
tions are those concerning ontological priority. For example, are qualitative facts—
facts about the identity of fundamental properties—ontologically prior or posterior
to haecceitistic facts or the more general structural facts expressed by full Ramsey
sentences? Or are haecceitistic and qualitative facts of equal ontological priority?
(Perhaps such a view is what best explains the independent variation across worlds
that quidditism and haecceitism guarantee.) Settling questions about priority and
posteriority is not my business here, but it is worth noting that these questions and
their cognates are naturally expressed in the present framework. I take this to provide
further evidence that the characterization of quidditism just offered is on the right
track.
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6.5 Chisholming Quidditism
Having clarified the thesis of quidditism, I now turn to the question of whether it
is true. This question and the parallel one regarding haecceitism are often thought
to be properly settled by appeal to modal intuition. So, if it seems as though mass
and charge might have swapped roles in the world’s fundamentality structure, there
is reason to accept quidditism.21 Conversely, if this does not seem to be a genuine
possibility, there is reason to reject quidditism. On this score, Lewis (2009) holds the
evidence for quidditism and haecceitism to be roughly even and favourable. He says,
“In both cases alike, haecceitistic or quidditistic distinctions between possibilities
seem offhand to make sense.”Others, like Black (2000), have opposing intuitions:
“My intuition is that to play the nomological role of colour or flavour is to be that
colour or flavour, and that the idea of two qualities swapping nomological roles is
thus unintelligible.”22
In light of the countervailing and inconclusive intuitions about quidditism, there
is reason to look for an independent argument that might settle the matter. I take the
most promising candidate to be a property-theoretic analogue of Chisholm’s Para-
dox.23 To see how such an argument might establish quidditism, let me begin by
introducing Chisholm’s Paradox, which some have used to defend haecceitism, and
then develop a property-theoretic version suggested by Bird (2007). I will then canvas
possible responses to this argument and argue that Bird’s anti-quidditist response to
the argument is unsatisfactory.
21Perhaps there are certain constraints. If, say, a fundamental property only admitted of deter-
minables corresponding to the real number-structure, while another admitted of determinables that
correspond to some less generous structure, one might hold that essences would be violated upon
swapping.
22Black (2000: 94)
23Phillip Bricker (personal communication) has suggested that the possibility of inverted spec-
trums, when realized in worlds where property dualism obtains, provide an argument for quidditism.
Whether such an argument differs in kind from Chisholm’s Paradox is, I believe, an open question.
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Chisholm’s Paradox, presented in Chisholm (1967), begins innocuously. Suppose
that individuals are identical across possible worlds such that de re modal claims like
“Fred could have been taller”are true only in case there is some possible world where
the very same individual, in this case, Fred, is taller than he is in the actual world.
Now, consider that two actual individuals, Adam and Noah, could have had slightly
different qualitative properties. For example, Adam, instead of dying at age 930,
could have died at age 931. Similarly, Noah, instead of dying at age 950, could have
died at age 949. If Adam and Noah can tolerate these incremental “changes”to each
of their qualitative profiles, it seems that had they been a different way than they
actually are, they could have tolerated even further incremental change. Moreover,
it seems that Adam and Noah could be subject to a finite series of changes and, in
each case, the way that Adam and Noah could have been would vary only slightly
from possible world to possible world.
Now, if we allow incremental possible changes to the ways that Adam and Noah
could have been and accept the transitivity of identity, we are committed to a finite
series of incremental changes that ends in a possible world where Adam has all the
qualitative properties Noah actually has and Noah has all the qualitative properties
that Adam actually has. This is because the relevant iterated modal claim “Adam
could have been such that he could have been such that he could have been such...”
is, by our initial assumption, true in virtue of one and the same individual, Adam,
existing at different possible worlds. So, if Adam and Noah could be incrementally
different and the individuals they could have been could also be incrementally differ-
ent, we must accept that Adam and Noah could “swap”their respective qualitative
properties. And, if so, there is a possible world that differs from the actual world only
in haecceitistic terms—that is, it differs only in terms of which individuals instantiate
which qualitative profiles.
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We can clarify Chisholm’s Paradox in terms of a particular schema of modal
inference. This schema involves a two-place predicate ‘M’ that relates an individual
and either their actual components (represented as c1) or their possible components
(represented as successors up to cN , a set of components wholly disjoint from c1).
The term ‘components’ is intended here to be a piece of neutral terminology. Certain
instances of Chisholm’s Paradox concern the hunks of matter that compose an object;
other instances concern the qualitative properties that comprise the qualitative profile
of an individual.24 Formally, the relation between the components of an individual—
understood as material parts or qualitative properties—is the same. But, in each
case, it purports to establish that a particular individual might have had different
components and, through iteration and the transitivity of identity, that it might have
had wholly different components. Presented schematically, it runs as follows:
P1. M(a, c1)
P2. (M(a, c1) → ♦M(a, c2))
P3. (M(a, c2) → ♦M(a, c3))
...
PN. (M(a, cN−1) → ♦M(a, cN))
C1. ♦M(a, cN)
In the version presented in Chisholm (1967), the two place relation represented
by M is the relation instantiates each member of; the constant ‘a’ is the individual
Adam; the constant ‘c1’ represents the set of Adam’s actual qualitative properties;
the constant ‘cN ’ represents the set of Noah’s actual qualitative properties. So, given
24See Salmon (1986) for discussion.
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these values, the initial presentation Chisholm’s Paradox involves (i) a claim about
the actual world, P1, (ii) a large yet finite series of apparently innocuous claims
about how individuals could have been slightly different than they are, and (iii) the
conclusion that Adam could swap all his actual qualitative properties and relations
with Noah.
From the conclusion that Adam and Noah could swap their qualitative profiles,
we arrive at the truth of haecceitism since, in addition to Adam and Noah’s intrinsic
properties, their qualitative profiles also include their relational and extrinsic qual-
itative properties. As such, in order for Adam and Noah to genuinely swap their
qualitative profiles, there must be one or more possible worlds that are indiscernible
from actuality, where Adam and Noah occupy the qualitative profiles in question.
If successful, Chisholm’s Paradox seems to establish not only haecceitism, but also
a particularly extreme form of anti-essentialism. Since we can construct a “Chisholm-
sequence”with any two individuals, the absolutely general acceptance of Chisholm’s
Paradox guarantees that, for any individuals, there is a possible world where those
individuals swap their qualitative profiles. For instance, there would be a possible
world where I occupy the qualitative profile of my favourite mug and vice versa. This
would, of course, entail that neither my mug nor myself have any interesting essential
properties.25
While some have taken haecceitism and this extreme anti-essentialism to be a
natural package, it is important to note that they are distinct conclusions and, as
we will see, one can take Chisholm’s Paradox to establish haecceitism without also
holding it to establish extreme anti-essentialism.
In order to transform Chisholm’s Paradox into an argument for quidditism, certain
modifications are needed. First, we dispense with talk of individuals and recast
25One might grant that, while we still have our haecceities and certain other non-qualitative
properties essentially, we would nevertheless lack any qualitative essential properties.
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the argument in terms of fundamental properties and their second-order properties.
So, for illustration, we can replace talk of Adam and Noah with talk of mass and
charge. Second, we need to fix upon the suitable analogue for the sets of qualitative
properties that Adam and Noah instantiate. Here, the most natural candidates are
the causal-nomic, locational, and cardinality-based second-order properties of mass
and charge. So, for example, properties like being that in virtue of which individuals
resist acceleration, being located at such-and-such a location, and being instantiated
n-many times. Perhaps the relevant second-order properties are more or less diverse,
but, as we will see, it is unlikely that a plausible restriction will help avoid a quidditist-
friendly conclusion.
With this recipe for filling out the Chisholm’s Paradox schema, we can consider the
various incremental changes to the roles of mass and charge. For example, could mass
be instantiated at such-and-such a location rather than at one of its actual locations?
Could charge tolerate similar alternations to its pattern of instantiation? In both
cases, these changes seem possible, and, if these slight changes are possible, further
changes would then seem possible. Very quickly, we are off and running towards the
quidditistic conclusion that, given the acceptance of certain incrementally different
possibilities, mass and charge might swap places altogether.
Prior to considering the most natural essentialist response to Chisholm’s Para-
dox, let me quickly set aside a more radical, logically revisionary response. According
Salmon (1986), the anti-essentialist consequences of many instances of Chisholm’s
Paradox show the assumed modal logic to be unsatisfactory. In particular, the un-
derlying problem is that the logic of metaphysical modality is assumed to involve a
transitive accessibility relation between worlds, which validates the inferences from
the necessitated conditionals to the actual truth of the conclusion. For this reason,
Salmon holds that we ought to abandon the standard assumption that S5 is the
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correct modal logic for representing metaphysical modality and, in doing so, hold
possibility and impossibility to be only relative to a world.
Following Lewis (1986), I take logically revisionary approaches of this sort to be
untenable. Against the concomitant world-relativity of possibility and impossibility
and the intransitivity of accessibility, Lewis argues:
[T]his is no defence, this is capitulation. In these questions of haecceitism
and essence, by what right do we ignore worlds that are deemed inaccessi-
ble? Accessible or not, theyre still worlds. We still believe in them. Why
don’t they count? ... I think it is like saying: there are things such that,
ignoring them, there are no such things. Ignoring all the worlds where
such-and-such obnoxious things happen, it is impossible that such things
happen. Yes. Small comfort.26
Here, I will follow Lewis in assuming logical revisionary approaches to be either too
costly or too mysterious to accept.
As just hinted at, the most natural response to Chisholm’s Paradox is to invoke
essentialism in order to block the argument. According to this response, some premise
between P1 and PN is mistaken, since it contravenes the essence of a by holding a
to be possibly something that a simply could not be. This premise has undeniable
plausibility when invoked to block a Chisholm-sequence involving, say, the Eiffel
Tower and my mug or, in the case of properties, mass and charge. But, despite this
plausibility, it carries a certain burden: If one rejects the argument by denying some
premise, it seems that one must also specify which particular premise is to be rejected.
And, here, the essentialist faces their most pressing challenge. In large measure, this
is because intuitions about essence are murky at best. As Cartwright (1968) notes:
26Lewis (1986: 247).
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Advocates of [essentialism] can be expected to disagree over particular
cases. What are the essential attributes of, say, Dancer’s Image? No
doubt it will be counted essential that he is a horse and accidental that he
was disqualified in this years Kentucky Derby. But what of the attribute
of being male, or of being a thoroughbred, or of not being a Clydesdale
stallion? Here, I suppose, essentialists may disagree. Indeed, a reasonable
essentialist might well take the position that these are hard cases that
admit of no clear decision.27
Given the difficulty in homing in on one or more specific premises that flout essences,
it is unclear where the burden of proof lies between essentialists and extreme anti-
essentialists who defend their view by way of Chisholm’s Paradox. What is crucial to
note for present purposes, is that the fates of haecceitism and quidditism come apart
from those of anti-essentialism at precisely this point.
The haecceitist or quidditist can concede that Chisholm’s Paradox does not suc-
ceed in establishing extreme anti-essentialism. Indeed, haecceitists and quidditists
can accept that individuals and properties have rather rich essences. But, so long
as they reject “individual essences”—essences that are uniquely instantiable by ob-
jects or properties—their argument by way of Chisholm’s Paradox can still be held
to establish haecceitism or quidditism.
Consider, first, a case relevant to haecceitism. Suppose there are two “identical
twins”, Kelly and Ruby, and grant the essentialist thesis that individuals have their
biological origins essentially. Such a view will rule out a possible world where Kelly
or Ruby swap qualitative roles with my coffee mug. But, since we can construct
a Chisholm-sequence where Kelly and Ruby swap their qualitative roles even while
retaining their common and essential biological origin, essentialists will still be forced
27Cartwright (1968: 615).
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to accept some instances of haecceitistic difference: the difference between the world
where Kelly is the first-born twin and Ruby is the second-born and the world where
their birth order is swapped.
Consider, now, a case relevant to quidditism. Suppose that there are two proper-
ties, fuzz and buzz, located at distinct regions but with the same causal-nomic roles.
Further assume that fuzz and buzz have these causal-nomic roles essentially. This
commitment to essentialism allows us to resist the Chisholm-sequence that concludes
there is a world where fuzz has the causal-nomic role of charge. Despite this, we can
construct a Chisholm-sequence where buzz and fuzz swap locations yet retain their
common and essential causal-nomic role. For this reason, the essentialist will still
be forced towards accepting some instances of quidditistic difference: the difference
between the worlds where fuzz and buzz swap locations.
The moral here is a simple one: essentialism with respect to properties is no
obstacle to quidditism. And, while richer essentialisms reduce the scope of quidditistic
difference, it is important to see that, unless one opts for a view that holds properties
to have a unique set of, say, causal, nomic, locational or other essential properties,
Chisholm’s Paradox guarantees at least some form of quidditism. Furthermore, the
gambit of accepting individual essences in order to block the case just surveyed seems,
at best, controversial.
Faced with the buzz and fuzz case, there are two responses available to the anti-
quidditist: hold properties to have their locations essentially or accept Structuralism
and deny distinct properties can have the same causal-nomic role. In either case,
quidditism seems a preferable option. It is, at the very best, surprising to think
properties have their locations essentially. And, if sameness of causal-nomic role
entails identity for fundamental properties as Structuralism requires, there can be
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only one epiphenomenal property—a conclusion that seems considerably less plausible
than quidditism.28
The moral just drawn has been missed by some commentators. For example,
Bird (2007) holds that, in order to meet the Chisholm’s Paradox argument for quid-
ditism, we need only appeal to essences. He says, “Just as we should reject haec-
ceitism we should reject quidditism, which we many do by allowing both particulars
and properties to have essential properties.”29 As we have seen, however, a com-
mitment to essentialism does nothing to preclude haecceitism, since two properties
might have one and the same causal-nomic essence but still occupy different roles in
the worlds fundamentality structure. At best, essentialism prevents certain quidditis-
tic differences—e.g., differences involving radically different properties like, say, mass
and phenomenal redness.
As I have now argued, essentialism does not supply anti-quidditists with a satis-
factory response to Chisholm’s Paradox. For this reason, anti-quidditists might look
to challenge the argument by taking issue, not with any first-order modal premise or
with the relevant modal logic, but by showing it to assume an unsatisfactory view
about de re representation for individuals or properties. To see how this response
might go, recall that Chisholm’s Paradox proceeds under the assumption that de re
modal claims are analyzed in terms of the literal identity of individuals across possible
worlds. So, for example, Adam and mass are held to have their de re modal properties
by being different ways at different worlds. And, given the transitivity of identity,
28The appeal to heavyweight quiddities is of no help to the anti-quidditist here. Even if there
are quiddities of that sort, it remains an open question what alternative causal, nomic, and other
properties fundamental properties might have had and, provided there are different possibilites in
this regard, Chisholm’s Paradox stands.
29I believe this confusion traces back to an earlier misunderstanding of quidditism and haecceitism.
For example, Bird (2007) says that “the simplest expression of haecceitism is that particulars lack
essential properties” and that “the haecceitist conception of particulars is that they are essentially
all alike, differing only in that they are mutually distinct.” As we have seen, these proposals conflate
importantly distinct views.
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possibilities for Adam and mass at any world are possibilities for Adam and mass at
all worlds. So understood, the background assumptions about de re representation
play a significant role in this argument for claims about what is possible.
An alternative account of de re representation, counterpart theory, offers a po-
tential response to Chisholm’s Paradox. For the counterpart theorist, de re repre-
sentation is not underwritten by literal identity. Instead, counterpart relations—in
the case of individuals, relations of qualitative resemblance—are what ground de re
representation. For the counterpart theorist, a is possibly F if and only if there is
some individual, even an individual distinct from a, that suitably resembles a and
is F. So, for example, the possibility that I am a scrimshandler is represented by a
world if and only if I bear a certain level of qualitative resemblance to an individual
that instantiates the property being a scrimshandler at that world.
Since the logic of resemblance is not the logic of identity, the counterpart relation
need not be transitive. And, if the accessibility relation between individuals and
properties is not transitive, we can accept that Adam or mass might have been such-
and-so and that, if they are such-and-so, they could have been thus-and-so, but deny
that Adam and mass, as they actually are, could have been thus-and-so. There is,
then, some reason to think that, if one accepts counterpart theory for individuals,
one is well-positioned to resist haecceitism and, if one accepts counterpart theory for
properties, one is similarly well-positioned to resist quidditism.30
In the next section, I will argue that this is not the case. After introducing
counterpart theory for properties, I will argue that, if one accepts counterpart theory
for properties, one ought to accept quidditism. In doing so, I foreclose the last
remaining option for anti-quidditists.
30Lewis (1986: 220-247).
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6.6 Quidditism and Counterparts
As Heller (1998) shows, property counterpart theory can be motivated in several
different ways. As noted above, anti-quidditists might find property counterpart
theory attractive because it provides a potential response to Chisholm’s Paradox. A
second and more general source of motivation is that one might hope to accommodate
the truth of certain modal claims that defy the logic of identity. If, for example, one
wants to make sense of claims like “If mass and charge were the same property, physics
would go to hell”or “Mass could be two separate properties”, property counterpart
theory is a promising option. A third source of motivation is the belief that properties
are not, in some relevant sense, identical across possible worlds and, for this reason,
a surrogate for identity—here, counterpart relations—is needed to make sense of de
re representation for properties.
As far as the second and third motivations go, I mark them here only to show
that they provide some independent motivation for property counterpart theory.31
Perhaps considerations of this sort ultimately prove decisive, but perhaps not. For-
tunately, my aim is not assess arguments for property counterpart theory that issue
from these considerations. Instead, my focus is on the first motivation—the desire
to avoid the argument for quidditism presented above. Before evaluating this strat-
egy, it is worth noting that property counterpart theory is perfectly compatible with
quidditism. That said, it is an open question adopting property counterpart theory
allows one to avoid a commitment to quidditism. As I will argue shortly, this is not
the case. Before doing so, I will begin by drawing a distinction between various ways
that counterpart theorists might accept or reject haecceitism. I then discuss how par-
allel options regarding quidditism emerge. After clarifying these options, I present
a problem for defenders of property counterpart theory and argue that defenders of
31Ehring (2004) accepts property counterpart theory in order to get around a certain puzzle for
his preferred metaphysics of properties, according to which properties are natural classes of tropes.
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property counterpart must accept quidditism. I then discuss broader methodological
reasons why property counterpart theory is a particularly poor fit for those drawn to
anti-quidditism on the basis of modal intuitions.
6.7 Cheap Haecceitism
According to the counterpart theory developed in Lewis (1986), individuals are
worldbound and therefore have their de re modal properties in virtue of bearing coun-
terpart relations—relations of qualitative resemblance—to various individuals.32 One
challenge that arises for counterpart theory is that of accommodating haecceitism. Af-
ter all, if you and I do not strictly and literally swap qualitative roles at another world,
how can another world represent the possibility according to which we swap qualita-
tive roles? For Lewis, there is an additional factor that complicates and constrains
his answer to this question. Since he holds counterpart relations to be relations of
qualitative resemblance, he cannot accept qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds
that represent different de re possibilities. For this reason, Lewis holds that which de
re possibilities a world represents supervenes upon the qualitative character of that
world.
Lewis’s answer to this challenge is ingenious. He takes a single possible world to
represent a plethora of de re possibilities for individuals, some of which are incom-
patible with one another. He says:
To illustrate, consider these two possibilities for me. I might have been one
of a pair of twins. I might have been the firstborn one, or the secondborn
one. These two possibilities involve no qualitative difference in the way
the world is. Imagine them specified more fully: there is the possibility of
being the firstborn twin in the world of such-and-such maximally specific
32Lewis takes the Problem of Accidental Intrinsics to be the primary motivation for endorsing a
worldbound conception of individuals. See Lewis (1986: 198-209).
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qualitative character. And there is the possibility of being the secondborn
twin in exactly such a world... I say: two possibilities, sure enough. But
they are two possibilities within a single world. The world in question
contains twin counterparts of me.33
Lewis’s solution preserves the view that counterpart relations are relations of qual-
itative resemblance and his acceptance of alternative haecceitistic possibilities for
individuals. It also delivers an interesting and novel view about the relation between
possible worlds and possibilities. Specifically, it holds that a single possible world
represent various alternative de re possibilities for individuals. As Lewis’s example
indicates, the actual world represents not only the actualized de re possibility that
Obama is President but also the non-actual de re possibility that Obama is cellist
who occupies precisely the qualitative role that Yo-Yo Ma actually occupies.
A natural way to generalize Lewis’s view is to distinguish between possible worlds
and the maximal possibilities they represent, where the latter are the various max-
imally consistent sets of de re and qualitative possibilities represent by a world.34
According to this generalization, there is a many-one relation between maximal pos-
sibilities and possible worlds, since every possible world represents each and every
maximal possibility consistent with the qualitative character of the world. So, for
example, the actual world represents both the actualized maximal possibility as well
as those maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically from it (e.g., the maximal
possibility where you and I swap qualitative profiles). I take it that there is very little
that separates this generalization from the view Lewis’s remarks suggest. And, while
this is best marked as an open interpretive question, it will be a helpful simplifying
assumption to interpret Lewis in this way, so, in proceeding, I will do precisely this.
33Lewis (1986: 231).
34Perhaps maximal possibilities are de re possibilities for a world. I leave this question aside here.
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As some commentators have pointed out, the prospects of a many-one relation be-
tween maximal possibilities and possible worlds complicates our talk of haecceitism.35
On the one hand, Lewis accepts that there are maximal possibilities that differ haec-
ceitistically. On the other hand, Lewis holds de re representation to supervene upon
qualitative character and therefore denies that any special non-qualitative properties
determine which possible worlds represent which maximal possibilities. According to
Lewis, this latter claim qualifies him as an “anti-haecceitist” even while he is content
to say, in the appropriate context, that “You and I could have swapped places in the
world”.
There is no point in quibbling over the one true meaning of “haecceitism”.36 Even
so, it is helpful to distinguish two relevant notions of “haecceitism”. The first notion
concerns only maximal possibilities, which we can take to include both haecceitistic
possibilities—possibilities for a specific individual like Napoleon that depend upon
haecceitistic facts—and qualitative possibilities—possibilities like that there exists a
red object that are not tied to specific individuals, but are determined by qualita-
tive facts.37 Since Lewis—on the view just assumed—accepts that there a maximal
possibilities where you and I swap qualitative roles, he is committed to the following
thesis:
Alethic Haecceitism: Some maximal possibilities differ in terms of the
haecceitistic possibilities they include.
In contrast, Lewis rejects the following sense of “haecceitism” because it violates his
qualitative resemblance-based counterpart theory:
35See, for example, Fara (2009), where Fara argues Lewis’s version of haecceitism creates problems
for the accommodation of an actuality operator.
36See Skow (2008) for a helpful discussion about the possible confusions regarding haecceitism.
37Here, I understand inclusion in terms of entailment. So, for example, any maximal possibility
will include a given possibility or its negation.
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Ontic Haecceitism: There are distinct possible worlds that represent
maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically.38
The view that emerges from Lewis’s affirmation of alethic haecceitism and denial of
ontic haecceitism is what he sometimes calls “cheap haecceitism”. It is cheap insofar
as it allows us to speak and think as alethic haecceitists, since we accept maximal
possibilities that differ haecceitistically, but does so without commitment to possible
worlds that uniquely correspond to each maximal possibility. In this way, it employs
only a single possible world to do the work that costly haecceitists need a multiplicity
of worlds to do.
6.8 Cheap Quidditism
Having already detailed the parallels between haecceitism and quidditism, it
should not be surprising that a number of philosophers have suggested that we can
extend the framework of Lewis’s cheap haecceitism in order to advance a form of
cheap quidditism.39 Hawthorne (2001) lays out cheap quidditism as follows:
Let a structural description of a world be a description which describes
the world using certain structural primitives—like part/whole and causal
necessitation—and which otherwise uses merely the resources of logic...The
lesson learned [from Lewis’s cheap haecceitism] can be applied here: dont
multiply possible worlds whenever one has a multiplication of possibili-
ties... What is crucial to this [view] is that it does not allow that worlds
can be alike structurally and yet different concerning what is true de re
of the properties in them.40
38Complications arise here in virtue of Lewis’s agnosticism regarding the existence of qualitatively
indiscernible possible worlds. See Chapter One for discussion.
39See also Heller (1998).
40Hawthorne (2001: 374).
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As with cheap haecceitism, the idea behind cheap quidditism is that a single possi-
ble world can be used to represent the various maximal possibilities that differ merely
quidditistically from one another. Mirroring Lewis, the cheap quidditist accepts the
analogue of alethic haecceitism:
Alethic Quidditism: Some maximal possibilities differ in terms of the
qualitative possibilities they include.
At the same time, the cheap quidditist rejects the analogue of ontic haecceitism:
Ontic Quidditism: There are distinct possible worlds that uniquely
represent maximal possibilities that differ quiddistically.
Since ontic quidditism entails alethic quidditism, we now have two ways for property
counterpart theorists to implement quidditism. We can be cheap quidditists in the
way just suggested or we can be costly quidditists and accept both alethic and ontic
quidditism. It is important to note, however, that the Chisholm’s Paradox-based
argument we considered can, in principle, be used to establish both cheap and costly
quidditism. While Chisholm’s own discussion of Chisholm’s Paradox suggests that
a commitment to possible worlds is a precondition of the argument, the essential
feature of the argument is, in fact, the transitivity of the accessibility relation be-
tween worlds. This feature is one that the cheap quidditist can preserve by recasting
the argument in terms of maximal possibilities rather than the possible worlds that
represent them. For this reason, even those who reject a Lewisian view of possible
worlds and helps herself only maximal possibilities owes a response to the Chisholm’s
Paradox argument.
What’s to be said for or against cheap and costly quidditism? Taken at face value,
cheap quidditism seems preferable solely by virtue of the parsimony it secures. It al-
lows us to posit only one possible world where the costly quidditist must admit a
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multiplicity of worlds that differ quidditistically. At the same time, there is a price to
this parsimony: disagreement with standing metaphysical thought and talk. Specifi-
cally, most metaphysicians slide back and forth between talk of maximal possibilities
and possible worlds, but, if cheap quidditism is correct, this slide is illegitimate and
threatens to distort our understanding of the metaphysics of modality. Indeed, Lewis
raises a precisely analogous worry about the conservatism that his cheap haecceitism
is at odds with. He says:
I think there is [a cost]—simply the cost of making a break with established
theory, on which all differences between possibilities are supposed to be
differences between possible worlds. It is chaos if too many questions come
open all at once, therefore theoretical conservatism is a good idea. There
should be a presumption in favour of the incumbent theory, and against
gratuitous substitutes.41
How are we to decide between these competing considerations? Here, I believe
the deciding factor emerges by considering precisely what is given up when we opt
for property counterpart theory. If one accepts property counterpart theory, there
is, strictly speaking, no possible world where mass and charge swap roles. What
good, then, is commitment to a world, distinct from the actual one that represents
the relevant maximal possibility? Why not make due with the maximal possibilities
being represented by the actual world alone? So put, it is not merely parsimony that
makes cheap quidditism attractive, but, rather, a kind of explanatory or theoretical
redundancy that it avoids once we grant that property counterpart theory can suc-
cessfully use a single world to represent myriad maximal possibilities.42 Moreover,
property counterpart theory already requires a sufficiently revisionary account of the
41Lewis (1986: 235).
42See Fara (2009) for a dissenting opinion.
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relation between worlds and modality. And, once such a view is accepted, we are
better served to go “all in”and accept the parsimony it affords us. With this in mind,
let us proceed under the assumption that defenders of property counterpart theory
ought to be cheap rather than costly quidditists.
6.9 From Counterparts to Quidditism
We have now seen how we might combine quidditism with property counter-
part theory. (Since we have set aside costly quidditism, I will, in this section, use
“quidditism”to mean cheap quidditism.) But, remember that we turned our atten-
tion to property counterpart theory precisely because it promised a response to the
Chisholm’s Paradox-based argument for quidditism. What I will argue now is that the
prospects for using property counterpart theory to avoid quidditism are grim. After
doing so, I will argue that property counterpart theory is far more naturally paired
with quidditism. In light of these considerations, I conclude that property counter-
part theory proves to be an unsuitable response to the Chisholm’s Paradox-based
arugment.
Recall that Lewis’s flight to cheap haecceitism was prompted by his particular
views about the counterpart relations between individuals. Specifically, Lewis holds
that counterpart relations are relations of qualitative resemblance. And, since quali-
tatively indiscernible worlds will therefore represent the same de re possibilities (and
therefore maximal possibilities), Lewis cannot accept costly haecceitism.
One feature of property counterpart theory that we have yet to examine is how
we ought to understand counterpart relations between properties. Most notably,
what is that makes one property a counterpart of another property? In the case of
individuals, fundamental properties played a central role in determining counterpart
relations, but, since it is the counterpart relations between these properties that are
now of interest, something other than properties themselves must be appealed to. For
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this reason, the most natural candidates for serving as counterpart relations between
properties are various relational features like the causal, nomic, and locational roles
that properties occupy. On views of this kind, F is a counterpart of G if and only if
F has the same causal-nomic role, locational role, or some combination thereof.
The bad news for anti-quidditists is that, at precisely this point, a dilemma arises.
On the one hand, views of this sort are either unsatisfactory on their own or, if they
are to be made suitable, seem to guarantee a commitment to quidditism. Schaffer
(2005) presents the argument that establishes the first horn of this dilemma as follows:
Furthermore, what could possibly determine counterparthood for proper-
ties? There are two candidates one finds in the literature: spatiotemporal
distribution, and nomological role. But these factors are too extrinsic to
capture duplication. Suppose there is a red cube here and a blue sphere
there. Then, intuitively, it seems possible for a perfect duplicate of the red
cube to exist alone, or to exist in a world full of green triangles that are
governed by alien triangle laws... In general, it seems that perfect duplica-
tion is an intrinsic affair largely independent of the overall spatiotemporal
distribution and nomological roles. But on the anti-quidditistic contingen-
tists view of counterparthood, for the red cube to be perfectly duplicated
is for there to be an object all of whose properties are counterparts of
those of the orginal red cube. And this then depends on preserving the
overall spatiotemporal distribution and nomological roles. Thus property
counterparthood is too extrinsic to support robust duplication. What is
missing is a crucial component of object counterparthood: intrinsic sim-
ilarity.43
43Schaffer (2005: 14).
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There are a number of difficult issues raised by Schaffer’s argument, but the cen-
tral point to bear in mind is that, if the defender of property counterpart theory
holds counterpart relations to be grounded by causal, nomic, or locational roles, it
will be mysterious how one and the same property could be instantiated in worlds
with wholly different causal, nomic, and locational structures. As Schaffer points
out, one consequence of this problem is that no sense can be made of duplication,
since property counterpart theory would make the sameness of intrinsic properties—
an intrinsic matter if there ever was one—a function of overall causal, nomic, and
locational resemblance.
Presented with this objection, the best available response is to move towards
a more generous conception of counterpart relations for properties. On this more
generous conception, which we can call generous counterpart theory, any property that
occupies a causal, nomic, or locational role will be a counterpart of any other property
that occupies any causal, nomic, or locational role. And, as a consequence, even this
minimal degree of role-sharing will serve to unite properties as counterparts—even
those with radically different causal, nomic, and locational roles. In this way, the
redness of the lonely cube can have a counterpart property even in a world full of
green triangles.
There are two problems with this proposal. Recall, first, that we are concerned
with developing a property counterpart theory that avoids a commitment to cheap
quidditism. Notice, then, that on the now-revised proposal, counterpart relations
are so cheap that any property will bear a counterpart relation to almost any other
property. Accordingly, within many possible worlds, a property like mass will have
myriad property-counterparts. For example, in the buzz and fuzz world discussed
earlier, counterpart relations will hold between the actual property of mass and buzz
as well as between mass and fuzz. As a consequence, there are too many counter-
part relations, so any worlds with various properties will represent a multiplicity of
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maximal possibilities that differ quidditistically from one another (e.g., where mass
occupies the “buzz”-role and where mass occupies the “fuzz”-role). Intuitively, then,
this revised proposal takes the anti-quidditist from not enough counterpart relations
to quidditism-inducing excess of counterpart relations.44
A second problem: Recall the world we considered earlier with Cartesian souls that
stand in no causal, nomic, or locational relations. Such worlds seem possible and, in
such worlds, the souls instantiate various properties. But, if, as generous counterpart
theory requires, counterpart relations are exclusively relations of causal, nomic, and
locational similarity, there are no de re modal properties for the properties of these
souls, since de re representation for properties is exclusively underwritten by relations
of causal, nomic, and locational resemblance. In order to remedy this problem, we
are therefore forced to rule out such worlds by fiat, deny the relevant properties have
de re modal properties, or, as seems most plausible, opt for an even more generous
conception of property counterpart relations.
According to fundamentalist counterpart theory, counterpart relations between
properties are cheap and hold solely in virtue of properties being co-fundamental.
On such a view, any fundamental properties are counterpart-related to one another,
regardless of whether they figure in the worlds causal, nomic, or locational structure.
In large measure, this proposal comports with generous counterpart theory but differs
only insofar as it generalizes that view in order to resolve the Cartesian property case
just considered. But, like generous counterpart theory, fundamentalist counterpart
theory also accepts a rich array of quidditistic differences in virtue of giving a perfectly
general account of de re representation for properties. But, if these are the only
views suitable for meeting the present challenge, we now have reason to believe that
44Perhaps a restriction might be proposed: properties only have one counterpart per world. But,
granted this restriction, we need some way to settle the question of which property in each world, if
any, is the counterpart of mass? No principled, non-arbitrary response can be given, so what makes
for counterpart relations quickly becomes an unacceptably mysterious matter.
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defenders of property counterpart theory have only two choices. They can accept some
mysterious, unanalyzed counterpart relation that is simply stipulated not to allow
for any quidditistic differences. But, since this seemingly ad hoc treatment would
require a primitive counterpart relation for properties, it represents an unacceptable
theoretical cost. As such, the property counterpart theorist ought to prefer a second
option: accept the quidditistic differences guaranteed by the fundamentalist and the
generous counterpart theories that are required to meet Schaffer’s objection.
I have now offered my argument that property counterpart theorists ought to be
quidditists. It is worth marking a second consideration that I believe points towards
the same conclusion, but in a less obvious way.
That property counterpart theory naturally leads to quidditism should not be
particularly surprising. Lewis, the leading proponent of counterpart theory for in-
dividuals took de re modality to be, at bottom, a mostly conventional affair rather
than a matter for fundamental metaphysics. By hewing de re modality to context
and qualitative resemblance, counterpart theory provides a way to analyze almost any
kind of modal claim, haecceitist or anti-haecceitist (provided the right context). For
this reason, property counterpart theory seems a perfectly good way to make sense
of quidditistic-sounding claims or, if we care to, anti-quidditistic sounding claims
(provided the right context). But, with this in mind, it should seem odd that any
anti-quidditist would opt for counterpart theory for properties. After all, it is a
largely deflationary view of de re modality. And if one’s anti-quidditism was initially
motivated by robust anti-quidditist intuitions—intuitions that suggest modality is by
not largely conventional—property counterpart theory and its deflationary character
should already seem a bad fit.45
45I take it that, for Black (2000: 94), it is this sort of intuition that counts against quidditistic
differences. As he says, “My intuition is that to play the nomological role of colour or flavour is
to be that colour or flavour, and that the idea of two qualities swapping nomological roles is thus
unintelligible.”
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For those who approached the problem from this initial direction (i.e., guided by
robust anti-quidditist intuitions), the fact that property counterpart theory proves
to be of no help would suggest that, in the end, the best option might be to accept
the conclusion of the Chisholm’s Paradox-based argument to begin with and sustain
a non-deflationary view about de re modality for properties. Alternatively, for those
amenable to a more deflationary treatment of de re modality, it is worth reiterat-
ing our previous, noteworthy conclusion: property counterpart theorists ought to be
quidditists and quidditists who accept property counterpart theory are liable to be
cheap quidditists.
6.10 Conclusion
I have argued that quidditism is best viewed as the thesis that there are possi-
ble worlds (or maximal possibilities) that are structurally and haecceitistically indis-
cernible, but differ with respect to which properties occupy which roles in the world’s
fundamentality structure. I have offered a property-theoretic version of Chisholm’s
Paradox as evidence for quidditism. After showing that standard essentialist re-
sponses to this argument are unsatisfactory, I argued that property counterpart the-
orists ought to be quidditists and, since property counterpart theory was the best
option for blocking the Chisholm’s Paradox argument, there is strong evidence in
favour of quidditism. As we have seen, this leaves open what kind of quidditist we
should accept. Prima facie, however, property counterpart theory seems well-suited
for cheap quidditism, and costly quidditism seems a better fit for those who accept
transworld identity for properties. Having now defended the truth of quidditism, I
believe this issue—i.e., the accommodation of quidditism—along with those regarding
the scope of quiddistic difference to be the most pressing in the neighbourhood.
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CHAPTER 7
THE MODAL VIEW OF ESSENCE
7.1 Introduction
Views about the metaphysics of essence differ on two main issues. The first issue
concerns what we can call the scope of essence. This is the issue that divides hyper-
essentialists, who hold that all of an individual’s properties are essential to it, from
anti-essentialists who deny that individuals have any interesting essential properties.
A second issue concerns the character of essence. This issue, and our present
focus, divides the modal view of essence, according to which essence is analyzed in
terms of properties individuals have necessarily or in certain possible worlds, from
competing views, according to which essence is to be understood in terms of “real
definitions” or through some other primitive notion.1
Despite the prominence of the modal view, there has been something of a sea
change in debates about the character of essence. This change in the status quo can be
traced back to Fine (1994). There, Fine argues that the modal view is extensionally
inadequate and delivers a view unsuitable for systematic metaphysics. Fine’s case
against the modal view has received a warm welcome and, surprisingly, defenders of
the modal view have been slow to directly address his arguments.2
1Defenders of the modal view include Marcus (1967), Parsons (1969), Plantinga (1974), Stalnaker
(1979), Salmon (1981), Forbes (1985), and Mackie (2007). Proponents of non-modal views include
Fine (1994) and Almog (1991).
2Some examples: Correia (2006) considers “Fine’s compelling objections to the standard modal
account of (objectual) essence”; Brogaard and Salerno (2007) “agree with [Fine’s] critique” of the
modal view as “fundamentally misguided”; Sider (MS) remarks that “Fine convincingly argues
against the standard modal definition of essence”. Hawthorne and McDonough (1997) present
objections to the modal view of a piece with Fine (1994).
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Here, my aim is to defend the modal view and restore its reputation as the best
way to analyze essence and cognate notions like “having a property essentially”. The
discussion will run as follows: In Section Two, I present the modal view. In Section
Three, I present Fine’s challenge to the modal view. In Section Four, I canvas several
strategies for responding to Fine’s charges of extensional inadequacy. In Section Five,
I turn to Quine’s views on essence and examine the disagreement between Quine and
Fine. In particular, I argue that a distinction between essences and natures must be
drawn in order to make sense of the disagreement between Quine and Fine. I then
argue that, once this distinction is drawn, it can be shown that the modal view is
not the true target of Fine’s challenge. I defend this response in Section Six, and
conclude in Section Seven.
7.2 The Modal View of Essence
Reductionists about essence aim to analyze either the concept of essence or its
cognate “being instantiated essentially”. If a reductionist opts for the former ap-
proach, the properties that are included with an individual’s essence are just those
properties it instantiates essentially. On the latter approach, the properties an in-
dividual instantiates essentially are just those properties that make up its essence.
Here, the difference between these approaches will be negligible, so I will treat them
as interchangeable.
Non-reductionists about essence make no attempt to analyze essence. For elimi-
nativists like Quine (1960), this is because talk about essence—or perhaps modality
in general—is somehow confused or philosophically illegitimate. For primitivists like
Fine (1994), talk about essence is in perfectly good order, but does not admit of re-
ductive analysis. This is because essence is thought to enjoy some kind of conceptual
primacy, serve as an especially fertile theoretical primitive, or, as Fine argues, resist
any satisfactory reductive analysis.
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Modal views of essence are reductionist. The guiding intuition behind these views
is that the modal features of reality determine which properties are essential or merely
accidental to particular individuals. Very roughly, modal views hold an individual’s
essence to consist of those properties that it must have or could not exist without
having.
Since the modal view assigns a privileged role to modality in analyzing essence,
tough questions about the nature of modality quickly arise. It will be helpful to note,
then, that the modal view can be developed in terms of primitive modal operators
like  and ♦ or, if one accepts possible worlds theory, through quantification over
possible worlds—entities in terms of which modal operators are themselves analyzed.
In what follows, it will be helpful to assume the resources of possible worlds theory,
but it is important to note that possible worlds theory and the modal view of essence
can indeed come apart.3
We can consider the Simple Formulation as a first pass at capturing the guiding
intuition of the modal view. It holds an individual, a, to instantiate a property
essentially if and only if it is necessary that a instantiate F. In the language of possible
worlds, it holds that an individual, a, has a property essentially if and only if a has
that property at all possible worlds. Formally,
Simple Formulation: a is essentially F =df Fa.
The Simple Formulation encounters a serious challenge: Unless a is a necessary ex-
istent, there will be worlds at which a fails to exist. But, since a will fail to exist
at some worlds, there will be worlds at which a fails to instantiate any properties.
So, upon pain of denying that contingent existents have any essential properties, it
3See Jubien (2009) for recent opposition to possible worlds theory.
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is natural to conclude that the Simple Formulation of the modal view delivers an
unsatisfactory analysis of essence.4
In order to avoid the challenge just considered, a natural response for defenders of
the modal view is to modify the Simple Formulation. Two modifications are typically
proposed. The first modification yields the Existential Formulation, which holds an
individual, a, to instantiate a property essentially if and only if necessarily, if a exists,
a instantiates F.5 Formally,
Existential Formulation: a is essentially F =df  (∃ x (x = a) → Fa)
A second modification yields the Universal Formulation. This formulation holds
an individual, a, to instantiate a property essentially if and only if necessarily, for
anything identical with a, that thing instantiates F. Formally,
Universal Formulation: a is essentially F =df  (∀ x (x = a → Fx))
While both the Existential and Universal Formulations address the challenge to the
Simple Formulation by placing a further condition upon essential properties, the pre-
cise differences between these formulations turn upon complications regarding what
is required for individuals to have properties at a world. According to the Existen-
tial Formulation, individuals need to exist at a world to instantiate properties at it.
According to the Universal Formulation, they need only be such that there are facts
about their identity and distinctness at that world. Following Kripke, I will set aside
4This challenge to the Simple Formulation assumes Serious Actualism, which is sometimes called
“the modal existence requirement” and is distinct from actualism—the thesis that only actual things
exist. Serious Actualism holds that, for any object, x, any property, F, and world, w, x instantiates
F at w only if x exists at w. Serious Actualism precludes non-existent objects from having any
properties whatsoever. In some cases, this is intuitive, since non-existent objects do not seem to
have properties like being a material object, being twenty pounds, or being a round square. In other
cases, this counter-intuitive, since non-existent objects do seem to have certain properties like being
distinct from Saul Kripke, being thought of, or being nonexistent. For discussion, see Plantinga (1979)
and Salmon (1990).
5Fine (1994: 4) distinguishes these formulations, but labels them differently.
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these “fussy considerations” as largely orthogonal to our present concerns and simply
assume the Existential Formulation in what follows.6
The Existential Formulation also encounters a prima facie problem. Since the
essence of an individual is the set of properties it has in every world where it exists,
the modal view entails that every individual will exist essentially, since, at any world
where an individual exists, it will have the property of existing.7 Defenders of the
modal view, when faced with this result, typically explain it away by distinguishing
between necessary existence and essential existence and noting that only necessary
existence—existence in each and every possible world—would be an objectionable
consequence of the view. While this is a point Fine (1994) takes to count against
the modal view, here and in what follows, I take it that, since the modal view has
the resources to distinguish necessary from essential existence, the present problem
is largely terminological in nature. Having now introduced the modal view, I will
presently turn to Fine’s challenge to it.
7.3 Against the Modal View
The primary competitor to the modal view is primitivism.8 Fine (1994) charac-
terizes his version of primitivism as follows:
6See Kripke (1980: 3). These views come apart if one rejects Serious Actualism and allows that
objects can have properties like being distinct from Saul Kripke even at worlds where Kripke exists
and they do not. Since such a view severs the intuitive tie between existence and identity, it can
overcome the objection to the Simple Formulation. Furthermore, it is able to rebut a problem for the
modal view to be considered shortly. And, while, the Universal Formulation can allow any properties
whatsoever to be instantiable by nonexistent objects, such a view proves implausible since it holds
that nonexistent objects can instantiate properties like being twenty pounds.
7Here, I set aside familiar worries about whether existence is a “genuine” property, since nothing
will turn on this particular issue. See Salmon (1990) for discussion.
8Here, I focus on the version of primitivism defended by Fine. I take it that, whatever its
differences from the primitivism of Almog (1991) and others, nothing in what follows hangs on this.
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[T]he traditional assimilation of essence to definition is better suited to
the task of explaining what essence is. It may not provide us with an
analysis of the concept, but it does provide us with a good model of how
the concept works. Thus [the definitional position] is the reverse of the
usual one. It sees real definition rather than de re modality as central to
our understanding of the concept.
For the primitivist, talk of essence is talk of the “real definition” of an individual,
which is something like a description of the metaphysically significant features of an
individual. This notion is a primitive, not explicable in terms of anything else. So,
while we can note certain properties as strong candidates for inclusion within real
definitions (e.g., being human, being immaterial, and so on), we cannot offer any
general account of what distinguishes such properties.
There are important respects in which the modal view and primitivism differ;
however, both views hold that, if some property is essential to an individual, it is
necessary that the individual have it in any world where that individual exists. In this
direction, both views agree. In the opposite direction, these views part company: the
primitivist denies that every property an individual has in every possible world where
it exists is an essential property of that individual.9 For this reason, the primitivist
accept only the left-to-right direction of the Existential Formulation biconditional.
As we will see, this disagreement is at the heart of Fine’s challenge to the modal
view.
In the remainder of this section, I present Fine’s challenge to the extensional
adequacy of the modal view. I begin by assuming the moderate essentialist view about
the scope of essence that Fine endorses and set aside extreme anti-essentialism and
9In addition to Fine’s primitivism, he is also a modalist and, therefore, rejects the deployment
of possible worlds to analyze modal locutions. I opt for talk of possible worlds here for ease of
exposition.
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hyperessentialism. Note also that I take on Fine’s additional assumption regarding the
theoretical role of essence: that it is the job of essence to provide answers to certain
metaphysical questions about individuals like “What is Socrates?” According to
Fine, these questions, which we can call what-questions, ask after the metaphysically
significant features of an individual, and are answered only if they explain what some
individual really is. These what-questions are therefore the primary subject matter
of metaphysics, and are properly answered by appeal to facts about the essences of
individuals. Fine marks this assumption as follows:
For one of the central concerns of metaphysics is with the identity of
things, with what they are. But the metaphysician is not interested in
every property of the objects under consideration. In asking ‘What is
a person?’, for example, he does not want to be told that every person
has a deep desire to be loved, even if this is in fact the case. What
then distinguishes the properties of interest to him? What is it about a
property which makes it bear, in the metaphysically significant sense of
the phrase, on what an object is? It is in answer to this question that
appeal is naturally made to the concept of essence. For what appears
to distinguish the intended properties is that they are essential to their
bearers.
Fine’s remarks invite us to conceive of essences as definitions that are distinguished
by their unique ability to answer what-questions. But, since the modal view stands
in opposition to primitivism, we should not take Fine’s remarks to be simply begging
the question against the modal view. Instead, Fine’s remarks bring to salience what
he takes to be a requirement of an account of essence: if some property is to be
essential to an individual, it should furnish us with a satisfactory, if perhaps only
partial, answer to what-questions like “What is man?” or “What is God?” So, if the
modal view packs putatively irrelevant or uninteresting properties into the essence of
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an individual, it will fail to meet Fine’s desideratum. Such a view will fail to provide
suitable answers to what-questions and therefore deliver an inadequate analysis of
essence.
Following Fine, we can now take Socrates and his essence as our case study and
consider whether certain properties the modal view deems essential to Socrates pro-
vide satisfactory answers to what-questions. If not, this will show the modal view to
deliver an inadequate treatment of essence qua methodological centerpiece of meta-
physics.
The first class of properties that Fine discusses are membership properties like
Socrates’ property of being a member of singleton Socrates.10 Since the modal view
and modal set theory entail that Socrates will be a member of his singleton set,
{Socrates}, in any world where Socrates exists, the modal view counts the member-
ship property, being a member of singleton Socrates, as essential to Socrates. Against
this result, Fine argues:
But, intuitively, this is not so. It is no part of the essence of Socrates to
belong to the singleton. Strange as the literature on personal identity may
be, it has never been suggested that in order to understand the nature
of a person one must know to which set he belongs. There is nothing in
the nature of a person, if I may put it this way, which demands that he
belongs to this or that set or which demands, given that the person exists,
that there even be sets.11
The second class of properties are distinctness properties like Socrates’ property of
being distinct from the Eiffel Tower and being distinct from every electron. According
to Fine, these properties are too extraneous to Socrates and other individuals to
10Socrates’ singleton is the unit set, {Socrates}, of which Socrates is the lone member.
11Fine (1994: 5).
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provide suitable answers to what-questions. For this reason, they cannot be essential
to Socrates. Fine says, “Consider two objects whose natures are unconnected, say
Socrates and the Eiffel Tower. Then it is necessary that Socrates and the Tower be
distinct. But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower; for
there is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it.”12
The third class of properties are necessary properties like Socrates’ property of
being such that 2 + 2 = 4 or being such that triangles have three sides. Fine argues
against the essentiality of these necessary properties, since they provide no answer
to what-questions that would serve to single out properties unique or fundamental
to any specific individual. He says, “it is no part of Socrates’ essence that there be
infinitely many prime numbers of that the abstract world of numbers, set, or what
have you, be just as it is.”13
The fourth class of properties are metaessential properties. These are properties
had in virtue of individuals being such that other individuals have the essences that
they do. For example, Socrates—who is co-actual with Plato—instantiates being such
that being human is essential to Plato. Fine argues against the essentiality of these
properties as follows:
Among the necessary truths, if our modal theorist is to be believed, are
statements of essence. For a statement of essence is a statement of neces-
sity and so it will, like any statement of necessity, be necessarily true if it
is true at all. It follows that it will be part of the essence of any object
that every other object has the essential properties that it has: it will
be part of the essence of the Eiffel Tower for Socrates to be essentially a
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
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person with certain parents... O happy metaphysician! For in discovering
the nature of one thing, he thereby discovers the nature of all things.14
The fifth and final class of properties are existential properties like existence dis-
cussed earlier. According to the modal view, everything essentially exists, since, at
any world where something exists, it has the property of existing. As already noted,
for most defenders of the modal view, this result is to be treated as a harmless artifact
of the view, since a distinction can still be drawn between essential existence had by
all things and necessary existence, which only a select number of entities enjoy. With
this in mind, I set aside this fifth objection and focus on the previous ones in what
follows.
7.4 Meeting Fine’s Challenge
In this section, I examine two potential responses to Fine’s challenge: revision-
ary and non-revisionary responses. While revisionary responses amend the letter of
the modal view in an effort to avoid the putatively objectionable entailments, non-
revisionary responses accept the entailments of the modal view that Fine’s challenge
draws upon but argue that they do not undermine the modal view.15
14Fine (1994: 6).
15It is worth marking an issue regarding property-individuation that Fine ignores. According
to the coarse-grained view, properties are individuated only intensionally. According to the fine-
grained view, properties are individuated hyperintensionally. So, while the coarse-grained view holds
that “being triangular” and “being trilateral” are distinct predicates that express the very same
property, the fine-grained view holds that these properties are cointensive yet distinct. Notice that,
on the coarse-grained view, necessary properties like being such that 2 + 2 = 4, certain distinctness
properties like being distinct from any round square, metaessential properties like being such that
Socrates is essentially human, and the property of existence are one and the same property. So, if we
accept the coarse-grained view, we would be well-positioned to allow that the universal property—
the property had by each and every individual—is a unique and principled exception to our intuitions
about essence. One’s views on the individuation of properties therefore have significant implications
for the present dispute. It is puzzling, then, that Fine assumes the fine-grained view, and also claims
that “any reasonable account of essence should not be biased towards one metaphysical view rather
than the other. It should not settle, as a matter of definition, any issue which we are inclined to
regard as a matter of substance.” (Fine (1994: 5). Here, I note this individuation issue in order to
set it aside, since my ultimate defense of the modal view does not turn on this issue.
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7.5 Revisionary Response
Revisionary responses aim to show, for each of the problematic properties Fine
discusses, the modal view does not, in fact, deem that property essential. To take
one example, many defenders of the modal view have responded to Fine’s worries
about necessary properties—properties had by all possible individuals—along revi-
sionist lines.16 For these philosophers, necessary properties like being such that 2 +
2= 4 are precluded from being constituents of essence, since they are had by every pos-
sible individual. On the resulting view, the second-order quantifier over properties in
the correct formulation of the modal view is rather neatly restricted to non-necessary
properties.
Revisionary responses enjoy some initial promise, but, as Fine shows, they leave
many problems unsolved. Notice, for instance, that being such that 2 + 2 = 4 and
a man is—let us suppose—had by Socrates in every world where he exists. And,
while this is not a property instantiated by all possible individuals, it does seem to
be inessential in the very same way as being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is alleged to be
inessential.17 A second issue with this response arises when we note that being such
that 2 + 2 = 4 is intuitively essential to the number four. But, given the proposed
restriction, it looks like the number four and any other necessary existent would
thereby be stripped of their essence. For this reason, the revisionary response to
the problem regarding necessary properties seems unsatisfactory. The modal view
therefore seems to be saddled with the conclusion that being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is
indeed a part of Socrates’ essence.
16See, for example, Mackie (2007).
17Faced with this rejoinder, the revisionist might try to stipulate that essential properties must
be non-conjunctive and non-disjunctive, but such a constraint is both ad hoc and ill-motivated once
we consider that being a man and a mammal seems like a perfectly good candidate for being part of
Socrates’ essence. Similarly, if one held Socrates to have his mother and his father essentially, such
a view would bizarrely preclude having both of his parents essentially.
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Revisionary responses quickly begins to seem like plugging holes in a sinking-ship.
This is because pursuit of the revisionary response forces us towards increasingly
extreme measures to meet Fine’s challenge: Worried about essential connections to
sets? Why not accept nominalism and deny the existence of sets altogether? Worried
about essential distinctness properties? Why not accept contingent identity and allow
that anything might have been identical to anything else? These responses have an air
of desperation about them, and, although some metaphysics could likely be cooked up
to circumvent Fine’s challenge, it would seem that such a view would be too partisan
or ad hoc to count as a satisfactory defense of the modal view. For this reason, the
revisionary response seems untenable.
7.6 Non-Revisionary Responses
Let me now consider a non-revisionary responses. Responses of this sort might
take different forms, but are distinguished by aiming to show that the properties Fine
draws upon do in fact provide suitable answers to what-questions. Let me now briefly
sketch how one such response might look.
A plausible implementation of a non-revisionary response runs as follows: Con-
sider, for example, distinctness properties like being distinct from the Eiffel Tower.
It would seem, at least prima facie, that such a property cannot furnish us with an
answer to what-questions about Socrates. There is, however, at least one distinctness
property that can serve as an answer: Socrates’ maximal distinctness property. This
property—an infinitary conjunction of distinctness properties like being distinct from
the Mona Lisa, being distinct from Pluto, and being distinct from all non-humans—
would seem capable of telling us what Socrates is by telling us everything that he
is not. For example, given the domain of all possible entities, the property of being
distinct from all but one of these things is equivalent to the property of being that
very thing. So understood, Socrates’ maximal distinctness property is necessarily
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coextensive with Socrates’ identity property, being identical to Socrates.18 And, since
the latter supplies us with a satisfactory answer to what-questions, so, too, does the
former. It would seem, then, that our initial intuition about the suitability of dis-
tinctness properties as answers to what-questions is shown, upon reflection, to be
mistaken. Furthermore, once we consider how knowledge about what something isn’t
allows us to determine what something is, this version of the non-revisionary response
holds that Fine’s worries about distinctness properties are no longer compelling.
While there is some hope that this version of the non-revisionary response might
succeed in meeting Fine’s concerns regarding distinctness properties, it is unclear
how, if it all, it might allow us to meet the rest of Fine’s challenge. It is, for example,
unclear how we might explain the essentiality of Plato’s essence to Socrates along
the lines of the non-revisionary reponse. For this reason, it is, at best, an incomplete
defense of the modal view.
Perhaps a combination of revisionary and non-revisionary responses might, in
some disjunctive fashion, meet Fine’s challenge. While it is not clear how this might
be accomplished, I leave this question open here, and, in what follows, pursue an
alternative response that provides a more general solution to Fine’s challenge. To
this end, I now turn to a decidedly different view of essence: the eliminativism about
de re modality championed by Quine.
7.7 Quine and Fine
Reductionism and primitivism about essence stand in opposition to eliminativism.
According to the arch-eliminativist, Quine, talk of essences is in disrepair and ulti-
mately incoherent. Quine’s case against essence issues from a general skepticism
18Here again, issues regarding Serious Actualism arise, since some story would need to be given
regarding the identity and distinctness properties individuals have regarding non-actual albeit possi-
ble individuals. I set these concerns aside here, given my focus on alternative strategies for meeting
Fine’s challenge.
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about de re modality. This skepticism itself emerges from a general stricture against
intensional notions and the problems that arise in accommodating quantification into
the scope of modal operators.19 For Quine, de re modality proves unintelligible unless
one accepts “invidious Aristotelian essentialism”, and, since Quine finds “essential-
ism” wildly implausible, he rejects de re modality altogether.
Unsurprisingly, many philosphers are quite happy to accept essentialism. Quine’s
objections have therefore been by and large dismissed. Despite this, Quine (1960)
expresses what amounts to a foundational—perhaps even dogmatic—opposition to
de re modality:
But in connection with the modalities it yields something baffling—more
so even than the modalities themselves; viz., talk of a difference between
necessary and contingent attributes of an object. Perhaps I can evoke the
appropriate sense of bewilderment as follows. Mathematicians may con-
ceivably be said to be necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged;
and cyclists necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational. But what
of an individual who counts among his eccentricities both mathematics
and cycling? Is this concrete individual necessarily rational and contin-
gently two-legged or vice versa? Just insofar as we are talking referentially
of the object, with no special bias toward a background grouping of math-
ematicians as against cyclists or vice versa, there is no semblance of sense
in rating some of his attributes as necessary and others as contingent.
Some of his attributes count as important and others as unimportant,
yes; some as enduring and others as fleeting; but none as necessary or
contingent.20
19See Quine (1960).
20Quine (1960: 1999).
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For Quine, there is simply no sense that can be made of de re modality and
therefore no place in his metaphysics for essences. He says:
Curiously, a philosophical tradition does exist for just a such a distinc-
tion between necessary and contingent attributes. It lives on in the terms
‘essence’ and ‘accident’... It is a distinction that one attributes to Aristotle
(subject to contradiction by scholars, such being the penalty for attribu-
tions to Aristotle). But, however venerable the distinction, it is surely
indefensible...21
Quine’s eliminativism is striking, and, when set against Fine’s views, a puzzle arises.
Recall that, for Fine, essences are distinguished by their unique methodological role
of supplying us with answers to what-questions, which are the basis for metaphysical
inquiry. If, however, we follow Quine in rejecting essences, we would, by Fine’s lights,
be unable to undertake metaphysics. But, quite clearly, Quine does not reject meta-
physical inquiry.22 Not only does Quine advance substantive metaphysical theses,
he undertakes the very task Fine uses to single out essences: he provides answers
to what-questions, which Fine holds to be answerable only by appeal to essences.
Consider, for example, Quine’s remarks on material objects:
Physical objects, conceived thus four-dimensionally in space-time, are not
to be distinguished from events or, in the concrete sense of the term,
processes. Each comprises simply the content, however heterogenous, of
some portion of space-time, however disconnected and gerrymandered.
What then distinguishes material substances from other physical objects
21Quine (1960: 199-200).
22See, for example, his defense of sets on their ground of their indispensability in Quine (1960:
233-276).
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is a detail: if an object is a substance, there are relatively few atoms that
lie partly in it (temporally) and partly outside.23
Quine’s views and their departure from Fine’s own reveal a contentious assumption
at the heart of Fine’s challenge to the modal view of essence. Fine assumes that
essences and essences alone supply us with answers to what-questions and serve as
the basis for metaphysical inquiry. But, in opposition to Fine, Quine holds essences
are irrelevant to answering these questions. He therefore deploys an alternative tactic
for answering what-questions. In light of Quine’s pursuit of metaphysics in the face
of eliminativism about essences, Fine’s methodological assumption regarding essences
can now be seen as highly controversial. Furthermore, Fine’s case against the modal
view turns on precisely this background assumption that essences are the resources
we need for answering what-questions.
Before revisiting Fine’s challenge, it will be useful to sharpen the disagreement
between Quine and Fine. Let us begin, then, by holding the “nature” of an individual
to be the collection of properties that supplies us with an answer to what-questions
regarding that individual.24 According to Fine, natures are to be identified with
essences, since essences are what supply answers to what-questions. Fine therefore
stipulates the following:
Natures as Essences (NE): F is within the nature of a =df F is essential
to a.
For Quine, there are no essences, so we must look elsewhere to determine the
natures of things. And, given Quine’s ardent naturalism, the right place to look
23Quine (1960: 171).
24I do not claim this terminology to be motivated by ordinary langage. While I believe it to
be consistent with ordinary talk—indeed, Fine himself slides between essence and nature-talk—I
introduce it here as technical terminology well-suited for the philosophical goal of clarifying the
disagreement at hand.
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is into the findings of the physical sciences, suitably regimented. Determining the
proper formulation of a Quinean account of natures would, however, be a considerable
undertaking, and, rather than attempting to develop such an account here, I will
simplify matters by introducing a quasi-Quinean figure, Linus.
Like Quine, Linus eschews essences for the purposes of answering what-questions.
Instead, Linus aims to answer what-questions by appealing only to a certain class of
elite properties that an individual actually instantiates. Linus therefore accepts the
following:
Natures as Sparse Properties (NSP): F is within the nature of a =df
a instantiates F and F is a sparse property.
NSP holds that what-questions can only be answered by appeal to the sparse prop-
erties actually instantiated by individuals. These sparse properties, unlike abundant
properties, figure into the causal-nomic joints of the world and ground relations of
resemblance between things. In contrast, abundant properties, which play no signifi-
cant role in the workings of nature and are shared by wildly gerrymandered collections
of things.25 So understood, NSP holds that for a human like Socrates or an electron
like Sparky, their respective natures will include the sparse properties they instantiate
like being human, being an electron, being a material object and exclude non-sparse
properties like being discussed in the previous sentence, being within twenty miles of
Earth, or being smaller than an elephant.
Quine and Linus share a disinterest in essence and modality that Fine does not.
For Fine, essence is needed to discern the natures of things, but, for Quine and
Linus, appeal to modality and essence is unnecessary for providing suitable answers
25Here, I follow the roughly Lewisian line developed in Lewis (1983) and (1986), but, for clarity’s
sake, I opt for talk of “sparse” rather than “natural properties”. Furthermore, I leave open, for the
moment, which properties qualify as sparse. For example, being human will be assumed to be sparse
even while certain conceptions of natural properties would resist this conclusion.
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to what-questions. This disinterest in the modal might be motivated by a Quinean
anti-realism about modality, or, alternatively, by an unorthodox view about the scope
of essence. If, for example, one accepts hyperessentialism or anti-essentialism, one will
need to appeal to non-modal resources to offer substantive answers to what-questions.
Setting aside the question of motivation for NSP, it is now helpful to clarify what is
at stake in the disagreement between Fine and Quine.
The dispute between Fine and Quine is not a dispute about essence. It is not that
Quine holds unorthodox views about essences. In Quine’s case, he simply denies there
are any essences. So understood, the present disagreement cannot be assimilated into
a disagreement over essence. We must therefore distinguish essences—conceived of ei-
ther along the lines of the modal view or via Fine’s primitivism—from natures, which,
for Quine, are distinguished by their theoretical role in metaphysical methodology.
Furthermore, notice that Linus could in principle endorse the modal view of essence
and retain his commitment to NSP on the grounds that essences are not suitable for
playing the role that natures ought to. On the resulting view, Linus would accept
the modal view’s conception of essence, but denies essence is of particular relevance
to fundamental metaphysics. This provides further evidence for the separability and
multiplicity of our concepts of nature and essence.
Recall, now, that the modal view of essence on its own—pace Fine’s partisan
assumptions—does not hold that essential properties determine the natures of in-
dividuals. Nor does it require that essential properties furnish us with answers to
what-questions. It is neutral with respect to these methodological matters and com-
mitted only to an analysis of the concept of essence and locutions like “x is essentially
F”. Notice also that Fine’s challenge assumes that the modal view of essence is satis-
factory only if the properties it deems essential supply answers to what-questions. For
Fine, the failure of the modal view turns precisely on the fact that properties like being
distinct from Socrates or being such that 1+1=2 fail to answers what-questions. But,
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since this requirement follows only upon the assumption of NE, it is a commitment
distinct from the modal view.
The moral to draw from Fine’s challenge is that if the modal view is conjoined
with NE, the modal view is untenable. But this does not show that the modal view is
untenable. It shows only that defenders of the modal view must resist the assimilation
of nature to essence. This is because Fine has refuted only the following thesis, which
is the conjunction of NE and the modal view of essence:
The Modal View of Natures: F is within the nature of a =df a instan-
tiates F at any world at which a exists.
Better, then, for the defender of the modal view of essence to reject the modal view of
natures and hold that, while a property like being distinct from Alcibiades is essential
to Socrates, it is no part of Socrates’ nature. Similarly, the defender of the modal
view of essence can deny, for any of the properties Fine’s challenge appeals to, that
those properties are part of Socrates’ nature even while they are essential to him.
I have now argued that, once we draw the distinction between essence and nature,
Fine’s challenge undermines, not the modal view of essence, but only the modal view
of natures. In light of this, the defender of the modal view ought to reject NE. And,
once they do so, Fine’s challenge presents no obstacle to upholding the modal view
of essence. Prior to concluding, let consider two objections to the present defense of
the modal view.
7.8 Against Nature
A natural objection to the just-offered defense of the modal view of essences aims
to show that the distinction between nature and essence is spurious since they are
one and the same concept. If this is correct, then the modal view cannot be defended
by holding Fine’s challenge to undermine only the modal view of natures rather than
the modal view of essence.
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One way to develop this objection is to hold that, even while the defender of NSP
and the defender of NE seem to be disagreeing about something other than essence,
these initial appearances are deceiving. This objection maintains that the defender of
NSP is in fact concerned with essence; she simply has a non-standard view of essence
that denies it has any connection with modality. Once this is granted, the objector
now recasts the debate between the defender of NSP and the defender of NE as a
dispute about essence, so we need not introduce the distinct concept of a nature to
capture it.
In meeting this objection, recall, first, that the motivation for drawing the distinc-
tion between essence and natures is non-partisan. Its aim is to allow us to make sense
of the dispute between Fine and Quine. Furthermore, if we hope to avoid drawing this
distinction by holding Fine and Quine’s disagreement to be concerned with essence
rather than nature, we cannot interpret the claims of either party straightforwardly.
Notice, for example, that both Fine and defenders of the modal view hold essence to
be a modally loaded concept such that essential properties “must be had” by their
bearers. Notice also that Quine is expressly uninterested in modality. So, if we are to
take Quine to be talking about essence (despite appearances to the contrary), we must
either deny that essence is modally loaded and disagree with both Fine and defenders
of the modal view, or hold Quine to be guilty of a kind of conceptual incompetence
by virtue of failing to recognize that he is actually talking about a modally loaded
notion of essence.
These are immodest and uncharitable interpretive maneuvers. There is good rea-
son to believe that, regardless of the particular character of essence, essence is indeed
modally loaded. There is also good reason—in particular, the principle of charity—
that invites us to interpret Quine as talking about natures rather than a modally
loaded notion they are expressly disinterested in. It would seem, then, that the ac-
count of this disagreement I have defended, which takes both parties’ claims at face
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value, is preferable to the interpretation required by the present objection. As a con-
sequence, there is good reason to accept the more charitable interpretation and draw
the relevant distinction between essence and nature. Furthermore, there is some rea-
son to think that the concept of a nature is a broader one that admits of qualification
insofar as we might ask after the “intrinsic nature” of things without any interest in
the modal features of a thing.
Let me now address a second objection, which takes issue with any modal view of
essence that rejects NE. This objection holds that, once NE is abandoned, there is no
interesting theoretical role for essence to play. So, unless we are willing to dispense
with a theoretically useful notion of essence, we are obliged to retain NE and, for this
reason, Fine’s challenge does indeed present a threat to the modal view of essence.
I believe the most attractive response to this challenge holds that, while essence
does not exhaustively determine nature, it nevertheless plays an important role in
doing so. To see how such a response might be developed, we can now sketch an
account of how essences and sparse properties like those Linus appealed to might
jointly furnish us with an account of natures.26 Consider the following thesis:
The Sparse Essence View of Natures (SEN): F is within the nature
of a =df F is instantiated by a in every world where a exists and F is a
natural property.
26Since it is an open question orthogonal to present concerns, I set aside how we ought to under-
stand sparse properties although two views seem attractive. On the first view, “sparse” is shorthand
for fundamental such that the only sparse properties are the fundamental ones borne by microphys-
ical entities that comprise a supervenience basis for the rest of the world. Such a view would hold
that, while being an electron is sparse, being a mammal is not. On the second view, “sparse” is short-
hand for something like kind properties, which are not limited to the properties of microphysics like
being an electron, but includes kind properties from higher-level phenomena like biology (e.g., being
a mammal) and astronomy (e.g., being a red dwarf). The appeal of the latter view is, of course, that
it sustains the possibility of macrophysical objects having natures, whereas the former view seems
to require a commitment to microphysicalism, according to which only fundamental entities have
natures and are therefore proper targets of metaphysical inquiry. See Schaffer (2004) for discussion
of these competing conceptions of sparse properties.
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SEN identifies natures with the intersection of the essential—here, understood in
terms of the modal view—and the sparse.
To get a feel for how this view would look in practice, consider the case of space-
time. In asking about the nature of spacetime, we aim to learn its metaphysically
significant features and thereby answer the what-question: what is spacetime? In
this regard, the essentiality requirement excludes certain contingent features of actual
spacetime that, while sparse, do not constitute its essence. For example, if spacetime
is actually Minkowskian, but might have been Euclidean, being Minkowskian will not
be part of the nature of spacetime. Such a property, while sparse, is not essential.
In the other direction, the property of not being occupied by a round square is es-
sential to spacetime, but not a sparse property of spacetime. For this reason, it,
too, is excluded from the nature of spacetime. The candidates for being both sparse
and essential properties of spacetime—the properties that constitute its nature—are
therefore properties like being unified by external relations and having an intrinsic
metrical structure (though not necessarily any particular structure).
Let us now consider how SEN avoids Fine’s challenge. For Fine, membership
properties like being a member of singleton Socrates are not suitable answers to what-
questions. According to SEN, such properties fall outside the nature of Socrates, since
being a member of singleton Socrates is not a sparse property. The same goes for other
allegedly problematic properties of Socrates like being distinct from Aristotle, being
such that Aristotle is essentially human, and being such that 2+2=4. Since none of
these properties are sparse, none of them figure into Socrates’ nature and, in this way,
Socrates’ challenge is avoided.27
27One might object that singleton Socrates will have no nature, since having only Socrates as a
member will be essential to singleton Socrates, but is not a sparse property. Here, I take this to be
the correct result: since abstract objects can be discerned from the concrete by virtue of lacking
natures, even while they might have essences.
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We have now seen that SEN can avoid Fine’s challenge and still afford essence
an ineliminable role in metaphysics, but there is a notable worry that arises from a
common view about the essential properties of things. For origin essentialists, the ma-
terial or biological origins of things are essential to them. So, for example, Nicomachus
essentially bears the relation being the son of to Aristotle. But, since relations of this
kind are not good candidates for being sparse relations (nor are the corresponding
relational properties good candidates for being sparse properties), there is a tension
between the view that these origin properties are part of individuals’ natures and the
stricture against non-sparse properties being included within individual natures.
In responding to this concern, my first point is a partisan one: for those amenable
to a Humean approach to modality, the necessary connections posited by the origin
essentialist will seem implausible and arguments in favor of origin essentialism will
not be compelling.28 Since I am sympathetic to this Humean approach, I am content
to discount these properties and relations as candidates for being essential.
Second, for the non-Humean, there are two options. The first option is to revise
one’s conception of sparseness and hold that these origin properties—contrary to the
prevailing Lewisian conception of sparse properties—are metaphysically privileged
in some way. The second option is to simply bite the bullet and hold that, while
these relations or properties are essential, they are not part of individuals’ natures.
While this might seem initially unattractive, I will argue in a moment that, if talk of
natures is context-sensitive, there is reason to believe that, in some contexts, appeal
to essences rather than sparse properties will furnish us with suitable answers to
what-questions. Granted this context-sensitive view of natures, the defender of origin
properties’ importance ought to be satisfied.
28For discussion, see MacKay (1987).
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SEN, as just presented, is unhelpfully silent on a number of issues; however, it
does illustrate how a bicameral treatment of natures—one that draws on essences and
sparse properties—provides essence an ineliminable role in answering what-questions;
however, there is a final issue to be addressed. This issue concerns the extent to
which what-questions admit of determinate answers. In the preceding, I have as-
sumed, following Fine, that there is some objective and context-insensitive standard
for answering these questions. Many are likely to think this assumption is implausible
and that the suitability of answers to what-questions will vary with context.
If this assumption is abandoned, Fine’s conception of essence is likely to be less
appealing. Even so, what I want to note prior to concluding is that, if one accepts
that what-questions are context-sensitive a slightly modified version of SEN fares
rather well. On a context-sensitive version of SEN, in asking what-questions, we are
often interested in different features of reality. On the one hand, our interest might
be modal and therefore be directed at the essential properties of things. On the other
hand, our interest might be in what things are actually like and would therefore
be directed at the sparse or fundamental properties of things. Within the context-
sensitive version of SEN, we can conceive of natures qua answers to what-questions
as context-sensitive and varying along the essential and sparse axes. So understood,
we might hold that the most eligible sense of nature is the intersection of the spares
and the essential, but that, in certain contexts, the proper answer to what-questions
are exclusively essential properties or exclusively sparse properties. In this way, the
resulting view affords the sparse and the essential a privileged status in determining
the natures of things while acknowledging that the correctness of an answer might
vary with context.
Furthermore, the modal view of essence, when supplemented with context-sensitive
version of SEN, provides an attractive way to conceive of the interaction of context
with the what-questions that drive metaphysical inquiry. For example, if our focus
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is on the modal, being rational would be a suitable answer to the question “What is
man?” since it is—let us suppose—essential but not sparse. Similarly, if sparse prop-
erties are our focus, being an electron might be a proper answer to what-questions,
despite—let us suppose—being sparse but not essential. This context-sensitive con-
ception of natures leaves open the possibility of endorsing the modal view of essence
and avoids the immodest conclusion that there is a uniquely delimited class of proper-
ties that, across all contexts, supply answers to what-questions. To be sure, it remains
an open question how to conceive of this putative context-sensitivity, but, here, I hope
to have shown that the modal view of essence can be readily supplemented with a
view of natures that is equal to the task laid out in Fine’s challenge.
7.9 Conclusion
In previous sections, I surveyed Fine’s challenge to the modal view of essence and
a number of possible responses to this challenge. While none of these responses is,
on its own, satisfactory, I have argued that a distinction between essence and nature
must be drawn to capture the disagreement between Fine and the modal deflationist.
Once this distinction is made clear, an assumption behind Fine’s challenge becomes
clear: he assumes that the modal view of essence entails the modal view of natures and
that, as a consequence, essence alone must provide answers to what-questions. I have
shown that the modal view of essence and the modal view of natures are separable,
and that, for this reason, Fine’s challenge to the modal view is unsuccessful.
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